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Abstract 
Competition law damages actions are often characterised by the uncertainty of the causal 
connection between the infringement and the harm. The anticompetitive damage consists in a pure 
economic loss caused by a market distortion. Here, the complexity of the market structures, 
combined with the interdependence of individuals’ assets, fuel this causal uncertainty.  The recently 
adopted Damages Directive, in line with the decisions of the Court of Justice of the EU, established 
a regime based on the compensatory principle, consequently giving central importance to the 
definition and to the assessment of the causal connection between the infringement of competition 
law and the harm suffered. Surprisingly, the Directive provides no guidance to the assessment of 
the causal connection. By consequence, national courts apply domestic principles of causations, 
which are deeply rooted in their legal traditions.  This thesis first addresses the concept of 
causation in competition law damages actions, discussing the main and more relevant approaches 
in tort law theory. Therefore, it describes the different solutions for the assessment of causation in 
competition law adopted by national courts and critically analyses the approach laid down by the 
European Union law and Courts. In order to examine in depth the reasons of the causal uncertainty 
in competition law damages actions, it delves into the analysis of the proof of causation and of the 
use of econometrics. The underlying comparative analysis serves, from a practical perspective, to 
observe how judges engage the problem of causal uncertainty in competition damages actions, 
while, from a theoretical standpoint, it addresses and complements the research of appropriate 
approaches.
 1 
 
 
Introduction 
Liability for compensation of private damages in European competition law is 
the result of the judicial interpretation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, which were 
designed for the public antitrust enforcement. The European Court of Justice introduced 
the principle of right to compensation for violation of competition law with the two 
seminal cases Courage
1
 and Manfredi
2
. In the latter, in particular, the Court stated that 
“any individual can claim compensation for the harm suffered where there is a causal 
relationship between that harm and an agreement or practice prohibited”3. The 
principle was then clinched into the recently approved Directive 104/2014 on 
competition damages actions
4
. The compensatory principle is based on a corrective 
justice regime where the duty to repair the damage burdens only the subjects that have 
caused the damage. 
The European Union law, however, provides few or no guidance to the judge in 
the assessment of the causal connection. The CJEU’s decisions together with the 
Directive, confer the right to stand to any individual harmed by the infringement, but do 
not deal with the instantiation of causation. It follows that, in accordance to Article 3, 
Regulation 1/2003, national courts have to apply their domestic laws of obligations, 
within the limits traced by the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. The claimant 
in actions for damages has therefore to prove the breach of law, the damage and the 
causal connection between the two, mainly relying on the applicable national laws of 
substance and procedure. 
The analysis of antitrust litigation in Europe reveals that only a minority of cases 
are based on claims for compensation of damages. Of these cases, a very small 
proportion is initiated by indirect purchasers or subjects aggrieved by deadweight 
                                                          
1
 Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and Others ECR I-
06297 (2001). 
2
 Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA ECR 
[2006] I-06619 (2006). 
3
 Ibid., para. 61. 
4
 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on Certain 
Rules Governing Actions for Damages under National Law for Infringements of the Competition Law 
Provisions of the Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA Relevance, 349AD. 
 2 
 
losses. The fil rouge connecting these situations is the causal uncertainty of the claim 
that makes the assessment of liability particularly complex. Surprisingly, no attention 
was given by the academia to the causal connection between the infringement of 
competition law and the damage
5
. 
Damages caused by antitrust infringements are pure economic losses protected 
by EU and national laws. As such, one might not doubt the fact they are indemnifiable, 
but the causal connection with the infringement rests in a covert of thick uncertainty. An 
antitrust infringement, by definition, restricts or distorts the competition in the relevant 
market and, potentially, all individuals acting in the same market may be affected by it. 
Direct purchasers may claim the disgorgement of overcharges paid and indirect 
purchasers the compensation of the overcharge passed-through the supply chain. While 
competitors aggrieved by exclusionary conducts may claim compensation for market 
foreclosure and lost chances, to mention just few. The consumer or undertaking who 
sees her assets diminished in value would base her claim on a loss of welfare caused by 
the antitrust infringement. The problem of causation has a long and diversified history 
that shaped different approaches in the Member States legal doctrines. Hence, national 
courts tend to assess this connection adopting different standards.  
This thesis first addresses the concept of causation in claims for damages for 
infringement of competition law, discussing the main and more relevant approaches in 
tort law theory (I). Therefore, it discusses the different approaches for the assessment of 
causation in competition law in national courts (II). Then, it describes and critically 
analyses the approach adopted by the European Union law and Courts to causation (III). 
In the fourth chapter, it delves into the fundamental issues of causal uncertainty in 
competition law damages actions (IV), to which it follows the analysis of the standards 
of proof for causation (V). It will then focus on particular cases of causal uncertainty 
that have a primary role in competition law litigation (VI). A conclusion follows.
                                                          
5
 The only example being, up to the moment, Hanns A. Abele, Georg E. Kodek, and Guido K. Schaefer, 
“Proving Causation in Private Antitrust Cases,” Journal of Competition Law and Economics 7, no. 4 
(2011): 847–69. 
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I. Causation in competition law damages actions 
The European Union law grants the right to claim for damages to anyone who 
was harmed by an antitrust infringement, be they consumers, undertakings or public 
authorities
1
. This is the legacy of the Courage
2
 and Manfredi
3
 cases and also the text of 
the recently adopted Directive 104/2014
4
. However, this should not be equated to a call 
for unlimited responsibility of antitrust infringers. The decision-maker, in each specific 
instance, has to verify the existence of a “causal relationship between the harm suffered 
and the prohibited arrangement”5. It is, indeed, through the filter of causation that 
national courts select the damages that are compensated for the infringement of EU 
competition law.  Despite this, the attention of scholars has generally focussed on the 
right to stand and on the quantification of damages
6
. The Damages Directive solved, 
once and for all, the doubts regarding the right to stand, according it to any legal or 
natural person who has suffered a harm caused by a violation of competition law. On 
the other hand, the Directive explicitly avoids dealing with causation and leaves its 
definition to the Member States laws of obligation. Competition law damages actions 
show a marked causal uncertainty. Meaningfully, the impact study ordered by the 
Commission in 2007 pointed out that “it seems that the success of a claim in the EU 
                                                          
1
 Article 1 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 
on Certain Rules Governing Actions for Damages under National Law for Infringements of the 
Competition Law Provisions of the Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA Relevance, 
349AD.Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA 
[2006] ECR  I-06619. 
2
 Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and Others [2001] 
ECR I-06297. 
3
 Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA [2006] 
ECR I-06619. 
4
 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on Certain 
Rules Governing Actions for Damages under National Law for Infringements of the Competition Law 
Provisions of the Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA Relevance, OJ L 349 
5.12.2014, 1–19. 
5
 Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA [2006] 
ECR I-06619, para 17. 
6
 Ever since the adoption of Regulation 1/2003 academic research has tried to analyse and define such 
requirements. Scholars have tried to explain the proof of the antitrust infringement, to smooth the hurdles 
for the quantification of the damages and to proposed solutions to several procedural rules. The 
quantification of damages may become particularly complex in antitrust litigation, because of the deep 
use of econometrics and economic theories. However, judges generally have the power to estimate the 
amount of damages, avoiding therefore their precise calculation. 
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would be dependent on whether the plaintiff is actually able to prove causation”7. 
Despite this, causation in competition law litigation continues to be one of the most 
underexplored topics on both sides of the Atlantic
8
.  From this comes the need to 
identify a proper theory of causation for antitrust litigation
9
. 
 
1.1. Empirical analysis of competition law damages actions in European 
Union: the importance of researching causation 
The analysis of empirical data on national litigation shows that where the 
causation link is more difficult to be found, the action is not proposed or is, in many 
cases, quashed by the judge
10
. For instance, only a minority of the actions submitted in 
the domestic systems are purported by indirect purchasers and the majority of them 
have been rejected by national judges. Moreover, the relatively low success rate in 
follow-on claims shows the difficulties encountered by private parties in proving that 
the damage to the market is causally linked to a precise prejudice suffered
11
. When the 
                                                          
7
 Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) and Luiss Guido 
Carli (LUISS), ‘Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU: Welfare Impact and 
Potential Scenarios’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf> accessed 
8 May 2014, 36. 
8
 See in the U.S., Michael A. Carrier, “A Tort-Based Causation Framework for Antitrust Analysis,” 
Antitrust Law Journal 77 (2011): 991; similarly observe for the EU, Ioannis Lianos and Damien Geradin, 
Handbook on European Competition Law: Substantive Aspects (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013); Ioannis 
Lianos and Christos Genakos, “Econometric Evidence in EU Competition Law: An Empirical and 
Theoretical Analysis,” CLES Research Paper Series 06/12, October 1, 2012, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2184563. 
9
 This is the observation made in the only paper published, at present on the topic: Hanns A. Abele, Georg 
E. Kodek, and Guido K. Schaefer, “Proving Causation in Private Antitrust Cases,” Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics 7, no. 4 (2011): 847–69. 
10
 I based my empirical analysis on some investigations already done in the field of private enforcement 
of competition law. I added updates and integrations but, above all, I analysed the aggregate data with 
reference to causation that none of these works have ever taken into consideration. 
11
 See, for instance, in France: Tribunal de Commerce de Nanterre, Arkopharma v. Hoffmann La Roche, 
11 May 2006; Tribunal de Commerce de Paris, Laboratoires JUVA v. Hoffmann La Roche, 26 January 
2007; Cour d'Appel de Paris, SNC Doux Aliments Bretagne etc v. SAS Ajinamoto Eurolysine, no. 
07/10478, 10 June 2009; Cour de Cassation, Doux Aliments v Ajinomoto Eurolyne, no. 09-15816, 15 
June 2010. In Italy, recently: Tribunale di Milano, Brennercom Spa v. Telecom Italia Spa, no. 
14802/2011, 3 March 2014; Tribunale di Milano, Brennercom Spa v. Telecom Italia Spa, no. 22423/2010 
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national competition authority has already proven the anticompetitive behaviour, the 
claimant only needs to substantiate the damage and the causative link. While the 
claimant holds generally all the information necessary to prove the harm, the thorniest 
hurdle rest with the causation requirement. 
The studies undertaken show that, at least in the period 1999-2014, the majority 
of claims are proposed by direct purchasers, while only a small part of these actions 
have been proposed by other classes of claimants, such as indirect purchasers. The 
reasons of this poor representation may be of different nature. The information 
asymmetry between parties and the hurdles to access relevant evidences may have 
played a role. A second factor may be the uncertain right to stand for such classes of 
claimants in some jurisdiction, until the recent decisions of the CJEU and enforcement 
of the Damages Directive. Moreover, consumers may be discouraged from bringing a 
claim for competition law damages, given that there is no common collective redress
12
 
system in Europe and that the existing ones produce insufficient results
13
. Finally, 
indirect purchasers, counterfactual buyers and other subjects who claim similar losses, 
may find particularly difficult to substantiate causation. This volatility translates into a 
rather consistent uncertainty of the causal link between the loss and the infringement. 
Some studies inform that part of these damages are not left uncompensated, 
since parties often prefer settlement agreements or arbitration proceedings, above all in 
follow on actions
14
. However, even taking into consideration these settlements, the 
damages caused by antitrust infringements to these private parties appear to be in great 
part uncompensated. Moreover, the preference of these subjects for settlements 
                                                                                                                                                                          
27 December 2013; Tribunale di Milano, OkCom Spa v. Telecom Italia Spa, no. 76568/2008, 13 
February 2013; Tribunale di Milano, Teleunit Spa v. Vodafone Omnitel Spa, no. 75623/2008, 1 October 
2013. In England:   JJB Sports Plc v Office of Fair Trading [2004] CAT 17, [2005] Comp. A.R. 29; 
Healthcare at Home v Genzyme Ltd [2006] CAT 29; Napp Pharmaceuticals Holdings Ltd v Director 
General of Fair Trading [2002] CAT 1; Devenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis SA (France) & Ors (Rev 
1) [2008] EWCA Civ 1086. 
12
 Consumers are often indirect purchasers of goods or services subject to the infringement and their 
interest to claim for damages independently is generally frustrated by lack of knowledge about the 
underlying antitrust infringement and the litigation costs as compared to the value of goods or services 
purchased. 
13
 Towards a Coherent European Approach on Collective Redress, SEC(2011)  4.2.201, 4 February 2011. 
14
 See UK Report in Barry Rodger, Competition Law, Comparative Private Enforcement and Collective 
Redress Across the EU (Kluwer Law International, 2014). 
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procedures over judicial claims are a further clue of their attempt to avoid the 
representation of uncertain elements of the action, first of all, causation. 
The empirical analysis is developed with reference to four European Member 
states, in particular United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and France. The choice hinged on 
reasons of dimension of their economies, number of cases and diversity of the 
approaches adopted by national courts. In all four selected countries, the majority of 
actions use competition law as a defence, generally to oppose the nullity of the contract 
that the claimant wants to enforce
15
. In this regard, the European Commission estimates 
that only 25% of the final cartel and antitrust prohibition decisions taken in the period 
2006-2012 were followed by private damages actions
16
.  
Therefore, despite the active role of antitrust authorities that have found and 
fined tens of infringement each year, private enforcement of competition law is mainly 
used as a counterclaim by defendants. The ratio of success in private claims is 
consistently higher for counterclaims than in damages claims based on competition 
law
17
. The low percentage of follow-on damages actions and, in general the scarce 
representation of damages claims, sided with the low success ratio show that damages 
claims are deterred by the procedural and substantial hurdles of domestic procedures.  
As noted, in follow-on claims the plaintiff is relieved from the burden of proving 
the antitrust infringement, having to substantiate only damage felt and causation. 
Therefore, without taking into consideration possible procedural mistakes of the 
claimant, we have to believe that the main hurdle for claimants resides in the causation. 
Among the analysed jurisdictions, the UK is the one with the highest success 
rate for damages claims, although it is still below a sufficient threshold. In UK the 
success rate is indeed about 40%, with only 32 cases where one of the litigants 
successfully claimed the application of competition law, in the period 2009-2014
18
. Of 
these 32 cases, however, 25 were active claims that ended successfully.  Moreover, only 
                                                          
15
 Ibid. See also the national Reports attached for the interested countries. 
16
 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying Document to the White Paper on Damages 
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules - Impact Assessment, 2008 para 52. 
17
 German Report, Rodger, Competition Law, Comparative Private Enforcement and Collective Redress 
Across the EU, 21. 
18
 UK Report, ibid., 13. 
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two of all the follow-on claims before the CAT, have ended in a final judgment. 
Between them, only one was successful
19
. The United Kingdom, however, is an 
exception among the analysed countries since the success rate of damages actions 
resulted in any case to be the highest, at least if taken into consideration damages 
actions ended up with a settlement, since damages awards by courts have been 
extremely rare.  In Italy, for instance, in the period 1999-2012 there have been 133 
decisions by courts concerning the application of competition law, of which 54 were 
stand-alone and 44 follow-on (the remaining 35 being non-classified).  
Notwithstanding these signs and despite the fact that some studies already 
admonished about the perilous nature of causation in private claims based on 
competition law
20
, the attention of regulators and experts has been focused on aspects of 
the antitrust actions other than the causal link
21
. 
 
1.2.  The causal connection in competition law damages actions 
Causation can be approached as a unitary topic, mostly from an epistemological 
point of view
22. However, as already remarked in philosophy, causation is “one word 
[but] many things”23. At the eyes of the lawyer, the link between a conduct and a 
specific event is not necessarily the result of a deterministic model for which causation 
is the conjunction between the two. Causation in the law is a particularly elusive 
                                                          
19
 UK Report, ibid., 21. 
20
 See, for instance, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), 
and Luiss Guido Carli (LUISS), “Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU: Welfare 
Impact and Potential Scenarios”, 36; Green Paper - Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust 
Rules SEC (2005) 1732 COM/2005, 672, 2005, 62; Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying 
Document to the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules - Impact 
Assessment; Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain Rules 
Governing Actions for Damages under National Law for Infringements of the Competition Law 
Provisions of the Member States and of the European Union.  COM(2013) 404, 2013, paragraph 4.2. 
21
 Such as the related but different topic of the information asymmetry which is capable to preclude the 
substantiation of infringements 
22
 Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies, The Oxford Handbook of Causation (Oxford 
University Press, 2009); Jon Williamson, “Causal Pluralism versus Epistemic Causality” Philosophica-
Gent 77 (2006): 69. 
23
 Nancy Cartwright, “Causation: One Word, Many Things” Philosophy of Science 71, no. 5 (2004): 805–
20. 
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concept whose definition is influenced by the extent and importance of the other 
elements of the non-contractual obligation.  
 
a. Causation and the anticompetitive harm 
In antitrust litigation, the assessment of causation is in first instance influenced 
by the rule of law it triggers and by the type of harm claimed. Infringements of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU may cause two different kinds of effects. Firstly, they often bring 
about the imposition of a price overcharge on all the units actually sold. Secondly, they 
may cause the so-called lost-volume effect, which is a dead-weight welfare loss
24
. 
European Union law does not exclude any of these damages as a matter of principle. 
The Directive has recently confirmed the strict adherence of EU law to the principle of 
compensation, excluding from its application punitive, multiple and similar damages
25
. 
By consequence, both the harm for price overcharge and for lost-volume effect (without 
comma) obliges the tortfeasor to compensate actual loss and loss of profits, plus the 
payment of interests
26
.  
The damage caused by an antitrust infringement is a pure economic loss, as it 
arises from the infringement without connection to personal injury or property damage. 
Although some European countries are still discussing about the compensable nature of 
pure economic losses
27
, when these losses are caused by antitrust infringements they 
may be compensated in all the Member States as they originate from the violation of a 
statutorily protected interests (articles 101 and 102 TFEU). However, they keep the 
typical traits of causal uncertainty surrounding pure economic losses. The damage in 
antitrust infringement consists indeed in a loss of welfare; the person aggrieved by the 
                                                          
24
 For a description of loss-volume effect in competition law see Kai Hüschelrath and Heike Schweitzer, 
Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Europe: Legal and Economic Perspectives 
(Springer, 2014), 127. 
25
 Article 3 (3). 
26
 Article 3 (2). 
27
 For instance, to some extent, United Kingdom and Germany; see Mauro Bussani and Vernon Valentine 
Palmer, Pure Economic Loss in Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2003); Vernon V. Palmer and 
Mauro Bussani, Pure Economic Loss: New Horizons in Comparative Law (Taylor & Francis, 2009); Jef 
De Mot, “Pure Economic Loss” in Tort Law and Economics, ed. Michael Faure (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2009), 201. 
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infringement has to demonstrate that she would be better off but-for the competition law 
restriction. The claimant has to show that the diminution of her assets, as a consequence 
of higher prices paid, lost chances or dead-weight losses, was caused by the antitrust 
infringement and not by other market factors. The particularly difficult task of 
ascertaining such causative link is effectively summed by Benson who, with reference 
to pure economic losses taking place on the market, observes that “[T]he fact that every 
individual is somewhere and is making use of some external objects, with the result that 
he or his property is put into relation with them and is subject to being affected by 
conduct that affects them, is an inevitable incident of being active in the world . . . 
[considered as] beings who exist in space and time and who are inescapably active and 
purposive, persons are necessarily and always connected in manifold ways with other 
things which they can affect and which in turn can affect them as part of a causal 
sequence”28. 
 
b. Causation and the type of anticompetitive conduct 
From the point of view of the behaviour causing harm, it is possible to 
differentiate between harm from exclusionary conduct and harm from exploitative 
abuses and cartels
29
. 
The first type of anticompetitive conduct aims at foreclosing the market to other 
competitors and new comers
30
. This target can be pursued through both a cartel and the 
                                                          
28
 Benson, Peter, “The Basis for Excluding Liability for Economic Loss in Tort Law” in Philosophical 
Foundations of Tort Law, ed. David G. Owen, 1995, 443; Bussani and Palmer, Pure Economic Loss in 
Europe, 4 footnote n. 2. 
29
 For a thorough overview of the discipline see Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Fundamentals of 
Antitrust Law (Aspen Publishers Online 2011), 6-23; Jürgen Basedow and Wolfgang Wurmnest, 
Structure and Effects in EU Competition Law: Studies on Exclusionary Conduct and State Aid (Kluwer 
Law International 2011); Robert Pitofsky, How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Efect of 
Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. 
Antitrust (Oxford University Press 2008), p. 142 ss; Gustavo Ghidini, Marcello Clarich, Fabiana Di Porto 
e Piergaetano Marchetti, Concorrenza e mercato. Rassegna degli orientamenti dell’autorità garante 
(2009) (Giuffrè Editore 2010), 21. 
30
 Basedow and Wurmnest, Structure and Effects in EU Competition Law. 
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abuse of a dominant position
31
, for example by fixing predatory prices. In these cases 
the injured parties are those who, as a consequence of the unlawful behaviour, have 
been excluded or foreclosed from the market. However, a number of different causes 
can concur to the exit of such undertakings from the relevant market. The causal link 
therefore has to establish with a certain degree of probability that it is the antitrust 
infringement that caused the foreclosure of the competitor, not other concurring factors.  
In this connection, causation responds also to the need of avoiding that the 
injured party is unjustly enriched by the claim. For instance it can happen that a 
competitor claims that its exit from the market causally depends on the anticompetitive 
behaviour of another firm when, instead, it would have in any case happen. Other events 
interrupt the chain of causality, making the antitrust infringement ineffectual for the 
causation of the damage. In these cases, therefore, the damages are not awarded, given 
the compensatory nature of the proceeding and the lack of a direct causal link between 
the unlawful behaviour and the damage. Moreover, the risk embedded in the exercise of 
an economic activity cannot be reversed on the antitrust infringer
32
 in absence of a 
causal nexus (i.e. in those cases where, even if the cartel would have not been set, the 
damage would have happened). 
In the second type of anticompetitive conducts, amounting to an exploitative 
behaviour through unlawful agreements or abuse of dominant position, the infringer 
fixes a price, which is overcharged. The damage consists in the overcharge itself 
multiplied for the number of purchases. Depending on the type and length of the market 
chain, the anticompetitive conduct can involve different subjects at the same time. The 
number of damaged parties can increase uncontrollably, from direct purchasers of the 
goods or services to indirect purchasers, to whom the overcharge is passed on through 
the market chain. The line of injured parties can be extended till the final consumer who 
- as a last user - receives the good or service. Here is touchable the temptation for the 
judge to identify the proof of the anticompetitive behaviour with the evidence about the 
existence of a damage, skipping therefore the assessment of causation.  
                                                          
31
 Michele Roma ‘Abuso escludente mediante contratto’ in Antonio Catricalà, I contratti nella 
concorrenza (UTET Giuridica 2011), chapter 6, 246 ff. 
32
 Pietro Trimarchi, Causalità e danno (Giuffrè, 1967). 
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Finally, national law of obligations have to be interpreted in accordance with the 
European Union law that they trigger (c.d. duty of consistent interpretation)
33
. 
If so, we should ask what characteristics identify the causation for antitrust 
infringement. European jurisdictions generally reconnect the illicit antitrust behaviour 
to the general rules on non-contractual liability
34
. It would therefore come natural to 
state that the same rules that find application in tort law have to be enforced in 
competition law litigation. However, damages for infringements of competition law 
proved to have peculiarities, which distinguish them from other torts. Antitrust 
infringements very often impact on sophisticated supply chains working in highly 
complex market structures
35
, which make the identification of causative links 
particularly difficult. 
This chapter sorts out the analysis of causation into three different parts. Firstly, 
it examines the different theories used for assessing the causative link in competition 
law. Since European competition law jurisdictions draw these principles from domestic 
tort laws, the analysis will be initially centred on the explanation of the most relevant 
aspects of these approaches. Secondly, the causation in antirust is revised with reference 
to the anticompetitive behaviour. Here it is described the link connecting the behaviour 
to the damage (cause in fact or material cause). In this regard, the chapter also considers 
the different categories of conditions used in the causal inquiry. Thirdly, it comments on 
the different approaches to legal causation. This part regards the analysis of the types of 
damages that can be linked to the antitrust infringement. In other words, the analysis 
here tends to frame the concept of causation in order to find the limits of the potentially 
vast recoverable damages that might spawn from the antitrust infringement. 
 
                                                          
33
 Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies, and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law: Cases and Materials 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010), 296. 
34
 See further chapter III for a comparative overview of the different approaches. 
35
 David Ashton and David Henry, Competition Damages Actions in the EU: Law and Practice (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2013), 39. 
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1.3. Causation theories: a primer 
A meta-approach to causation aims at the creation of general rules able to 
identify appropriate links for any relation of agency-effect
36
. Question arises, however, 
on whether a specific agency is cause of some other events, or only their occasion, a 
mere condition, or part of the circumstances in which the cause operated
37
. In this 
regard Hart and Honoré wonder if there are any principles governing the selection of the 
set of conditions of events or if it is arbitrary, irrational, the mere survival of the 
metaphysical beliefs in the superior ‘potency’ possessed by some events38. While causal 
uncertainty cannot be fully displaced, correct use of theories on causation can help to 
unravel the connections between antitrust infringements and private damages. Without 
any pretention to be exhaustive, the following chapter aims at describing these theories 
and the approaches on causation that are particularly relevant for the analysis of 
antitrust infringements. 
Causation expounds three main functions: is forward looking, backward looking 
and explanatory and, finally, attributive
39
.  The first function tends to a description of 
the conditions that lead to certain results. Therefore, it focuses on the studies of 
conditions in order to give predictions about outcomes and foster prevention
40
. The 
second function relates instead more closely to the language and reasoning of law. 
Causation serves indeed to spot from a given set of conditions the one that can explain 
an event or a class of events
41
. The third function is attributive as well as the second and 
serves to attribute responsibility to a specific agent
42
.  
Outside the law, two seminal approaches have founded the entire scientific and 
philosophical speculation: the empirical method of Hume and the metaphysical forged 
                                                          
36
 Julian Reiss, “Causation in the Social Sciences: Evidence, Inference, and Purpose” Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences 39, no. 1 (2009): 20–40. 
37
 HLA Hart and Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law (Oxford University Press 1985), 112. 
38
 Ibid., 17. 
39
 Antony Honoré, “Causation in the Law” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta, Winter 2010, 2010, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/causation-law/. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Ibid. 
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by Kant
43
. Of them, only the former developed into the legal discourse
44
. For Hume 
causation can only be established in terms of empirical regularities involving classes of 
events, by calling “to mind their constant conjunction in all past instances”45. John 
Stuart Mill further built on this elaboration of regularity theories prosing a system of 
inductive inference for causal reasoning
46
. 
The subsequent philosophical and scientific doctrine developed on these basis a 
number of other theories and definitions, such as the counterfactual, for which it is a 
cause “something that makes a difference, and the difference it makes must be a 
difference from what would have happened without it”47, the statistical model48, the 
‘structural equation modelling’49 and others50. However, they all have in common the 
research of an explanation of existing links between facts, while they differ in the means 
of research and on the description they give of the same connection.  
Differently the lawyer is not content with finding connection between events 
because only legally relevant antecedent can determine the event and therefore become 
cause of it. Since Collingwood
51
 the quest of a specific notion of causation related to 
                                                          
43
 John David Collins, Edward Jonathan Hall, and Laurie Ann Paul, Causation and Counterfactuals (MIT 
Press, 2004). 
44
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Metaphysics (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
45
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Nature, 1817., 87/61. 
46
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have every circumstance save one in common, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in 
which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the 
phenomenon” John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View 
of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation (Harper & Brothers, 1858)., p. 
455. 
47
 David Lewis, “Causation” The Journal of Philosophy, 1973, 556–67. 
48
 See in particular the the ‘Neyman-Rubin Model’,  Donald B. Rubin, “Causal Inference Using Potential 
Outcomes” Journal of the American Statistical Association 100, no. 469 (2005). 
49
 Roy J. Epstein, A History of Econometrics (North-Holland Amsterdam, 1987). 
50
 John Losee, Theories of Causality: From Antiquity to the Present (Transaction Publishers, 2012). 
51
 R. G. Collingwood, “Causation in Practical Natural Science” RG. Collingwood, An Essay on 
Metaphysics. Revised Edition. R Martin, Ed, 1940, 286–312. 
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legal responsibility has become independent. In other words, the role of the independent 
conception of legal theory of causation is to define the meaning of the word cause (and 
its several synonyms) in statutes, regulations and judicial decisions
52
. 
Compared to other disciplines
53
, causation in law requires the analysis of only 
some circumstances that are valuable for detecting the causal connection. In other 
words, only some items of the event are legally relevant to the causation of the damage. 
For instance, in case of a cartel the fact that the tortfeasor sold the good subject to 
infringement to the claimant and that an overcharge was applied to the market price are 
certainly relevant aspects of the agency, while information about the characteristics of 
that good or its colour may have no standing for establishing causation. These remarks 
are important to understand the hurdles that national judges and authorities have to 
overcome in deciding about causation in antitrust cases, where the burden of proof is 
very often rooted in highly complex econometric theories whose interpretation of 
economic causality often and easily overlaps with the one of legal causation
54
. For the 
same reason it is fundamental to understand the use of the causal theories in tort law in 
order to consciously apply them in competition damages actions. 
The difficulty to define causation is exacerbated by the different legal traditions 
of civil and common law countries, which show quite distant definitions of material and 
legal causation. This problem can well explain the reason for the adoption of a rather 
general definition of causation in the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) on 
Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law
55
, slightly deepened 
in the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL)
56
. 
                                                          
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Included economics that in competition law plays a fundamental role, see further para 6.6. 
54
 For an analysis of the differences between causality and causation see further para 6.6. 
55
 Article 4:101 “General rule 
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Despite the different legal backgrounds, both civil law and common law 
countries deploy a two-stage inquiry approach to causation, where firstly the judge 
establishes the existence of material causation between the events submitted to the court 
and their effects. Secondly, the judge has to select the causes which are legally relevant 
for the causation of the damage
57
, delimiting the damages that the defendant is bound to 
compensate.  
 
1.4. Causation in fact 
The factual connection between the defendant’s conduct and the harm is 
generally established on the basis of the ‘conditio sine qua non’ test or of probability 
theories.  
The but-for test (or conditio sine qua non) is probably the most immediate 
among the different approaches, since it compels the ruling out of the fact under 
scrutiny
58
. An act is the cause of an injury if the injury would have in any case 
happened, but-for the conduct of the defendant
59
. In other words, the but-for test “asks 
the question -- would the accident have occurred but for the defendant's negligence? If 
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 For an introduction to the two-stage causation framework, see, among the others, Cees Van Dam, 
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Pub Co 1984); Cees van Dam, European Tort Law (Oxford University Press 2013); Håkan Andersson 
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the answer is that the accident would have occurred even without the defendant's 
negligence, there is no causation"
60
. Despite its clarity, this test contrasts with solutions 
of common sense when over-determination and joint determination are involved. The 
most diffuse example to show this downside of the theory is the one of the two men 
both shooting at the same time at the victim, a third man, who dies. Given that both 
shots would alone be fatal, the application of the but-for test brings to the paradoxical 
result for which neither the first nor the second shot would be cause of the victim’s 
death. The same problem would reappear in other instances of multiple causes. In 
competition law damages actions, it may happen, for instance, that the exclusionary 
conduct of two undertakings, each of them individually capable of foreclosing the 
competitor, are deemed as non-causes of the harm. 
There are different theories on how to overcome this hurdle. The counterfactual 
reasoning of the but-for test is based on generalisations that are the main critical points 
for those who support NESS (necessary element of a sufficient set) theory
61
. This test 
has been designed by Hart and Honoré
62
, and later refined by Wright
63
 who pointed out 
that an act is a cause of an injury if it is a “necessary element of a set of conditions 
jointly sufficient for the result”64. In other words, this test “states that a particular 
condition was a cause of a specific consequence if and only if it was a necessary 
element of a set of antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of 
the consequence”65. The NESS test draws on J.S.Mill’s notion of a jointly sufficient set 
of conditions and uses the logic of conditions, mixing sufficient and necessary elements 
of the event in order to select the material cause of the event. The result is that the 
decision maker has to employ causal generalisations in order to assert the singular 
                                                          
60
 Supreme Court Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 
1210 
61
 Hart and Honoré, Causation in the Law. 
62
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63
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Response to Criticisms’, R. Goldberg, ed., Perspectives on Causation (Hart Publishing 2011), available at 
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64
 Wright, “Causation in Tort Law”. 
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causal judgment
66
. A further result is that each set of conditions can be a cause or not of 
a specific event, while no gradation is admitted. The NESS test would help to solve the 
typical conundrums spotting when ‘too many conditions’ are present. By turn, however, 
this test is limited to a specific set of circumstances to find application. 
The opposers of this theory
67, as well as of the other ‘counterfactual’ theories 
based on causal generalisations
68
, note that the NESS test hinges on causal 
generalisation
69
 that cannot be applied when organic processes, such as the decision-
making activity by human beings, are at stake, since such processes do not conform to 
settled patterns
70
. This doctrine proposes quantitative or scalar approaches which 
measure the extent of causation of an event rather than a certain causal link
71
. In 
particular, for instances of multiple causes coexisting in the causation of the same event, 
these scholars created the quantitative theory according to which an agency is a cause of 
                                                          
66
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a harm if it is involved in
72
 or contributes to
73
 the damage to a greater or less extent. 
Based on this theory, the agency must be a substantial factor of the damage in order to 
be legally a cause of it
74
. This selection takes place thanks to the use of probability, 
statistics or other scientific laws. These theories have also been labelled as 
individualizing theories as opposed to the generalizing such as the but-for test
75
. 
Without embracing such approaches, Trimarchi instead advanced the idea that judges 
should gauge liability on the basis of the relevance of the different causal variable 
within the damage
76
.  
In application of the NESS theory, the actual loss and the lost profits are 
factually linked to the anticompetitive conduct, if the exploitative abuse or the 
exclusionary conduct was a necessary element among all the market conditions in order 
to cause the damage. Differently, for the individualising theories, it is enough to state 
that the anticompetitive conduct contributed to a certain extent to the damage. 
 
1.5. Categories of conditions for causal connection 
A different point of view in the causal enquiry analyses causation through the 
logic of conditions. A first ‘distinction’ is between necessary and sufficient conditions77. 
An action is a necessary condition if the harm would not have occurred if the action had 
not taken place (conditio sine qua non)
78
. An action is a sufficient condition of a harm, 
if that type of action is always followed by that type of harm (causa efficiens or causa 
                                                          
72
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causans)
79
. This system of conditions is useful in order to explain the weight of control 
of the agent over the events. On this point Hellner observes that the actions 
corresponding to a sufficient condition exercise positive control over the action
80
. 
Differently, necessary conditions mark the presence of a negative control over the 
action
81
. The two conditions contribute to explain the type and extent of control of the 
agent over the action. 
Competition law litigation is based on the formulation of hypothetical scenarios 
having the scope to illustrate a counterfactual universe through economic laws
82
. A 
number of coexisting conditions influence the assets of every individual active on the 
market. By consequence, a loss of welfare might be caused by any of them. For 
instance, in case of damages caused by the exit of a competitor from a monopolised 
relevant market, the abuse of dominant position may be a sufficient condition but not a 
necessary one of the damage. The exit of the undertaking might depend indeed on 
structural inefficiencies of the company. 
Peczenik built on the logic of conditions, in order to make it useful tool for the 
assessment of the proof of causation. If the action is both a sufficient and a necessary 
condition of the harm, we have a strong causation
83
. On the other side, Peczenik 
observes that when the action is a sufficient condition that participated with other 
conditions to the causation of the event, and therefore is not necessary, we would talk 
about weak causation
84
. 
 
1.6. Legal causation and the selection of damages 
The effects originating from a specific agency are different and possibly diverse. 
All of them are de facto linked to the agency but not necessarily should be attributed to 
                                                          
79
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the agent. The legal causation is the second stage of the causal enquiry and has the 
function of limiting the compensable damages
85
. The criteria for delimiting such 
consequences are different. While some jurisdictions refer to the concept of remoteness, 
others focus on specific characteristics of the damages
86
 or at the scope of the infringed 
rule. Hence, while in English law the cause should not be too remote
87
, in US the 
leading principle for courts is the one of a proximate causation
88
. Civil law countries 
show a wide range of approaches, which span from the direct and adequate causes to the 
scope of the rule theory, and the ‘causal regularity’ theory89.  
However, the difference between factual and legal causation can be particularly 
faded to the extent that the limit between the two may become extremely difficult to 
ascertain
90
. Moreover, some authors maintain that the concept of legal causation hides 
public policy reasons behind a curtain of ‘generalizing theories’. This was the view of 
the so-called legal realists
91
, also called causal minimalist
92
, who stated that there is 
only one causal issue in tort law that is the causation-in-fact, while all other aspects are 
mere instruments in the hands of judges to exercise broad discretion in their own 
decisions
93
.  
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 The responses to these critiques, and in defence of the two-stage causal test, 
have been of two types. Firstly, facing the failure of courts to deal with causation as a 
mere material and policy-neutral account, some authors noted that causation-in-fact is 
permeated by policy considerations
94
. Secondly, Hart and Honoré rightly noted that 
common-sense judgments are characterised by nonlegal causal language, which is 
fundamental not only for the description of the cause-in-fact but also for most of the 
proximate-cause issues
95
. Therefore, theorist such as Hart and Honorè
96
 and Moore
97
, 
believe that legal causation can fruitfully borrow from other disciplines the items and 
reasoning to delimit causal grounds respectively ordinary usage and metaphysics of 
causation. Moreover, it should be noted that the scope of legal causation is to set a limit 
to liability that, otherwise, would be uncontrollably at the mercy of factual connections. 
These limits, if not present in nature, have to be found in common sense or, in 
alternative, in the broader scope that the rule of law intends to pursue.  
All in all, the division between factual and legal causation is not a neat one. 
However, critics to a division of the assessment of causation become rather misleading, 
if we think at factual and legal causation as two phases of a process rather than two 
independent concepts. Moreover, in this regard, we should think that causation is a link 
between facts, not a fact itself. Hence, the two-stage process is a method useful to test 
under different perspectives the relevance of the conditions of the harm. 
In competition law damages actions the distinction between cause-in-fact and 
legal cause becomes even thinner but, paradoxically, particularly important. Every 
anticompetitive conduct, be it an abuse of dominant position or a cartel, may bring 
about several different effects on the assets of market actors, all of them factually linked 
to the infringement but not necessarily legally compensable. For instance, an 
exploitative conduct, which effects into a price overcharge, may cause an actual loss 
together with a possible loss of profits for a reduction in sales, to the undertaking that 
uses those products as part of its output. Possibly, the damaged purchaser might 
complain about a lost chance caused by the higher cost of its outputs or by a missed 
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purchase of a particular good, due to the  higher expenditure caused by the cartel. 
Moreover, due to the lost profits, the purchaser would foreseeably reduce the production 
and the purchase of other goods from her suppliers. The supplier of this undertaking 
would be, by consequence, damaged by the infringement as well, as but-for the 
overcharge they would have sold more units. Now, the level of factual causation in all 
the different heads of damages listed is theoretically the same since the competition law 
infringement is a necessary cause of the damage. However, there are sound reasons to 
severe from a causal perspective the damages due to the overcharge paid on the price to, 
for instance, damages caused to the direct purchasers for buying alternative goods or for 
lost chances.  
To this problem, the European Member States’ tort law regimes respond with 
different solutions, that the following chapter analyses with reference to the four 
selected jurisdictions.
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II. Comparative analysis of causation in national courts 
National courts have generally embraced the two-fold account for causation in 
virtually all Member States
1
. However, the different national tort law systems seek this 
objective in different ways. National judges enforce competition law rules largely 
relying on their domestic laws of obligations. However, many of the usual divides 
deployed in comparative tort law fail to describe some of the peculiarities of 
competition law litigation, especially with reference to causation. The first reason is 
that, the legal traditions of some national systems struggles to accept, from a substantive 
point of view, the pure economic loss as a compensable head of damage. The traditional 
comparative division between civil law and common law jurisdictions here loses 
importance. Indeed, while German law, together with English and US law has always 
wondered about the possibility to compensate ‘pure economic losses’, arguing about 
their vagueness and remoteness, in other systems, such as in France, these losses do not 
even constitute an autonomous category and are generally deemed compensable as lost 
chances
2
. Differently, the standard of proof of the causative link is still deeply 
entrenched in the traditional divide which opposes common law to civil law countries. 
Aware of this diversity, the European Group on Tort Law opted for a rather 
comprehensive rule in drafting the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL), relying on 
the foreseeability of the harm, risk rules and the scope of the liability
3
.  
 
                                                          
1
 Cees Van Dam, European Tort Law (Oxford University Press, 2013), 308. 
2
 Mauro Bussani and Vernon Valentine Palmer, Pure Economic Loss in Europe (Cambridge University 
Press, 2003). 
3
 Art. 3:201, European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law, 2005, available at 
http://www.egtl.org/: “Scope of Liability 
Where an activity is a cause within the meaning of Section 1 of this Chapter, whether and to what extent 
damage may be attributed to a person depends on factors such as 
a) the foreseeability of the damage to a reasonable person at the time of the activity, taking into 
account in particular the closeness in time or space between the damaging activity and its consequence, 
or the magnitude of the damage in relation to the normal consequences of such an activity; 
b) the nature and the value of the protected interest (Article 2:102); 
c) the basis of liability (Article 1:101); 
d) the extent of the ordinary risks of life; and 
e) the protective purpose of the rule that has been violated.” 
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2.1. Germany 
The German law of obligations has been defined as “narrow in tort but wide in 
contract”4. This definition refers in particular to the ban of pure economic losses as 
compensable damages, unless they are not consequence of the infringement of a 
statutorily protected interest. This is one of the reasons that explain the early adoption of 
a specific Statute on antitrust enforcement, amended in 2005 with the adoption of the 
7th Amendment to the Law against Restraints of Competition
5
 (ARC). Article 33(1) of 
the ARC provides that whoever causes harm by negligent infringement of competition 
law shall be liable for compensation. The ARC however provides no special rules on the 
assessment of causation. Therefore, the general principles of tort law find application.    
The German civil code first introduced the adequate causal theory approach
6
 
(“Adäquanztheorie”), in order to filter the damages compensable after the application of 
the conditio sine qua non test. A cause is therefore adequate “if it has in a general and 
appreciable way enhanced the objective possibility of a consequence of the kind that 
occurred. In making the necessary assessment account is to be taken only of (a) all the 
circumstances recognisable by an ‘optimal’ observer at the time the event occurred, (b) 
the additional circumstances known to the originator of the condition”7. The 
‘enhancement’ of objective possibility of damage, soon became an objective probability 
of causation of a certain event
8
. The adequate causal theory is flawed by its abstract 
nature that detaches the analysis from the concrete role of agency in the production of 
                                                          
4
 Bussani and Palmer, Pure Economic Loss in Europe, 148. 
5
 Siebtes Gesetz Zur Änderung Des Gesetzes Gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, Bundesgesetzblatt 
(BGBl.) 2005, Part I, 1954-1969, 2005. 
6
 Initially postulated by Carl Ludwig von Bar, Zur Lehre von Versuch und Theilnahme am Verbrechen 
(Hahn, 1859). and Von Kries, Johannes, Die Principien Der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung, 1886. Later 
developed by Träger, Ludwig, Der Kausalbegriff Im Straf- Und Zivilrecht (Marburg - Elwert, 1904). And 
refined by Guido Calabresi, “Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr.” 
The University of Chicago Law Review, 1975, 69–108.  
7
 BGH 23 October 1951, BGHZ 3, 261VersR 1952, 128. The translation is derived from B. S. Markesinis 
and Hannes Unberath, The German Law of Torts: A Comparative Treatise (Hart Publishing, 2002). 
8
 Anthony M. Honoré, “Causation and Remoteness of Damage” in International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law, ed. A. Tunc, vol. 6, XI (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1983), para 80. 
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the event
9
. However, this theory produced a useful intuition that the cause has to be 
“apt” to generate the damage.  
Challenged by the downsides of the Adäquanztheorie, German theorists 
formulated another approach, then called the ‘scope of the rule’10 theory or ‘legal policy 
theory’11 (“Schutzzweck der Norm”). This approach maintains that the injury claimed, in 
order to be compensable, should be protected by the specific rule of law that was 
infringed
12
. For instance, bad maintenance of a public street triggers the responsibility 
of the authority which owes a specific duty of care for damages to persons who are 
involved in a car accident caused by the bad maintenance. On the other hand, the 
authority is not liable, for instance, for claims based on pure economic losses incurred 
by persons who suffer a delay because of bad maintenance
13
. This is because the scope 
of the rule is to impose to the highway authority a duty of care of the safety of road 
users and not a protection against any sort of loss the highway users might incur in. 
Other civil law countries prefer instead different approaches to legal causation 
less clearly hinging on policy reasons.  
 
2.2. France 
The French liability system for competition law damages actions is based on 
general tort law rules. Parties harmed by antitrust infringements can therefore claim 
damages under Article 1382 of the French Civil Code
14
 for which “Any act of a person 
                                                          
9
 H. L. A. Hart and Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law (Oxford University Press, 1985), 465. 
10
 This theory is applied within the framework of § 823 II BGB (breach of statutory duty), § 839 
(governmental liability), and § 823 I as regards safety duties (Verkehrspflichten), the right to business 
(das Recht am Gewerbebetrieb), and the general personality right (allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht). 
11
 In particular this second definition was given by Hart and Honoré, Causation in the Law. 
12
 It is defined, within the notes to the art. 4:101 of DCFR as “an obligation to make reparation will only 
arise, if the damage claimed, according to its type and its origin, stems from a sphere of danger which the 
infringed norm was enacted to protect against” see Christian von Bar, Non-Contractual Liability Arising 
Out of Damage Caused to Another: (PEL Liab. Dam.) (Sellier, 2009)., p. 759. 
13
 Van Dam, European Tort Law, p. 314. 
14
 The statutory basis for damages actions under French law is the general regime for torts, i.e. art.1382 of 
the French Civil Code. It states the general principle that whoever anyone who caused a damage by his 
 26 
 
which causes damage to another makes him by whose fault the damage occurred to 
make reparation for the damage”15. This provision states a general principle for which 
any act which causes damages by fault obliges the tortfeasor to repair it. For the 
assessment of causation, French civil courts apply the account of the ‘direct cause’ of 
harm, based on Art. 1382 of the French Civil Code. The French system is characterised 
by a determined reluctance to define causation that remain a vague concept both in case 
law and in scholarly papers
16
. 
From a factual perspective, French judges tend to apply the same but-for test 
used by other national courts. With regard to legal causation two are the main tests for 
the causal enquiry in case law. The German theory of adequate causation strongly 
influenced the French laws of obligations, at the beginning of the 20
th
 century, to the 
extent that French courts often apply a version of the adequate theory deprived of its 
probabilistic calculus
17
. Differently, other courts simply require the causal link to be 
certain and direct
18
. The legal causal link is specified by the Art. 1151 of the Code Civil, 
which although refers to contracts, it is since long being applied to non-contractual 
obligations
19. This norm prescribes that only the “immediate and direct consequences” 
of the breach of law are subject to compensation.   
All in all, the causal connection between the breach of law and the damage has 
to be ‘direct and certain’20, where these characteristics do not refer to specific abstract 
categories but rather tend to limit the judicial application of causation. Generally, 
French lawyers recur to the commonsense and the ‘normal course of things’ standard in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
fault shall be liable and compensate the victim for the loss incurred, which implies three general elements: 
a fault, a direct and certain damage and a causal link between the fault and the damage. 
15
 In the original version “Tout fait quelconque de l'homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige celui 
par la faute duquel il est arrivé, à le réparer”. 
16
 Geneviève Viney and Patrice Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité (L.G.D.J., 2006), 335, who 
refer to « le refus systématique de tout effort de définition ». 
17
 Jacques Ghestin et al., Traité de droit civil: Les conditions de la responsabilité (L.G.D.J., 1998). 
18
 Walter Van Gerven, Jeremy Lever, and Pierre Larouche, Cases, Materials and Text on National, 
Supranational and International Tort Law (Hart, 2000), 424; Van Dam, European Tort Law, 319. 
19
 François Terré, Philippe Simler, and Yves Lequette, Droit civil: Les obligations (Dalloz, 1999), 592; 
Viney and Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité, 348; Duncan Fairgrieve and Florence G’Sell-
Macrez, “Causation in French Law: Pragmatism and Policy,” in Perspectives on Causation, ed. Richard 
Goldberg (Hart Publishing, 2011), 113. 
20
 Fairgrieve and G’Sell-Macrez, “Causation in French Law: Pragmatism and Policy,” 113. 
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order to determine the adequacy of a single causal element
21
.  These characteristics have 
to be matched with a particularly strict standard adopted in competition law cases. The 
requirement of the direct causal link in competition law has been defined as “the main 
obstacle on which the right to reparation stumbles”22. This situation may explain the 
reasons why the majority of competition law claims concern contractual disputes and 
the claims for damages are often based on loss of chances.  
French scholars have proposed, in the last ten years, two projects of reform of 
laws of obligations
23
. The first project was submitted to the French Minister of Justice 
in 2005 and it was coordinated by Prof. Pierre Català (Català Project)
24
. The second 
was prepared by another group of scholars and divided into two draft projects, one 
devoted to the law of contracts and the other to the non-contractual liability (Terré 
Project)
25
. Both the Català and Terré projects tend to understate the importance of a 
thorough definition of the causal link, although they deal with it in different manners. 
While the Català draft simply suggests that the causal link must be proved, the Terré 
draft devotes the Article 10 to the definition of the causal link. However, also in the 
latter case, the draft offers a particularly loose definition which introduces the concept 
of the “ordinary course of things and without which it would not have occurred” in 
order to determine the causal regularity of the link
26
. Both drafts opted for flexibility of 
the civil liability systems, leaving to the judge ample discretion in the investigation of 
the causal nexus
27
. 
This wide definition of causation in law justifies the rather flexible approach 
adopted by French Courts that have used in some cases also the causal proportional 
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 Ibid., 119. 
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 Louis Vogel, Les Actions Civiles de Concurrence. Union Européenne, France, Allemagne, Royaume-
Uni, Italie, Suisse, États-Unis (Paris: EPA, 2013), 43. 
23
 Olivier Moréteau, “France: French Tort Law in the Light of European Harmonization” Journal of Civil 
Law Studies 6, no. 2 (2013): 15. 
24
 Pierre Català, ed., “Avant-Projet de Réforme Du Droit Des Obligations et Du Droit de La Prescription” 
((Documentation française, P. Catala ed., 2006). Available in English at 
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/rapportcatatla0905-anglais.pdf and 
http://www.henricapitant.org/node/73, 2005). 
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 François Terré, ed., Pour une réforme du droit de la responsabilité civile (Dalloz, 2011). 
26
 Article 10 (1): «Constitue la cause du dommage tout fait propre à le produire selon le cours ordinaire 
des choses et sans lequel il ne serait pas advenu» 
27
 Moréteau, “France: French Tort Law in the Light of European Harmonization” 770. 
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liability approach to justify the causal link
28
. The assessment of causation in 
competition law damages actions remains however the thorniest issue to substantiate for 
French lawyers
29
. This situation explains the frequent recourse to the doctrine of loss of 
chance (“perte de chance”) which permits to overcome the probation of the certain and 
direct causal link between the infringement and the damage
30
.  
 
2.3. Italy 
The Italian theoretical background related to causation has being at the centre of 
important doctrinal discussions and brisk changes in the case law, with seminal 
decisions in competition law damages actions that defined the extent of causation.  
The causal assessment consists of a two-stage process
31
 where, firstly, the judge 
has to assess the ‘natural causality’32 to ascertain the link between the event and the 
damage, generally through the adoption of the ‘conditio sine qua non’ test33. Secondly, 
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 Olivier Moréteau, “Causal Uncertainty and Proportional Liability in France” in Proportional Liability: 
Analytical and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Israel Gilead, Michael D. Green, and Bernhard A. Koch, 
Tort and Insurance Law 33 (De Gruyter, 2013), 141. 
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 Jacques Buhart and Lionel Lesur, “France: Private Antitrust Litigation” Global Competition Review, 
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 See infra par 5.3. 
31
 Gorla, Gino, “Sulla Cosiddetta Causalità Giuridica: Fatto Dannoso E Conseguenze” Rivista Di Diritto 
Commerciale I (1951): 46; Angelo Luminoso, “Possibilità O Necessità Della Relazione Causale” Rivista 
Giuridica Sarda, 1991, 533; Francesco Realmonte, Il problema del rapporto di causalità nel risarcimento 
del danno (A. Giuffrè, 1967); Francesco Donato Busnelli and Salvatore Patti, Danno e responsabilità 
civile (G Giappichelli Editore, 2013); Umberto Breccia, Le obbligazioni (Giuffrè, 1991); Eugenio 
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persona (A. Giuffrè, 1971); S. M. Carbone, “Il Rapporto Di Causalità” Alpa-Bessone (a Cura Di), La 
Responsabilità Civile, n.d.; Vincenzo Carbone, Il fatto dannoso nella responsabilità civile (Jovene, 
1969); Valente, “Appunti in Tema Di Fatto, Nesso Causale E Danno” Diritto E Giurisprudenza, 1955, 
372; Pietro Trimarchi, Causalità e danno (Giuffrè, 1967). 
32
 The Italian Civil Code does not define the cause-in fact whose definition is borrowed from the Articles 
40 and 41 of the Criminal Code, see Guido Alpa, La responsabilità civile. Parte generale (Wolters 
Kluwer Italia, 2010), 326; Marco Capecchi, Il Nesso Di Causalità: Dalla Condicio Sine qua Non Alla 
Responsabilità Proporzionale, III (Cedam, 2012), 18. 
33
 Other authors dissent from this view maintaining that the assessment of causation has a unitary nature 
and is operated before the selection of the compensable damages; see Paolo Forchielli, Il rapporto di 
causalità nell’illecito civile (CEDAM, 1960); Francesco Carnelutti, “Perseverare Diabolicum (a Proposito 
Del Limite Della Responsabilità per Danni)” Il Foro Italiano, 1952, 97–98; Mario Barcellona, 
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the judge determines the legal causation for detecting and limiting the damages subject 
to compensation
34
.  
Italian judges have swiftly transitioned from an account similar to the adequate 
cause to a more elaborated rule of ‘regular causality’ (‘regolarità causale’). Article 
1223 of the Italian Civil Code, literally requires the compensable damage to be limited 
to the direct and immediate effects of the action
35
. This rather restrictive definition was 
interpreted extensively by proponents of a broader approach who described Art. 1223 as 
a mere application of the theory of adequacy of the causal conditions
36
. The prevalent 
opinion supports this view, although scholars have put forward dissenting and 
alternative approaches
37
. The predominant theoretical approach reframed the provision 
of Article 1223 going back to its historical roots
38
. The contextualisation of the norm 
permitted to go beyond the precise wording of the law
39
 and even to clearly point out 
that Italian law admits the award of indirect damages
40
. 
The approach of Italian courts to Art. 1223 Civil Code is unanimous in stating 
that it is impossible to establish a unique criterion for the ‘immediate and direct 
effects’41. Relying on an extensive interpretation of the law, judges normally consider as 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Inattuazione dello scambio e sviluppo capitalistico: formazione storica e funzione della disciplina del 
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37
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Traité des obligations, selon les règles, tant du for de la conscience que du for extérieur (Letellier, 1805). 
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 Paolo Forchielli, Responsabilità civile (CEDAM 1983), 50. 
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 Adriano De Cupis, Il danno: teoria generale della responsabilità civile (A Giuffrè 1979), 235. 
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 Laura Castelli, “La Causalità Giuridica Nel Campo Degli Illeciti Anticoncorrenziali” Danno E 
Responsabilità 18, no. 11 (2013): 1051. 
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covered by the Article 1223 Civil Code both direct and indirect damages
42
. The 
predominant case-law follows the principle of causal regularity, for which legal 
causation is established when damages are a normal or regular consequence of the 
event
43
. This approach entails a logic or probabilistic judgement based on which the 
judge has to rely on ‘covering laws’ (‘leggi di copertura’) that consist in sufficient 
scientific or economic evidences which can support the allegation of causation. The 
recourse to this method allows to avoid the risk of adopting as a benchmark the 
geographical distance or the time-span in assessing the causal nexus. 
In competition law damages actions national courts generally use economic 
theories and logic inferences in order to determine causation.  Courts also use 
probability in order to gauge the likeliness of an event to happen
44
. This approach 
allows moreover to build presumptions from economic data
45
. Especially in follow on 
actions, courts have often used the economic assessments of the Italian Antitrust 
Authority (AGCM), in order to determine the likeliness of damages to competitors or 
consumers. When the claimant falls in that class, she benefits of a presumption that 
revert the burden of proof on to the defendant
46
. For instance, in the case Allianz v 
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Tagliaferro
47
 the Court of Cassation stated that there is a presumption of damage caused 
by cartels to consumers. The cartelist, however, in order to rebut this presumption, 
cannot submit general economic data regarding price trends, but has to demonstrate that, 
in the specific instance, the price imposed to that consumer was higher than the market 
price due to reasons different from the anticompetitive agreement
48
. The Court argued 
that the judge can find the causal nexus relying on criteria of ‘high logic probability’, or 
through the use of probabilistic presumptions based on the regularity of the causal 
chain. On the other hand, the law has to guarantee to the defendant the right to rebut this 
presumption submitting sufficient proof of the interruption in the causal connection
49
. 
 
2.4. England 
The quest for the causal enquiry is developed through the usual two-stage 
procedure. The factual connection is established on the basis of the but-for test
50
 and the 
standard for its proof is the ‘more probable than not’51. The contiguity of the but-for 
factors to the damage have to be intended as absence of the elements that can severe the 
link between event and damage
52.  When it is said that a superseding cause ‘broke the 
causal chain’ it is intended that there is an intervention in the course of events. It might 
also happen that an action with adequate causal effect on the damage is overtaken by a 
subsequent event unrelated to the initial tort. In this case, the defendant is responsible 
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only for the injury caused regardless of the consequences created by the subsequent 
event
53
. Some approaches derive the determination of the causal link from common 
sense that would justify the limitation of legal responsibility to certain damages. Some 
authors oppose that this theory is too lax and uncertain
54
. Indeed the criteria set out for 
determining causation through common sense consist in decision about limitation of 
liability rather than assessment of de facto causality
55
. In case of multiple causal 
conditions, English case law resorts to the use of scientific laws which have to ascertain 
which action in fact caused the damages
56
. The House of Lords in McGhee stated that 
there is a presumption of liability of the person that materially increased the risk of 
injury, who has also the right of proving the contrary
57
.  
Finally, there are cases where it is not possible even to define if the case has a 
single material causation or multiple causes. Here the House of Lords in Fairchild v 
Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd
58
 stated that when it is scientifically impossible to 
show which of several negligent employers in fact caused the death, it is sufficient for 
the claimant to demonstrate that the defendant’s negligence materially increased the risk 
of contracting the disease.  In the following case Barker v Corus (UK) plc
59
, the House 
of Lords added that the liability of the tortfeasors has to be proportionate to the increase 
in risk they caused. 
With reference to legal causation, English judges adopt different accounts to 
limit responsibility and recoverable damages. English law firstly resorts to the concept 
of remoteness
60
, for which the defendant is responsible only if the damage was a 
foreseeable consequence of the breach of duty irrespective to its extent
61
. As long as the 
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damage is foreseeable it does not matter the form it takes, even if it is unusual
62
. By 
consequence, the law requires the damage to be of the same type of the one described 
by the rule, no matter how severe it is. The cause is too remote when it was not 
foreseeable to a ‘reasonable man’63. 
The adequate causal theory relies instead on laws of probability in order to 
assess causation
64
. The agency is cause of the event, in legal terms, only if it 
considerably increases the objective probability of the outcome
65
. This theory 
substitutes therefore to the subjective foreseeability an objective requisite that, however, 
is subdue to an ‘assumed epistemic base’66. Pursuant to this alternative approach, the 
harm must be ‘within the risk’ meaning that the harm has to fall into the type of risk that 
the liability rule protects
67
. The purpose of the rule of law defines the risk concerned by 
it, therefore delimiting the responsibility for harm through causation
68
.  
The judicial application of these principles is effectively described by Mr Justice 
Popplewell in Fulton Shipping Inc v Globalia Business Travel, observing that “The 
principle does not, however, mean that a claimant always recovers for the amount of 
the losses which arise from the breach. Principles of causation mean that his losses may 
be factually too remote from the breach to be recoverable despite the fact that they 
would not have been suffered but for the breach. His losses may be too remote in law. 
Conversely, he may end up better off as a result of the breach than he would otherwise 
have been, without having to give credit for such benefit against his recoverable loss”69. 
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2.5. Causation in the US antitrust case law  
Causation has been defined in the US as “one of the most underexplored areas 
in antitrust law”70. Contrary to what is observed in Europe, the US judge refers to the 
antitrust regulation in order to define each single aspect of the unlawful behaviour, and 
causation makes no exception. Therefore, no (at least direct) references to general tort 
law are made. However, several tests are borrowed from tort law
71
 with some variations, 
allowed mainly by the lack of specific regulation
72
.  
This premise is fundamental to understand the differing, sometimes even 
contrasting, approaches adopted by US and EU courts in assessing antitrust causation. 
 
a. Material causation 
Causation tests can vary from a “sole proximate cause” to a mere “substantial 
factor”. It is not possible to find a principle which enjoys priority over the others in the 
case law because, from a chronological viewpoint, they have being bundling up without 
the subsequent dismissing the prior. 
In Zenith Radio Corp.
73
 the Supreme Court opened to what is still nowadays the 
most common approach in cartel litigation, which is to require the plaintiff to 
substantiate that the agency is a “material cause of the injury”74. Differently, in the 
more recent Methyl and Tele Atlas cases, courts stated, respectively, that the conduct has 
to be a “substantial factor of the injury”75 and that the plaintiff do not need to "exhaust 
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all possible alternative sources of injury"
76
. Additionally some courts require that the 
conduct has to be the “sole proximate cause” of the harm77. These obiter dicta have 
been also inflected with different formulations, such as that the conduct has “materially 
contributed” to the plaintiff’s harm or that the plaintiff must show “with a fair degree of 
certainty”78 that “defendant's illegal conduct materially contributed to the injury"79. 
Factual causation in abuse of monopoly power cases has shown a similar 
pattern. In Microsoft the Court alleged that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to show that 
there is a reasonable connection between the conduct and the injury suffered
80
. In the 
following Broadcom case, the Court adopted a particularly flexible causation test since 
it merely required that the harm has to "increase the likelihood that patent rights will 
confer monopoly power". Finally, in the subsequent Rambus case the Court applied an 
higher standard of causation adopting a ‘but-for’ exclusive test81. The claim was 
rejected on the basis that since it was at least possible that the defendant would have 
selected plaintiff’s technology, causation was not proved. 
In Costner, instead, the court dealt with the problem of multiple causes, in 
particular when antitrust and non-antitrust causes concur in the causation of the 
damage
82
. The judge accepted the claim even though "[t]here was evidence that general 
economic conditions and poor management caused a decline in plaintiff's business", 
and taking into consideration that there also was "evidence that the illegal tying 
arrangements contributed to the decline"
83
. In City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co. 
of California the Ninth Circuit has attained an opposite result, rejecting the claim for 
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lack of causation since "[t]he establishment of price ceilings" did "not in itself mean 
that the companies' conduct could not have caused the injuries."
84
. 
However, three mainstream approaches can be differentiated in the US antitrust 
panorama: the Microsoft with its flexible approach; the Rambus with its strict 
requirements and the Broadcom with its particularly lax rule. These are only the main 
and better explained of the many different canons developed so far. American case law 
on antitrust causation is indeed drifting in a sea of different approaches. The problem 
depends firstly on the refusal to build the civil antitrust framework on the more solid 
basement of tort law
85. Carrier observes that private antitrust law should gain “insights 
by turning to tort law, the law with the most developed causation framework”86. He also 
proposes an adaptation to the general tort law rules which echoes the newly approved 
European Directive on damages actions, since he suggests an inversion of the burden of 
proof when there is a “reasonable connection between the challenged conduct and the 
anticompetitive effects”87. The plaintiff would have to show the anticompetitive effects 
of the unlawful behaviour and the damage would be presumed. 
 
2.6. Economic analysis of the different approaches to causation 
The economic lawyers divide the analysis of causation in tort law on the basis of 
the usual partitioning between strict liability and negligence.  
A potential injurer is negligent if, and only if, the cost of precaution is less than 
the expected accident cost (probability of loss per magnitude of loss)
88
. From an 
economic point of view the reasonable person standard applies to the cost at which an 
average reasonable person would avoid a harm
89
. Therefore, if a normal reasonable 
person could avoid at a cost of 10 a harm which has an expected cost of 8, nobody 
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under this rule can be found liable even if an exceptional person could avoid the same 
harm at a cost of less than 8. Under the reasonable person standard, personal skills and 
abilities of the injurer are not taken into consideration; hence an exceptional man who 
can avoid the damage at a lower cost is not liable even if he does not act accordingly. 
However, Courts find exceptions to this rule mainly in favour of the defendant, in cases 
where the capacity of avoiding the damage is widely different from the average. 
In this regard, the economic analysis gets to the conclusion that causation 
requirements do not change incentives to take care
90
. In other words, optimal incentives 
are not influenced by the fact that an undertaking can escape liability for negligence by 
showing lack of causation. For the economists, therefore, the possibility of an 
intervening cause does not induce the subject to take excessive precautions. 
However, the causation requirement shows two advantages. Firstly, without 
causation requirement the differences between negligence and strict liability are 
smoothed over, to the extent that the former accuses the same problem of 
overdeterrence typical of strict liability
91
. Secondly, causation requirement has a 
beneficial effect on administrative costs because it reduces the quantity of claims 
restricting the number of tortfeasors and types of damages subject to compensation
92
. 
From an economic point of view strict liability is mainly criticised because the 
victim has no incentives to prevent the damage and all the costs are borne by the injurer 
who will take the most cost-effective precautions.
93
 The behaviour of the injurer does 
not ensure, however, the minimisation of the social cost of the accident. As a matter of 
fact, when prevention activities by potential victims are the most efficient method of 
accident prevention, forcing the injurer to internalise all the costs of prevention has the 
effect of decreasing the overall efficiency of the system.
94
 On the other hand, when a 
shift in activity level of the potential injurer is not efficient or not feasible, there is an 
                                                          
90
 Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard University Press, 2009), 251. 
91
 Steven Shavell, “An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts,” The 
Journal of Legal Studies, 1980, 465. 
92
 Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, 321. 
93
 John P. Brown, “Economic Theory of Liability Rules” in Economic Analysis of Law: Selected 
Readings, ed. Donald A. Wittman (London: Blackwell, 2003), 38. 
94
 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (Pearson Education, Limited, 2013), 336. 
 38 
 
argument for strict liability.
95
 Starting from this assumption, Shavell demonstrated that 
strict liability is always efficient for unilateral accidents, which are torts where only 
injurers (not victims) influence risk by their choice of care.
96
 As far as the injurer is the 
only party who can prevent the damage, his total cost correspond to the total social cost. 
Hence, his activity of minimizing his costs will seek at the same time the minimisation 
of social costs.
97
 Strict liability has also the effect of decreasing litigation costs, since 
the claimant needs only to prove the damage and the causal connection between the 
damage and the defendant’s action. In some cases, in order to decrease the risk of 
damage, the injurer prefers to cut back on the scale of activity instead of adopting 
further precautions.
98
 In strict liability regimes, contrary to what happens in negligence, 
causation boost correct incentives. This is due to the fact that the firm is strictly liable 
only if the rule of law contemplates the damage as a consequence of the defendant’s 
action or omission.  Differently, the firm would have excessive incentives: “basic 
incentives to take due care are correct whether or not there is a causation 
requirement”99. 
The underlying assumption of these economic studies is that “[r]ational actors 
will always be led to act nonnegligently even if they would escape liability when they 
are not the cause of losses”100. These considerations are determined with regard to the 
general principle of causation in fact. In relation to the probability approach (50 % + 1), 
it has being noted that it can lead to either to inadequate or to excessive incentives to 
reduce risk
101. The economic doctrine illustrates the downsides of an ‘all-or-nothing’ 
approach based on probability, observing that a firm that supplies 20% of the market 
demand will escape liability for any harm caused by its product. For this reason, that 
firm will have no liability-related incentives to take precautions
102
. On the other hand, if 
a firm's market share exceeds 50%, the firm’s causal contribution will always be 
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deemed to be ‘more likely than not’ and, therefore, it will be held responsible. This 
situation, the economic doctrine comments, creates a civil liability burden on that firm 
that is “socially excessive”, especially under strict liability regimes103. 
However, it has to be noted that the decision-maker normally resorts to the 
market share in order to identify the responsible subject, in cases of high causal 
uncertainty, i.e. only if the injurer-producer is unknown, yet in those cases it is true that 
the market share will be decisive.
104
 Proportional liability differs in that case because 
the assessment of causation would be replaced by the proportional payment of damages 
(also based on market shares). 
As for legal causation, the economic doctrine argues that allowing parties to 
escape liability for unforeseeable events does not reduce incentives to reduce risks
105
. 
These scholars propose an economic analysis of legal rules on causation, which aims at 
wealth maximization.
106
 The economic analysis of law in some cases goes even further 
in loosening the reasons for the application of the causal terminology and bolsters the 
idea of placing responsibility on the person best placed to avoid the damage most 
cheaply
107
. In this way, the decision maker avoids the whole causal assessment. This 
view, at least in European Union law system, utterly contrasts with the underlying 
present principles of damages actions. The compensatory principle, indeed, is based on 
the idea for which the damage is compensable unless it was caused by a person who is 
held responsible by law. In this equation, therefore, the assessment of causation is 
inescapable as it does not leave any room to the condemnation of a subject under a 
different standard, such as the ‘best placed subject’. However, on the basis of similar 
considerations, national courts, followed by the Directive 104/2014, have established 
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presumptions that burden the subject best placed to prove lack of causation for the 
anticompetitive harm
108
.
                                                          
108
 See paragraphs 6.5 and 7.1. 
 41 
 
III. Causation in the European Union competition law and decisions  
The European legislator openly states that the issue of causation is not dealt in 
the Directive on damages actions
1
 and that, therefore, its definition is left to the 
domestic laws of Member States. The only limit fixed by the EU law is the observance 
of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, in line with what was already 
disposed by the CJEU in Manfredi
2
. However, there are some principles addressing 
causation that can be found in European law and case law. 
The European Union law fully endorsed the principle for which the right to 
stand in a claim for infringement of articles 101 and 102 TFEU belongs to “any 
individual”3. From a procedural point of view, therefore, there is no limitation as for the 
standing to sue of subjects damaged by antitrust infringement. These claimants cannot 
be selected on the basis of individual characteristics, for instance differentiating 
between direct and indirect purchasers. However, the decision maker has to make sure 
that the claim for compensation is well founded and has to verify the existence of a 
“causal relationship between the harm suffered and the prohibited 
arrangement”4.Therefore, there is no selection of compensable parties but only of 
compensable damages. In other words, as for the actual formulation of European law 
principles, no one can be denied access to damages action for antitrust infringement as a 
matter of right to stand, but the limitation to compensation can be found as a matter of 
lack of causal connection of the damage to the infringement. 
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  The diverse set of approaches to causation in the European Union did not 
suffice to the adoption of a common rule, although several voices urged for a major 
clarification of the issue of causation in competition law
5
. However, some common 
interpretative principles can be found from the case law of the European courts and 
from the legislative acts and papers of the European Union institutions, although both 
showed visible reluctance to give univocal definitions and to deepen into the 
interpretation of causation.  
 
3.1. Causation in the Court of Justice of the European Union decisions 
The European Union courts did not develop any precise definition of causation 
or causal link. However, from its case law it is possible to glean important information 
on the minimum requirements of the causal nexus for civil liability. Albeit some authors 
argue that the CJEU has formulated an autonomous theory of causal relationship
6
, the 
definition(s), if existing, are lacking of a consistent and comprehensive approach to 
causation.  
The CJEU case law on causation is abundant with regard to state liability for 
infringement of Treaty’s norms. The approach to causation developed by this case law 
has been adopted also in issues of horizontal application of EU competition law.
7
 
Hence, it is meaningful to analyse the matter of causation in European private antitrust 
enforcement starting from this case law. 
                                                          
5
 Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), and Luiss Guido 
Carli (LUISS), “Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU: Welfare Impact and 
Potential Scenarios,” December 21, 2007, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf; Study on 
the Conditions of Claims for Damages in Case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules, 2004, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/comparative_report_clean_en.pdf; 
Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the 
EC Antitrust Rules, 2008. 
6
 Wolfgang Wurmnest, Grundzüge eines europäischen Haftungsrecht: eine vergleichende Untersuchung 
des Gemeinschaftsrechts (Mohr Siebeck, 2003); Klaus Bitterich, “Elements of an Autonomous Concept 
of Causation in European Community Law Concerning Liability,” Zeitschrift Für Vergleichende 
Rechtswissenschaft, 2007, 12–39. 
7
 Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA [2006] 
ECR I-06619. 
 43 
 
Chronologically, the leading case is Roquettes frères
8
, which applied a 
particularly strict rule about the burden of proof of the causal nexus. The Court, facing a 
case of state liability, decided that the claimant has to prove the “causal connexion” 
between the damage and the measures adopted by the European Community. Moreover, 
the Court argued that, in order to substantiate the causal link, it is not sufficient for the 
applicant to supplement its claim with statistical evidences even in a claim for nominal 
damages
9
. 
Later in the Dumortier Frères case
10
, the Court pointed out that the consequence 
of the misconduct causing the damage has to be direct. The following case law ‘forgets’ 
about this particular requirement of the causal link. Indeed, the Fresh Marine decision
11
 
and also the landmark Francovich decision
12
 require only the presence of a causal link, 
without assuming it to be direct.  
However, this characteristic of the causal link is taken back to life in Brasserie 
du Pêcheur, where the Court sets the three requirements for conferring the right to 
damages, that are: i) a rule of law which confers rights on individuals; ii) a sufficiently 
serious breach of that rule; and iii) a direct causal link between the breach of the 
obligation resting on the State and the damage sustained by the injured parties
13
.  
However, the Court never delves into the nature of the direct causal nexus that it 
requires. There is no clear definition of it neither in the EU legislation nor in the case 
law interpreting it. The Court hinted the need of the adoption of a conditio sine qua non 
test or but-for test
14
, and also added that it is not enough to prove causation, as the 
claimant has to prove also a sufficient proximity between the illegal act and the loss 
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suffered.
15
 However, the Court also admitted that this way of assessing causation is not 
sufficient and that it needs to be completed by national laws.
16
 Some Advocate Generals 
argued for the introduction of an adequate causation test, but it has never become 
jurisprudence.
17
 
The CJEU, when dealing with private enforcement of competition law, appears 
to be more reluctant to give a definition of rules pertaining to the law of obligations. In 
Manfredi the CJEU clearly stated that causation is a fundamental element of the 
compensation claim, but that it rests with the applicable law to determine the 
characteristics of this link
18
. The Court further specified that the application of domestic 
law has to be subordinated to the observance of principles of equivalence
19
 and 
effectiveness
20
 of EU law
21
. 
This decision however, beyond the formulation of the horizontal effect principle, 
confirms another important fundamental pillar for the following private antitrust 
enforcement. The Court, indeed, by referring to the requirements of liability developed 
by previous case law, confirms that the criteria pointed out for state liability are 
applicable also in competition law. For the first time it was the A.G. Van Gerven, in the 
case Brasserie du Pêcheur, to observe that the three conditions for liability fixed by the 
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CJEU should find application also in the actions for breach of competition law
22
. 
However, it was only with the Manfredi case that this jurisprudential ‘renvoi’ was 
crystallized also in competition law. 
 
3.2. Causation in the European Union competition law 
The Green Paper mentioned causation as a necessary requirement of any 
damages claim. It acknowledged that proof of a causal link between the infringement 
and a loss “may be particularly difficult to achieve due to the economic complexity of 
the issues involved”, and it concluded that the application of the causation requirement 
“should not lead to exclusion of those who have suffered losses arising from an antitrust 
infringement from recovering those losses”23. This position was based on the outcome 
of the ‘Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC 
competition rules’ (so called Ashurst study), which observed that proof of causation was 
one of the main obstacles to an efficient deployment of competition damages actions
24
. 
With visible clarity the Ashurst comparative study takes note of the fact that the 
different reporters informed that the “[p]roof of causal link is considered as a great 
obstacle to plaintiffs. This will particularly be the case as regards plaintiffs who are 
indirect purchasers”25. 
 However, the great flexibility and diversity of approaches to the notion of 
causal link in the Member States, together with the common case-by-case approach to 
it, limited an in-depth comparative analysis of causation. Most probably, this aspect 
discouraged the European legislator to take a position on the issue of causation that, 
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indeed, was just mentioned in the following White Paper
26
.  Even the Commission Staff 
Working Paper attached to it, mentioned nothing but the usual warning reported by the 
Green Paper and the Ashurst study about the particularly complex nature of the proof of 
causation
27
. 
These pieces of legislation acknowledge that causation remain one of the 
thorniest issues in competition law damages actions and they also call for major 
harmonisation. The Proposal Directive, in particular, highlighted with unprecedented 
persistence the problem of the diversity of the liability standards in the EU, especially 
for matters related to assessment and quantification of damages. The Proposal Directive 
pointed out that this diversity of approaches may cause legal uncertainty for all parties 
involved in actions for antitrust damages and that “has created a markedly uneven 
playing field in the internal market” and that it “may cause legal uncertainty for all 
parties involved in actions for antitrust damages, which in turn leads to ineffective 
private enforcement of the competition rules, especially in cross-border cases”28. 
Despite this, even the recently approved Directive decided not to take an explicit 
stand on this issue. The Directive mentions the causal link only once at Recital (11) to 
confirm the principle that “All national rules governing the exercise of the right to 
compensation for harm resulting from an infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU, 
including those concerning aspects not dealt with in this Directive such as the notion of 
causal relationship between the infringement and the harm, must observe the principles 
of effectiveness and equivalence”29. 
Therefore, the only explicit limits to the application of the domestic notion of 
causation are the principles of effectiveness and equivalence of EU law. Actually, the 
Directive poses other adaptations to the application of national laws of obligations 
through presumptions and legal inferences that certainly influence the formation of the 
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proof of causation. In the following paragraph, I will address the direct limitations set 
forth with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. 
 
3.3. Principle of equivalence and effectiveness as (positive) limits to the 
national rules on causation 
The principle of equivalence consists in the enforcement of rules that are not less 
favourable than those governing similar domestic actions
30
. The principle of 
effectiveness, on the other hand, makes sure that domestic rules “do not render 
practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by 
Community law”31. 
The CJEU has demonstrated strong intentions to intervene through the 
application of these rather wide and misty concepts
32
, especially to enforce the 
effectiveness of European laws in order to limit the application of national remedial 
rules
33
. This interventionist approach of the European Union courts had being described 
as “waxing and waning” in the history of EU law34, and it seems to be reviving more 
than ever in competition law remedies. Recently, the CJEU used indeed the principle of 
effectiveness in order to overcome the application of domestic rules governing 
causation in the Austrian jurisdiction that would have impeded the compensation of 
damages caused by umbrella prices
35
. Generally, the principle of effectiveness has been 
applied with the aim of guaranteeing judicial protection to individual right-holders
36
. In 
this vein, the position held by the CJEU in Kone becomes more clear as to the defence 
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of individual right to claim for damages. The principle of effectiveness, to a certain 
extent, becomes therefore a European ‘scope of the rule’, applied to legal causation. The 
application of national rules on causation needs therefore to pass this extra filter, that 
however has only a positive function. In case indeed the domestic rules on causation 
bring to the rejection of the claim, the judge has to further analyse the claim under the 
light of the principle of effectiveness and of the European Courts’ decisions. Moreover, 
the effectiveness of EU law has always to go along with the application of the principle 
of proportionality, laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union, for which 
the involvement of the institutions must be limited to what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the Treaties. 
The application of these principles has the further aim and consequence of 
bringing a progressive harmonisation of national remedial rules. Principles of 
effectiveness, equivalence and proportionality impose indeed to national judges to 
restrain and modify the applicable law to the extent it is needed to compel with the 
European rules and principles
37
.  
 
3.4. The objectives of the Directive 104/214 and of articles 101 and 102 
The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions (Damages Directive) was signed 
into law on 26 November 2014. It asks the adoption of “certain rules governing actions 
for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of 
the Member States and of the European Union”.  The Damages Directive states, in line 
with the CJEU case law, that anyone can claim full compensation of the damage 
causally connected to the infringement
38
. An infringement of competition law, national 
and European, which cause an injury to a protected interests of individuals, gives 
therefore right to reparation against the infringer. As for the assessment of causation, the 
harm is legally relevant if the loss results from a violation of a right conferred by the 
law. In other words, the infringement resulted in the violation of an interest worthy of 
                                                          
37
 Walter Van Gerven, “Harmonization of Private Law: Do We Need It?,” Common Market Law Review 
41, no. 2 (2004): 505–32. 
38
 Article 2, Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 
on Certain Rules Governing Actions for Damages under National Law for Infringements of the 
Competition Law Provisions of the Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA Relevance. 
 49 
 
legal protection
39
. But what are the protected interests for European competition law
40
? 
And what is the function of competition law in relation to its private enforcement
41
? 
The Directive clearly states that its main objective is “to establish rules 
concerning actions for damages for infringements of Union competition law”42. These 
rules should ensure the full effectiveness of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the proper 
functioning of the internal market for undertaking and consumers. The European 
legislator maintains indeed that these objectives cannot be achieved while applying 
Member States’ laws of obligation. As lately pointed out by the European Commission 
in its Impact Assessment of the proposal Directive for Antitrust Damages Actions 2013 
“the differences in the liability regimes applicable in the Member States may negatively 
affect competition and risk to appreciably distort the proper functioning of the internal 
market”.43 The European Parliament held this position also in the approved text of the 
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Directive
44
. Therefore, in order to ensure the full application of the principles of 
effectiveness and the consistency in the application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU, the 
EU legislator has resolved that the only and most effective way to achieve this 
uniformity for the functioning of the internal market is through the enforcement of a 
specific directive
45
. The Directive 104/2014, in line whit the Proposal, aims at 
establishing and give effect to the compensation principle and to grant it to anyone who 
suffered a damage caused by an infringement of competition law, as established by the 
CJEU in Manfredi
46
. Moreover, the further and collateral objective is to avoid 
overcompensation
47
. With regard to the different liability regimes, the Directive makes 
clear that the intent of the legislator is to create a “level playing field” where all the 
undertakings can compete at the same level and the internal market is not endangered by 
inequalities in the application of EU law
48
. Relying on this background, one could say 
that the assessment of causation in competition law damages actions has to be 
contextualised into a system that aims chiefly at compensation, rather than at 
punishment and deterrence, and at the convergence of the different approaches. 
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3.5. The right to full compensation in the Directive on antitrust damages 
claims 
When an infringement of competition law happens, it is often the case that it 
causes an injury to protected interests of individuals. The injury is legally relevant if the 
loss results from a violation of a right conferred by the law or the violation of an interest 
worthy of legal protection
49
. This injury gives right to reparation but against whom and 
on what basis?  
The Damages Directive, as already pointed out, adopts a particularly broad 
approach with reference to the right of standing. By consequence, the term ‘injured 
party’ is referred to any person (natural or legal) that has suffered harm caused by an 
infringement of competition law
50, and the infringer is broadly defined as “an 
undertaking or association of undertakings which has committed an infringement of 
competition law”51. On the basis of Article 3 (1), therefore, any injured party should be 
able to obtain full compensation unless the harm was caused by an infringement of 
competition law
52
. Full compensation, for the Damages Directive, is composed by 
actual loss and loss of profits, plus interests, as it should “place a person who has 
suffered harm in the position in which that person would have been had the 
infringement of competition law not been committed”53. 
The Directive presumes that a cartel causes harm via price-effect
54
. The Recital 
(47) explains that this rule has the aim of remedying the information asymmetry 
between claimant and defendant and the difficulties in reckoning the amount of 
damages. This Recital argues that “Depending on the facts of the case, cartels result in 
a rise in prices, or prevent a lowering of prices which would otherwise have occurred 
but for the cartel”. This is a rebuttable presumption, although some authors pointed out 
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that such inversion of the burden of proof brings an ‘erosion’ of the defendant’s right of 
defence “so that in this type of actions it seems that the defendant is prevented from 
proving the lack of «causal link» between the infringement and the alleged harm”55. 
The Directive limits this rebuttable presumption to cartels, arguing that their 
‘secret nature’ increases the information asymmetry and makes it more difficult for 
claimants to obtain the evidence necessary to prove the harm
56
.  Moreover, the Directive 
tries to unravel the knot regarding the legal value of decisions of antitrust authorities in 
the civil proceedings. Article 9 makes clear that when the final decision is taken by the 
national competition authority or by a review court, it constitutes a conclusive proof of 
the infringement in the following action for damages. When, instead, the decision 
comes from an antitrust authority of another Member State, it is “at least prima facie 
evidence that an infringement of competition law has occurred”57. These procedural 
rules certainly influence also the assessment of causation. In cases of follow-on claims 
based on infringements of Article 101 TFEU, the clamant benefits of a double 
presumption. Firstly, she does not have to prove the infringement of competition law 
and submit the NA’s decision. On the basis of this decision, moreover, the parties have 
to presume that a damage was caused both to direct and indirect purchasers.  
With these rules, the EU legislator intends, allegedly, to ensure effectiveness to 
the right to compensation for harm caused by an antitrust infringement. These rules tend 
not only to ease the burden of proof of the claimant but also to slightly reconcile the 
different approaches adopted by national systems of law
58
. However, the use of these 
presumptions can be misleading for claimants who might be tempted to skip the proof 
of causation which is only indirectly involved in this process. The claimant has in any 
case the burden of proving that the presumed damage was caused to her business due to 
specific market operations connecting them to the infringer. For example, if an 
undertaking claims damages caused by a cartel that fixed higher prices, the claimant 
needs to submit evidences that the overcharge was applied to her. Similarly, if a firm 
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that assumes to be injured by an abuse of dominant position, which effected into a price 
squeeze, has to substantiate the specific damage consequence of the exclusionary abuse. 
 
3.6. Scope of competition law damages and causation 
Causation in the law is limited in first place by the same rules that place liability 
on the tortfeasor. For the damage to be compensable is also necessary that the purpose 
of the infringed rule protects precisely the harmful consequences object of the claim. 
Once it has being ascertained that the damage corresponds to the legal interests 
protected by the law, the judge must ensure that that injury is causally connected to the 
offense.  
The antitrust laws have a dual function of protection. On the one hand, they 
protect the process of competition in the European market
59
. On the other hand, 
competition law rules ensure the compensation of the damage suffered by those privates 
affected by distortions of the market
60
. It follows that, as the European Court of Justice 
considers in Kone
61
, the damage that the competition regulation recalls is not only the 
one directly caused to buyers of the cartel, but also the losses caused to all the other 
subjects who act in different ways on the same market. Infringers are then responsible 
toward all persons who have suffered damages causally linked to the anti-competitive 
behaviour. In causal terms, among the conditions of the event, the judge has to find the 
ones that are legally relevant and, among them, the conditions that caused a damage 
which falls into the scope of the rule
62
. The damage, in any possible instance, in order to 
be compensable as to be of the type that is protected by the rule of law. Therefore if the 
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assessment is not part of the causal analysis it is attributed to the phase of the 
assessment of responsibility
63
.  
In competition law damages actions the judge has therefore to define the scope 
that European and domestic rules private enforcement pursues. The milestones are once 
again placed by the cases Courage and Manfredi were the Court explained what are the 
characteristics of such scope. European laws and treaties created a legal order, which 
works in parallel with domestic legal systems of the Member States. Here “[t]he 
subjects of that legal order are not only the Member States but also their nationals. Just 
as it imposes burdens on individuals, Community law is also intended to give rise to 
rights which become part of their legal assets. Those rights arise not only where they 
are expressly granted by the Treaty but also by virtue of obligations which the Treaty 
imposes in a clearly defined manner both on individuals and on the Member States and 
the Community institutions”64. 
However, this still does not tell us what is the scope of the norm and the 
protected private right of the articles 101 and 102 TFEU. This rules indeed explicitly 
address the protection of competition, as they punish those conduct “which may affect 
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market”. The Court in 
Courage notes that, given the fact that these norms produce direct effects applicable in 
relations between individuals, they create rights for the individuals concerned which the 
national courts must safeguard
65
, the full effectiveness of articles 101 and 102 would be 
put at risk if such a protection is not granted. The duty not to create restrictions or 
distortions within the internal market is therefore completed by the obligation of 
avoiding damages to private parties caused by the same restrictions. This duty is 
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moreover detailed by domestic rules on civil liability and, where present, specifically on 
competition law liability. 
The limits of the scope of the duty placed on firms, as a matter of causation, is 
better detailed in the following cases Manfredi
66
 and more recently in Kone
67
. The 
scope of the rule is therefore to ensure compensation of damages that are caused by 
such infringements. The lack of a punitive scope (at least to the moment) can reasonably 
be seen as one of the main reasons for the ban of punitive or exemplary damages from 
the Directive on compensation of damages for infringement of competition law
68
. 
However, in accordance with the principle of equivalence
 69
, if it is possible to grant 
punitive damages in domestic actions, domestic courts should make the same in actions 
based on European law. 
Amongst these classes of compensatory damages, which damage falls within the 
scope of articles 101 and 102 TFEU, as completed by the domestic rules applicable in 
each case, it is still matter of discussion.  However, the case-law of European courts 
gives no further clues about the limitation of such damages and the scope of the 
European laws. What the case law says is that the purpose of private claims under 
European competition law is compensation. This is in line also with previous case law 
of the CJEU where, with regard to State liability, the European judges noted that the 
aim of State liability is compensation, not deterrence or punishment
70
. 
In Kone the Court of Justice broadened the classes of damages subject to 
compensation, arguing again on the principle of effectiveness of EU law
71
. We know, 
therefore, that umbrella effects, not only are (potentially) linked to the event, but the 
damages arising from them are, by principle, falling within the scope of European law 
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and, therefore, may be subject to compensation. Similarly in Courage v Crehan, the 
European Court of Justice stated that the English law rule ex turpi causa non oritur 
actio violated the principle of effectiveness of EU law because it impeded to a subject 
damaged by an anticompetitive agreement to obtain compensation of such losses
72
. 
In Manfredi, the Court referred to the definition of effectiveness reported in the 
Courage case and added that ensuring full effectiveness of European competition law 
means also to guarantee full compensation of the losses caused by the antitrust 
infringment
73
. Domestic laws of substance and procedure should not deter the lodging 
of meritorious cases
74
.  
Actually this right is declined into two different principles, the first being, stricto 
sensu, the principle of effectiveness, limited exclusively to the protection of Treaty 
norms, and the second being the principle of effective judicial protection which 
concerns “the effectiveness of subjective rights enjoyed by individuals under the Treaty 
as they are enforced against Member States or private parties”75. However, the Court of 
Justice’s principle of effectiveness tends to encompass both principles, sometimes 
making it rather ambiguous
76
. On the other hand, the same case law of the CJEU did not 
develop a definition of the content of the rights that have to be enforced within the 
principle of effectiveness, of their function, scope and content
77
. Therefore, the principle 
of effectiveness should draw the limits of the right to compensation for infringement of 
EU competition law, showing to the domestic laws of obligations when a right to 
compensation has to be conferred under EU law. But the definition of such right is left 
to the Member States’ laws, as far as they abide to a non-defined EU principle of full 
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compensation, creating a self-contradictory statement rather than a principle, an 
oxymoron rather than a rule. An efficient solution, although not fully resolving, is the 
one suggesting that the legal basis of the right to compensation which “determines 
function and content of the right under Community law and the existence and scope of 
the remedy” should be analysed “in conjunction with the principle of effective judicial 
protection”78.  The reach of the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, however, 
appear to be determined by principles enclosed in ephemeral boundaries that tends more 
to the expansion of the EU right to compensation, as in Kone, rather than to its 
restriction. 
 
3.7. Convergence of different causation regimes: the effects of a diverse set of 
legal frameworks 
The endeavour of the EU institutions to harmonise the private enforcement of 
competition law is notorious. The application of the Regulation 1/2003 highlighted the 
underlying issue of the parallel application of national laws when domestic courts 
enforce articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The Article 3, Regulation 1/2003 introduced indeed 
the principle of parallel application of national competition law, by which domestic 
rules are used in order to integrate the application of EU competition law. Given the 
numerous and important differences among national laws of substance and procedure, 
the European Commission argued that this parallel application of national rules 
endangers the uniform enforcement of EU laws across the Member States
79
. As pointed 
out by the European Commission in its Impact Assessment of the proposal Directive for 
Antitrust Damages Actions 2013, the “undertakings established and operating in 
different Member States are exposed to significantly different risk of being held liable 
for infringements of competition law”80. Therefore, the Commission has clung to the 
argument by stating that “the differences in the liability regimes applicable in the 
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Member States may negatively affect competition and risk to appreciably distort the 
proper functioning of the internal market”81. The process of convergence sponsored by 
the European institutions aims, in this vein, at harmonizing national private enforcement 
rules in order to ensure a more level playing field for both infringers and victims of the 
illegal conduct.  It may be argued, in this vein, that the harmonization process backed 
by the European institutions, should respond also to the EU Treaties’ aims and guiding 
principles. The wider concern of the process of convergence is to ensure equivalence
82
 
and effectiveness
83
 of EU law, that together - in turn - foster the sound functioning of 
the internal market. It is worth observing that the divergent substantive and procedural 
standards of liability in Europe may also endanger the application of the constitutional 
principle of non-discrimination
84
. Moreover, national competition laws have to be 
checked under Art. 3 TFEU which states that “[t]he Union shall have exclusive 
competence in the following areas: (b) the establishing of the competition rules 
necessary for the functioning of the internal market”.  
As pointed out by the Commission, two different undertakings might be judged 
differently by national courts, even when they are accused of pursuing the same 
anticompetitive behaviour
85
. Moreover,  it has to be observed that the same undertaking 
operating in more than one Member State and affecting evenly their markets, might be 
held liable in one Member State but not in the other
86
. This situation is, for the 
Commission, particularly advantageous for deep-pocketed competitors that can use the 
wide chances of ‘forum shopping’ given by the European legislation to choose the 
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Court that would be more ‘favourable’ to them87. By contrast, injured parties with 
smaller claims or fewer resources will tend to choose the domestic Court or, more often, 
to drop the case. The uneven playing field created by such diversity can result in a 
competitive advantage for some undertaking and a disincentive to the exercise of the 
rights of establishment and provision of goods and services
88
. Moreover it can 
negatively affect competition and proper functioning of internal market. As a result, 
undertakings are discouraged from settling in countries where the right to compensation 
is more effectively enforced
89
. 
This conclusion is however a moot point. By fact, indeed, the countries where 
competition law is more effectively applied are also those where companies are moving 
their seats. However, the Damages Directive did not give green light to such 
convergence, preferring a more cautious approach. As a result, undertakings operating 
in the European territory are subject to different standards of liability for competition 
law infringements, despite the presence of common antitrust rules. This situation may 
support, on one hand, a process of regulatory competition among domestic laws of 
obligation and, on the other, a partial inconsistency of judgments across the European 
Union. 
 
3.8. Causation and EU law   
The harmonisation process of the rules establishing liability for compensation of 
antitrust damages, involves also the causative link that is recalled several times by the 
Commission and remain one if its unresolved major concerns. The empirical studies on 
antitrust litigation in Europe demonstrate that there is a diffuse uncertainty over the 
substantiation of the causal connection. This uncertainty is common to all the 
jurisdictions analysed. However, a closer inspection of causal theories and principles 
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adopted by national courts tells that the uncertainty often hinges on different basis. 
National courts are accustomed to different ways of approaching the proof of causation, 
although, they adopt similar solutions, as in the case of passing-on of price overcharges. 
These solutions are also oriented to the pursue of the principle of effectiveness of EU 
law and of the obligation to interpret national law in conformity with Community law
90
 
as interpreted by the EU courts
91
. By consequence, there is a natural, although limited, 
process of convergence of the solutions regarding the causal enquiry, supported by 
national courts. 
Advocate General Kokott went further than this maintaining in her Opinion to 
the Kone case that “the issue of the civil liability of cartel members for umbrella pricing 
is a matter of European Union law, not national law”92 and that the legal conditions for 
the finding of the causal link have to be found under European Union Law
93
. Her 
Opinion focuses specifically the problem of causation and, in this analysis, she 
embraces the concerns of the European Commission related to the diversity of civil 
liability standards in Europe
94
. This situation, in practice, would justify the formulation 
of a common concept of causation. A.G. Kokott takes the view that, in the context of 
non-contractual liability of European Union institutions under Article 340 TFEU, 
European Union law developed an independent notion of causation that “[f]or the sake 
of consistency” should be applied also in competition law litigation95. This criterion, as 
she acknowledges, is the “sufficiently direct causal nexus between the harmful conduct 
and the damage alleged”. She admits that, given the open-endedness of this concept, it 
would need further specification by the domestic judge. However, the A.G. Kokott 
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observes that the, in the end, national domestic approaches do not differ show wide 
discrepancies. Henceforth, and before delving into the specific analysis of causation in 
the specific case of umbrella pricing, the A.G. Kokott puts forward the, rather supposed, 
common theory of causation  for which “the criterion of a sufficiently direct causal link 
is in substance intended, on the one hand, to ensure that a person who has acted 
unlawfully is liable only for such loss as he could reasonably have foreseen (…). On the 
other hand, a person is liable only for loss the compensation of which is consistent with 
the objectives of the provision of law which he has infringed”96. At a closer inspection, 
this interpretation of the direct causal link is not rooted into CJEU’s case law but rather 
on selected national European causal canons. This theory seemingly bundles the English 
concept of remoteness to the German theory of the scope of the rule
97
. In confirmation 
of this view, it may be observed that the European Court of Justice did not follow this 
approach in its judgement. On the contrary the Court joined the previous case law 
stating that “in the absence of EU rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal 
system of each Member State to lay down the detailed rules governing the exercise of 
the right to claim compensation for the harm resulting from an agreement or practice 
prohibited under Article 101 TFEU, including those on the application of the concept of 
‘causal relationship’, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are 
observed”98. The Advocate General’s call for convergence shades light on an important 
topic that is the application of a common notion of causation in the law. However, the 
analysis of national systems shows that the diversity of approaches is rooted into the 
legal traditions of domestic civil law that is not, at present, a matter of EU law.
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IV. Causal uncertainty in damages claims for competition law 
infringement  
The common thread that connects all the jurisdictions analysed, despite the 
different theoretical backgrounds, is that courts tend to divide the assessment of 
causation in a two-stage process where the verification of the conditions of the causal 
link has a strong empirical base. In actions for infringement of competition law, where 
the claim for compensation is funded on a pure economic loss, the judge in order to 
assess the causal link can rely only on economic laws and logical inferences that are at 
the end expressed in terms of likelihood of the damage to be caused by the defendant’s 
action. From here the importance of analysing how probabilities are used in situations 
of causal uncertainty in antitrust damages claims. 
In abstract, it is possible to have a never ending chain of damages originating 
from an antitrust infringement. For instance, when a competitor is excluded from the 
market by an anticompetitive behaviour, there are normally several parties injured by 
this infringement, other than the foreclosed competitor. There are indeed the 
contractors, distributors and suppliers of the same competitor, who are normally injured 
by its exclusion from the market. Moreover, there might be employees who lose their 
jobs because of this loss of competitiveness. The causal nexus has to establish to which 
extent the different losses of these subjects can legitimate to claim for damages
1
. The 
risk of opening the way to compensation to any damage which is sufficiently connected 
to the infringement is overdeterrence. Moreover it would be contravened the 
compensatory nature of the antitrust damage.  
 Theory of causation has to solve also another problem: the injured party cannot 
be exempted from risks that would in any case bear
2
. Some authors pointed out that this 
is connected to the ‘theory of the aim’3. That is to say that liability of the antitrust 
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infringer covers only the consequences that the specific rule protects, but this protection 
finds no application when the damage would have in any case happen. 
For instance, if a cartel fixes an overcharge to the market price of a good, some 
consumers might renounce to the purchase. However, not all of them may have 
renounced because of the increased price, being it involved also external causes such as 
loss of interest in that good
4
. In these cases judges have to gauge the likeliness or 
probability of the events in order to infer the causative link. 
 
4.1. Balance of probabilities by national courts 
Causal uncertainty imposes to find accounts of causation different from a fully 
deterministic approach. The regularity theories of causation are those which evolved 
from the assertion of David Hume that causes are invariably followed by their effects: 
“We may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects 
similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second”5. However, it has been 
noted that, from a philosophic perspective, the limits of human knowledge make 
impossible to conceive a fully deterministic approach to causation. In this vein, Kneale 
defined probability as “the substitute with which we try to make good the shortcomings 
of our knowledge[…] to the extent of our knowledge is less than we could wish”6. 
The application of invariable patterns in the resolution of legal disputes deploys 
limits
7
 that might endanger the application of the law. In competition law this statement 
is even more true given the fact that the damage generally consists in an economic loss 
and no organic patterns that yields to a specific damage can be found. The limits of 
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 Luigi Prosperetti, Eleonora Pani, and Ines Tomasi, Il danno antitrust: una prospettiva economica (Il 
Mulino, 2009), 225. 
5
 David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. A Dissertation on the Passions. An 
Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. The Natural History of Religion (T. Cadell, 1772), section 
VII. 
6
 William Kneale, Probability and Induction (Clarendon Press, 1966), 45.  
7
 Neatly explained by David Lewis, Philosophical Papers, Volume II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986). 
 65 
 
regularity theories have been used, in many areas of tort law, to motivate the adoption 
of probabilistic approaches to causation
8
.  
Probability, in this thesis is intended both as a semantic tool
9
 and as statistical 
analysis of reality. Expressions such as probable, likely, possible, apparent, reasonable 
to think, most likely, credible, plausible and feasible, and the like, are justified by 
judges in order to assess the id quod plerumque accidit or to state a logic inference
10
. 
Probabilities do not just influence factual inferences but also the argument that serves as 
a means to substantiate the same fact. Therefore, the words ‘reasonably’ or ‘probably’, 
once entered into the legal jargon and accepted as a benchmark of proof, become a tool 
for reaching the conclusion also through their semantic structure
11
. 
Probability is used to investigate singular causal claims as well as general causal 
claims. General causal claims are those referred to an abstract causal connection 
between an unlawful event and a damage, for instance “cartels cause damages via price 
effect”. Singular causal claims are instead those referred to a specific instantiation: “the 
cartel X caused the overcharge, i.e. the damage via price effect”. 
Singular causal judgments are however generally framed upon generalisations, 
where probabilities play a significant role. These generalisations are fundamental to 
obviate the limitations of human knowledge in assessing with certainty life events.  
Probability has to be distinguished from the concept of probabilistic causation, 
that is the probability to increase the risk of the damage
12
. Although in other branches of 
tort law this theory has found vast room, in competition law enforcement, on the 
contrary, it is worth to reflect on the sole application of probability theories in order to 
gauge the likeliness that an event was caused by a specific set of causes. The use of 
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probability is indeed largely needed because, in many cases, it is uncertain in 
competition law the NESS inference that links conditions to the event. On the other 
hand, the unconditioned application of probabilistic cause would bring an 
uncontrollable extension of liability grounds for competition law infringements. 
Authors such as Wright rejected the validity of a probabilistic causation on the 
basis of the fact that it would lead to award damages also in cases where the result of the 
action does not happen. Wright notes that “[a] competing interpretation [of NESS 
approach], “probabilistic causation” has arisen from the confusion, which, despite its 
obvious implausibility, continues to attract a growing number of adherents at least 
among legal academics”13. Differently, Wright admonishes that “a causal law 
describes an invariable, non-probabilistic, causal connection between fully specified set 
of antecedent NESS conditions and some result”14. Wright looks at the probability 
mainly from its risk related point of view, based on which it is the risk to cause an event 
to be object of the claim and not the causation of the same event. However, probabilities 
can be applied in order to weight the different conditions and causes of the event. As 
seen in the logic of conditions applied to legal causation
15
, the judge has generally to 
decide which of the conditions caused the damage. This choice often hinges on 
probabilistic evaluations of the event to happen as a consequence of the specific 
condition. The probabilistic analysis in competition law is, moreover, strictly connected 
to the use of econometrics in national courtrooms
16
. 
The generalisation of causal conditions through probabilities
17
 can purport 
several problems in the application of competition law. It might happen, indeed, that the 
action is not fitted to cause the damage, or that it even decreased the probability of the 
damage to be produced, but nonetheless it should be accounted as a cause of the injury. 
A well-known example tells of a golfer who badly slices a golf ball. The ball shoots 
away toward the rough, but it then bounces off a tree and then into the cup for a hole-in-
                                                          
13
 Wright, “Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof,” 1030. 
14
 Ibid., 1043. 
15
 See paragraph 2.5. 
16
 See paragraph 6.6. 
17
 Hitchcock, Christopher, “Probabilistic Causation,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 
2012 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, 2012, available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/causation-probabilistic/. 
 67 
 
one
18
. The golfer's slice lowered the probability that the ball would wind up in the cup, 
yet nonetheless caused this result. The singular causation, in this case, is not explained 
by any generalising theory founded on probability
19
. In this case, the application of 
causal probability theories would clearly yield paradoxical results. 
The application of a NESS approach presumes the certainty of the sets of 
conditions that are being applied
20
. In order to obviate to this problem, for some authors, 
probabilities should be intended as mere indicators of possible reference classes that can 
be used to build causal generalisations
21
. The use of probabilities, in other terms, is 
translated into a criterion to choose among different sets of condition for the application 
of a NESS approach. In this vein, the NESS theory could be sided with the definition 
given by Cartwright for whom a cause is “a factor that increases the probability of its 
effect in every background context”22. Embedding probability into the NESS theory to 
this extent would allow to use the logic items of the theory of conditions without relying 
on fully deterministic approaches, above all when the conditions cannot be selected 
empirically
23
. Moreover, the use of this approach should be limited to the factual 
analysis of causation
24
. 
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4.2. The use of probability and the creation of risk 
Causal relations are generally intended to be objective features of the world for 
some branches of knowledge
25
. However, situation of causal uncertainty are an 
undeniable truth in areas such as competition law, and this uncertainty justifies to some 
extent the use of probability
26
, that takes the shape of an explanation of causal 
connections through scientific disciplines which interpret probabilities objectively. 
There are two main streams of interpretation of probability, that are the frequency 
theory and the propensity theory
27
. The former approach tends to reckon probability 
based on the number of measurement of a certain event in a particular time lapse
28
. It 
was initially designed for cases of asbestosis by the US Court of Appeals in Lohrmann, 
noting that “To support a reasonable inference of substantial causation from 
circumstantial evidence, there must be evidence of exposure to a specific product on a 
regular basis over some extended period of time in proximity to where the plaintiff 
actually worked”29. 
The second theory finds application, instead, for singular occurrences. Each 
individual occurrence has clearly no ‘frequency history’, but might have a particular 
propensity to yield a specific event in the future
30
. 
The responsibility for an event is therefore established when the action belongs 
to a class of events, all characterised by a high probability, intended as frequency or 
propensity, of causing the harm. The probability method, in its counterfactual 
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formulation, is instead founded upon the observation that a specific event had only few 
chances not to happen.  
The explanation of probability is generally integrated by the use of the risk 
theory
31
. Proof of causation consists, along these lines, in providing evidence that the 
probability of an event to happen equalled, ex ante, to a risk that was negligible (hence 
not foreseeable)
32. The risk’ test is applied generally when the claimant is not able to 
prove the material contribution of the tort to her damage. In such cases, some courts
33
 
allow claimants to prove that the illicit behaviour has materially contributed to the risk 
of suffering the damage
34
, easing the burden of proof of the claimant. In causal terms 
this means to substitute the proof of general causation to the substantiation of singular 
causation of the risk. What is important to note is that the object of the proof switches 
from the causation of a damage to the creation of a risk. For the risk theory, indeed, 
causation is given by the same probability of an event to happen. In this regard, some 
authors criticised the effects of the use of causal generalisations combined with the risk 
theory. When generalisations are framed in probability terms the risk of a class of 
events to happen draws to the conclusion that all the events belonging to the same class 
– and probability - will likely happen, and therefore infer causation. The probative 
relevance of the statistic proof raises doubts, therefore, when it blindly draws same 
conclusions for events that have same chances to happen
35
.  
In this dispute, Pucella wisely expounds that, in practical terms, when the use 
probability for assessing causal links brings to a re-balance of the burden of proof 
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between parties to the advantage of the claimant, this benefit is justified by the legal 
‘weight’ given to the risk created36. 
Therefore, the use of risk theories and probabilities in cases of causal uncertainty 
might be justified to the extent that it simplifies a burden of proof otherwise extremely 
difficult. However, the ‘risk’ of applying such theories in antitrust damages actions 
consists in the fact that it might take to a substantial by-pass of the assessment of 
causation. The infringement of competition law coincides already with the creation of a 
threat for other market players and, therefore, to a risk of damage to them. The 
assessment would by consequence stop to the finding of the antitrust infringement, as 
the risk of creating a damage to market actors would correspond to the restriction to the 
market
37
. But, competition law infringements, as known, may involve and touch the 
interests of many different subjects at the same time. Hence, while placing a rebuttable 
presumption of damage might, in some cases
38
, be reasonable in order to facilitate the 
actions for claimants, assuming the damage to private actors from the restriction to the 
market would equal to an unreasonable impairment for infringers. 
In Enron the Court solved this question stating that “Since a finding of 
infringement does not require proof that damage has in fact been caused to a rival 
undertaking, the fact that an infringement has been established does not show, as a 
necessary implication, that such damage has been caused”39. 
Differently, the finding of an infringement influences the probability of 
causation of a damage in cases of uncertainty. Probability becomes a tool to manage 
uncertainty in the hands of the judge sided with other logical instruments such as 
inferences and deductions, and, finally, common sense. Allowing such techniques into 
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the civil proceeding for compensation claims, responds also to policy aims that courts 
are (indirectly) in charge to apply.  
The probabilistic reasoning affects also the approach to the proof of the causal 
link. For instance, when the proof is given through counterfactuals, the claimant 
substantiate that the actions yields a particular result showing that if the action had not 
happen, the damage would have been avoided. In other words, the statement shifts from 
a standard counterfactual which recites “if A had not committed the infringement, B 
would not have been injured”, to the case of indeterministic outcomes, where 
probabilistic formulation has to be preferred: “if A had not committed the infringement, 
B’s probability of being damaged would have been only X %”. 
However, the over-reliance on scientific or economic concepts in competition 
law has being criticised from different angles
40
. Moreover, it has to be noted that causal 
uncertainty is boosted by the use of scientific concepts to the extent that in some cases it 
even impedes the finding of an etiologic connection
41
. In such cases, some courts resorts 
to the principle of common sense, in order to determine a judicial truth that, not 
necessarily has to reproduce the empirical truth.  In this vein, Lord Salmon argued that 
“The nature of causation has been discussed by many eminent philosophers and also by 
a number of learned judges in the past. I consider, however, that what or who has 
caused a certain event to occur is essentially a practical question of fact which can best 
be answered by ordinary commonsense rather than abstract metaphysical theory”42. 
 
4.3. Loss of chance 
The creation or contribution to a risky situation can impede a particular event to 
be brought about. The event remains in its ‘potentiality’ and, therefore, it is measurable 
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only through probability to happen in a counterfactual universe. The situation that, due 
to the defendant’s action, was not realised, is a lost chance43.  
The lost chances theory predicates that the damage consists in the probability 
that the claimant had (before the infringement) to avoid the damage. The loss of chance 
does not refer, therefore, to the final damage and the probability that this might happen. 
It might also consist instead in a different head of damage
44
.  
In competition law damages actions, the causative link between, the 
anticompetitive behaviour and the damage claimed may be assessed through the risk 
added by the infringement to the loss of chance. Risk and chances are different, but 
raising the risk of damage might lower the chances to avoid it. However, general class-
based probabilities of risk should not be confused with the proof of a loss of chances. 
Let us take the example of a claimant that, in a follow-on action, maintains to have lost 
the chance to close a contract because of an exclusionary abuse. In this case, the judge 
may determine that the abuse raised the risk of such type of contract not to be concluded 
by competitors. However, the singular causation requires the assessment of the fact that 
that particular cartel impeded the conclusion of that specific contract. 
The lost chance generally refers in tort law to an infringement which caused a 
loss to reach a rather probable outcome or objective or to avoid an undesired one.  
With regard to economic damages, the possible cases of loss of chance are 
many: inability of the victim to develop business relationships with a customer or to 
enter a market, to access and exploit a particular technology, to renew a concession 
contract, to avoid contracting a disproportionate loan or bond
45
, to make highly risky 
investments
46
 or, finally, to make an investment on life insurance
47
. A further practical 
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consequence of the application of such approach is that it affects the quantum of 
damage and not necessarily the an debeatur. Indeed, if the grievance is accepted by the 
judge the damage awarded will amount not to the damage but to the loss of chance. 
Lost chances should not be confused with lost profits, although they both 
address a future lost income. The qualification of the damage as loss of chances or lost 
profits becomes decisive indeed at the moment of calculation of damages. Take as an 
example a case where the lost profits would amount to 100 with a probability of 80% 
and to 500 for the remaining 20%. If the damage is qualified as a loss of profits, the 
damage would be quantified in 100, since that is the amount that ‘most probably’ (80%) 
the claimant was going to earn, while the 500 possible loss would remain a neglectable 
possibility (only 20%). By contrast, if we define the damage as a loss of chances, both 
opportunities have to be quantified in relation to their chances to be realised. Hence, the 
damage would amount to 180 (that is 100*80% e 500*20%)
48
. 
In general terms, while a claim for lost profits focuses on the earning which 
cease to exist, the lost chances address a future income that exists as a possibility to do 
business
49
. In antitrust litigation these claims are easily confused by claimants that, as 
Hovenkamp observes, “generally claims damages for what may be loosely 
characterized as lost profits”. The author suggests that in cases such as “reduction in 
market share, a smaller markup per unit sold, an existing firm's loss of investment or 
business assets, or preclusion from entry into a profitable business (…) the measure of 
damages is so imprecise that "loss of the opportunity to do business" would describe the 
plaintiff's loss more accurately than "lost profits," which suggests a sum that is 
quantifiable with a fair amount of precision”50. 
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4.4. Lost chances in national antitrust case law 
European courts have different positions over the indemnifiable nature of such 
hypothetical damages
51
.  
In France the concept of loss of chance (“perte de chance”) is generally used in 
order to obviate to the shortcomings of legal causation
52
. The lost chance permits to by-
pass the proof of a causal connection between action and damage because, for French 
law, it is an independent head of damage
53
. In this vein the Cour de Cassation requires 
the claimant to prove the lost chance as well as the causal connection between the action 
and the lost chance
54
 also in cases of pure economic loss
55
. The probability of lost 
chances is calculated as a percentage, that is then compensated. 
In competition law litigation the lost chance theory has been used in different 
cases before French courts. In SAS Ajinomoto Eurolysine v. SNC Doux Aliments
56
 the 
decision of the Court of Appeal of Paris was based on a follow-on claim raised by Doux 
against the price increase of lysine due to the cartel found by the Commission
57
. The 
European Commission fined several producers of lysine for operating a global price-
fixing cartel. Doux, a French poultry producer using lysine in its aliments
58
, claimed 
damages resulting from the cartel price increase. The claimant maintained that as a 
result of the cartel overcharge it suffered damages due to the cartel price overcharge, to 
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a reduction of profit margins and to loss in competitiveness. The defendant, Ajinamoto 
Eurolysine, opposed the fact that Doux had passed the overcharge on to its buyers and 
objected also the expert opinion submitted by the claimant, observing that it was 
imprecise. The Court of Appeal rejected the passing-on defence and stated that the 
amount of damages had to be calculated as lost chances due to the reduced 
competitiveness on the market, to be calculated in the amount of the 30% of the amount 
claimed
59
.  
The Court of Cassation considered that the judgement of Court of Appeal lacked 
legal basis for decisions under Article 1382 of the French civil code
60
, by not 
considering whether the claimant Doux had totally or partially passed-on to its 
customers the additional costs resulting from the infringement committed by the 
Ajinamoto, so that the allocation of damages could cause them unjust enrichment. On 
the other hand, the Court of Appeal violated Article 16 of the French code of civil 
procedure
61
 because did not invite the parties to submit their comments when converted 
part of Doux’s claim in an appeal for lost chances. Moreover, the Court of Cassation 
objected that the judges must prove the existence of a causal link between the event 
giving rise to liability and the loss of a chance which should not be presumed, by 
retaining that the prejudice to Doux consisted of a loss of opportunity to maintain the 
competitiveness of its products. The fact that the lysine market prices had been subject 
to erratic fluctuations should not bring the judge to infer that the causal link between the 
rise in prices and loss of competitiveness of products by Ajinomoto, as the damage 
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remain purely hypothetical, and therefore violates the principle expressed by the Article 
1382 of the French civil code
62
.  
In at least other two competition law damages actions, French courts have 
instead successfully granted damages for loss of chances. The first regards a judgment 
of the Court of Appeal of Versailles facing a claim for damages caused by the selective 
rebates operated by the defendant
63
. The Court observed that the selective rebates policy 
benefitted only some competitors causing a loss of chance to the claimant who, 
potentially, had had more chances to increase the number of sales but-for the 
infringement. 
In a second successful case, a potential buyer of a newspaper stall claimed 
damages for exclusion from the distribution network of SNC, the local incumbent for 
newspapers
64
. The Court of Appeal granted damages to Mr. Merhi in form of lost 
chances caused by the fact that the claimant had refused to sign the contract with SNC 
under potentially illegal clauses imposed by the firm in dominant position.  
In England, the notion of loss of chances does not find the same broad 
application as in France. While, indeed, it has been for long accepted in contractual 
disputes related to financial losses
65
, in tort law disputes courts have been more 
sceptical
66
. 
The application of the ‘more probable than not’ or ‘50+’ rule, impeded a scalar 
application of the lost chances. British courts tend to be therefore very reluctant to grant 
damages for loss of chances, especially in medical negligence, where the House of 
Lords has twice rejected such claims, in Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health 
Authority
67
 and Gregg v Scott
68
. However, outside the area of medical malpractice, 
British courts are more prone to accept such claims, in particular in cases of pure 
economic loss, as for instance the decision in Allied Maples v Simmons & Simmons
69
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that regards a claim on professional responsibility and company law. With specific 
regard to competition law damages actions, a future economic loss was generally 
considered too remote to be accounted as an independent head of damage. In Crehan v 
Inntrepreneur Pub Company CPC
70
, the first UK case awarding damages for breach of 
competition law, Mr Crehan – a pub owner – claimed damages caused by the lease 
contract with CPC which he maintained to be unlawful for breach of Article 81 (now 
Article 101 TFUE). In particular Mr Crehan claimed to have felt consistent losses of 
chances to compete against pubs which were purchasing beers at more competitive 
prices. Moreover, he reasoned, the loss was flowing from his inability to "shop around 
for best buys". The Court of Appeal considered that under English law the damages 
should not be awarded for a lack of causal link. However, in application of the principle 
of effectiveness, such damages had to be awarded, as the CJEU stated that private 
enforcement of EU competition law covers also such type of losses
71
.  
This approach has been reversed in recent times, in particular with the 
conclusions reached by the Court of Appeal in Enron v. English Welsh & Scottish 
Railway
 72
. Here, the claimant sustained a loss of chances caused by the abuse of 
dominant position of the defendant. The infringement of competition law was 
practically uncontested, given that the action was a follow-on type and the violation of 
art. 102 TFEU was already assessed by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR). Moreover, 
the British Authority also found out that English Welsh & Scottish Railway (EWS) 
deliberately tried to endanger Enron position in the relevant market through a 
discriminatory treatment of the claimant, that was placed at a competitive disadvantage 
in its contractual negotiations with Edison Mission Energy Ltd (EME). On these basis 
Enron claimed the abuse of dominant position of EWS deprived Enron of a real or 
substantial chance of winning a contract for the supply of coal to one of EME’s power 
stations for the period spanning from 2001 to 2004
73
. Finally, for the Court the 
grievance purported by Enron was also adequately substantiated. The plaintiff claimed 
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damages in form of loss of profits for failing to close an E2E contract with Edison 
because of the competitive disadvantage caused by the EWS anticompetitive behaviour. 
However, the Tribunal, in first instance, observed that Enron, even in absence of 
the anticompetitive conduct, had few (if any) chances to win the coal contract from 
Edison. The anticompetitive behaviour, translated in causal language, was therefore a 
condition of the harm but not necessary and not even probable.  
The CAT, endorsing the first instance decision, evaluated the findings of the 
Authority in terms of causal connection to the harm claimed and observed that “The 
finding of competitive disadvantage (which EWS accepts, as it must) means that EWS 
hindered the competitive position of ECSL in relation to the EME Tender. This is 
certainly relevant to, but not determinative of, the question of causation. It is relevant 
because it means that ECSL was impeded in its ability to offer EME competitive rates 
for coal haulage and supply. It is not determinative because the Decision does not 
establish that ECSL was well-placed to win a coal supply contract with EME absent the 
abuse.”74. The loss of chance for not winning the contract was therefore not causally 
connected to the competitive impairment suffered by Enron. However, in this decision 
the English courts argue around the right to recover lost chances, confirming that it is 
possible to claim such damages if adequate proof of causal connection is provided. 
By the same token, in the case 2 Tavel v Cardiff Bus
75
 the CAT rejected the 
claims related to loss of a capital asset, loss of a commercial opportunity and for the 
costs of 2 Travel’s liquidation, on the basis of the fact that the infringement was not a 
necessary condition of the loss. The OFT found that Cardiff Bus had abused of its 
dominant position in the Cardiff bus market by seeking to force 2 Travel out of that 
market. However, the CAT rejected the further claims observing that “We have found 
that the Infringement would have resulted in additional revenue to the company of 
£33,818.79. This was a drop in the ocean, and could not have saved the company. We 
consider the Infringement to be causally irrelevant to 2 Travel’s demise”76. 
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German tort law, instead, generally rejects the application of loss of chances 
theory, on the basis of the fact that “If the chance has no economic value, redefining the 
damage encounters difficulties because the loss of this chance cannot be qualified as 
recognisable damage which can be compensated”77. 
German law predicates an all-or-nothing approach that, for the prevalent 
doctrine, cannot be reconciled with the application of lost chances theory
78
. In 
competition law damages actions, claimants visibly qualify the head of damage as a loss 
of profits
79
, when possible.  
Italian judges, instead, are more willing to accept claims based on lost chances, 
relying on probabilistic theories of adequate causation
80
. In Italy the lost chance became 
an independent head of damage through a deep revision of tort rules by the Supreme 
Court which declared protected by law also the lost possibility to realise a positive 
outcome in the future
81
. The probability of the positive event to happen, not necessarily 
has to be more than 50%, as the Italian case law, differently from common law 
traditions, requires a “reasonable certainty of a positive probability”82. 
The Tribunal of Milan treated the issue of loss of chance also in two recent 
competition law damages actions
83
.  In one of these cases, Brennercom, a telecom 
company, claimed damages with two different actions against Telecom and Tim, two 
national telecom incumbents. Two was also the number of the correspondent decisions 
of the Italian Antitrust Authority (AGCM) ascertaining an abuse of dominant position 
of the national incumbent. Although in none of the AGCM’s decision Brennercom was 
mentioned, the judge deemed reasonable to define both actions as follow-on type. 
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Brennercom was indeed operating in the same market interested by the Authority’s 
decision, although with geographical limitation given by the fact that its business was 
mainly (if not solely) based in the Region of Trentino and Alto Adige. Brennercom 
claimed to have lost reasonable chances to close contracts with potential clients due to 
Telecom’s abuse of dominant position. The claimant therefore observed that, in absence 
of Telecom’s infringement, would have had the chance to acquire more clients and 
reckoned the damage as a percentage corresponding to the probability of this positive 
outcome. The Italian court acknowledged that the loss of chances are one of the 
categories of damages subject to compensation in competition law actions
84
. However, 
the court quashed the claim from Brennercom in the part related to loss of chances on 
the ground that the claimant failed to substantiate the possible future chance and its 
causal connection to the antitrust infringement. In particular, Brennercom did not 
submit a sufficient proof of the fact that potential clients preferred contracting with TIM 
or Telecom Italia, depriving therefore Brennercom of the chance to gain a potential 
client
85
.  In general terms, if it is not possible to substantiate a link between damage and 
event, it would be correspondently complicated to give evidence of the fact that the 
same behaviour reduced the probability of avoiding the same damage
86
. 
In some cases the lost chances can however facilitate the burden of proving 
causation to the claimant
87
 in the sense that the claimant can move the ground for the 
proof from the very complex one of the causal relationship between action and damage 
to the more immediate one that connect the action to the loss of a chance. The loss of a 
chance brings the judge to operate a substitution in the causal reasoning: in place of the 
effects of the infringement, there is the probability of that action to produce the effects. 
In competition law possible grounds for claims based on lost chances are 
numerous. For instance, a firm might claim the loss of the chance to conclude a contract 
that failed to secure because of the exclusionary infringement of the incumbent. 
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Otherwise, a consumer might ask for the damages caused by the loss of chance to 
purchase a good because of its cartel inflated price. 
Modern theories tend to calculate the probability of lost chances as a quota of 
the final damage, if happened
88
. However, this translation of probabilities in actual 
damages gives, sometimes, the illusion that probabilities equal certainties, at least from 
a legal viewpoint. Moreover, the quota of lost chances has a relative weight depending 
on the position of the damaged party and the final damage. A 30% loss, in terms of 
future chances of reaching a certain objective, exercises a different power whether the 
loss takes the chances from 90 to 60 or from 40 to 10. In the latter, case, indeed, the 
damage is clearly more important since the successful expectations are highly 
diminished almost to 0, although in both cases the quota amount to a 30 %. 
However legal rules do not strictly reflect the application of naked probabilities, 
to the extent that, above all in highly complicated cases, the search for causal relation 
becomes the judgment between competing narratives. Moreover policy considerations 
are of utmost importance, and sometimes the main driver of the decision. 
 
4.5. Probability, causal uncertainty and competition  
The take-over from philosophy and legal reasoning should be enough persuasive 
to devoid from thinking that causation can ever be certain. Causal uncertainty requires 
therefore the use of reasoning which are not fully deterministic. However, the 
probabilistic appreciation of causation, if becomes the rule completed by a proportional 
approach, purports serious problems. First of all, with this approach the probability 
would become subject to indemnification also when it is very small
89
. Hence, if the 
probability for a competing firm to conclude the contract ‘but-for’ the anticompetitive 
behaviour are ten per cent, the judge should grant a corresponding pro quota damage for 
the firm has lost a very small, but still a chance. Potentially, every situation would be 
prone to damages claims.  
This approach would, therefore, contrast the general principles of causation 
developed in tort law traditions for which the high probability of an event to happen, 
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corresponds to a legal certainty, while a low probability corresponds to non-
indemnifiability
90
. Furthermore this method would create a massive recourse to 
litigation, since all damages would be subject to compensation. 
Moreover, probability theories go hand-in-hand with the observation of creation 
of risk. The probability of an event is indeed often reckoned by courts observing the risk 
added or created by the action. This risk, in competition law, takes the form of the 
likelihood of an impairment created on the market. For instance, in case of a claim for 
damages resulting from the loss of the chance to close a contract, the claimant might 
want to demonstrate that while without infringement he would have had a 80% chances 
to close the contract, after the infringement, due to the market distortion provoked, the 
chances decreased to 30%. However, proportional liability might be used when 
probabilities are close to a ‘turning point’ but not sufficient to justify the application of 
the ‘all-or-nothing” approach 91. 
 
4.6. Causal proportional liability and multiple tortfeasors 
When an anti-competitive harm is caused by more than one undertaking, 
typically in case of cartels, a problem of imputation of cartel damages and of liability of 
each antirust infringer arises. The Damages Directive opted for solution where all the 
undertakings taking part to the same breach of competition law are jointly (solidary) and 
severally liable for the harm caused
92
. By consequence, each undertaking is “bound to 
compensate for the harm in full, and the injured party has the right to require full 
compensation from any of them until he has been fully compensated”93. The European 
legislator opted, in this first rule, for avoiding any form of causal apportionment of the 
damage. The multiple tortfeasors who have caused the anticompetitive harm are each 
accountable for the whole damage. The infringer who paid the compensation has the 
right to recover a contribution from the co-infringers. The solution laid down by the 
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Directive endorses the main trend in Member States tort laws, where, in order to avoid 
inconsistencies of the application of deterministic approaches (such as but-for test or 
adequate causality) they prefer to account every tortfeasor in solidum
94
. Similarly, the 
PETL states that “[l]iability is solidary where the whole or a distinct part of the 
damage suffered by the victim is attributable to two or more persons”95.  
In order to obviate to the shortcomings of the overdetermined causation cases, it 
was suggested that in case of multiple defendants, if each action was a sufficient 
condition of the harm, the but-for test has to be applied to the aggregate of potential 
causes
96
. These rules are clearly developed in order to make possible and, in any case, 
ease the burden of proof of the harmed party who seeks compensation. 
The apportionment of the damage among the tortfeasors happens in a second 
moment, subsequent to the finding of the causal responsibility of the cartelists. The 
defendant, through recourse claims, can seek restoration from the co-infringers. 
Domestic tort laws regulate this apportionment, which is generally based on 
comparative fault
97
. By consequence the recourse claim does not have to establish any 
causation issue, such as the causal contribution of each tortfeasor. 
However, the Directive leaves open to the choice of each jurisdiction whether to 
apply an alternative system of causal proportional liability
98
. At Article 11 (5) the 
Directive states indeed that “the Member States shall ensure that an infringer may 
recover a contribution from any other infringer, the amount of which shall be 
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determined in the light of their relative responsibility for the harm caused by the 
infringement of competition law”. Moreover, the Directive points out that “[t]he 
determination of that share as the relative responsibility of a given infringer, and the 
relevant criteria such as turnover, market share, or role in the cartel, is a matter for the 
applicable national law, while respecting the principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence”99. 
On this basis, it is valid the apportionment of liability among the independent 
tortfeasors done in accordance with their causal contribution to the risk of harm
100
. 
Proportional liability is a general term used to refer to the apportionment of liability 
between defendant and plaintiffs or solely between defendants on the basis of the 
portion of liability their share in the illegal event
101
.  
Causal proportional liability systems seek to adjust liability to the extent of its 
singular contribution to the damage. Therefore, the liability of the defendant equals the 
probability that he has caused the damage. For instance, if the company D abused of its 
dominant position excluding other competitors from the market and one of these claims 
damages deriving from loss of clients, the judge might award damages in proportion to 
the probability of the loss to happen.  
A second application of the proportional liability theory regards the 
apportionment of liability amongst many tortfeasors. In these cases, every defendant 
will respond in measure of the amount of its proportional participation to the 
infringement. Rules of apportionment of liability such as contributory negligence and 
comparative fault
102
 differ from causal proportional liability with multiple tortfeasors. 
While indeed in the first case, the factual causation is already assessed through 
conventional means and the apportionment is only a way to distribute the damage 
among the tortfeasors, in the case of CPL, the apportionment regards the very moment 
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100
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101
 Ibid., 5. 
102
 See for a comparative analysis of their usage, Van Dam, European Tort Law, 309. In this vein, Lord 
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of assessment of causation
103
. The adoption of a causal proportional liability test poses, 
however, a heavier burden of proof on the claimant while easing the position of the 
defendants.  
Scholars have put forward also a third category comprising the uncertainty of 
the causation of a future event
104
. In competition law private actions, such a study can 
deploy a useful role in helping the judge in actions for injunction and to deter future 
damages
105
. The object of this class of events is therefore an unrealized risk of a 
potential future harm. 
The retrospective application of CPL to past events, fosters instead the pursue of 
the goals of justice and fairness in tort law, apportioning liability on the basis of the 
causal contribution of each defendant, who will pay only for what he caused. 
Moreover, the proportional liability test allows to overcome the impasse created 
by the cumulative foreclosure effect of parallel networks. It might happen that a number 
parallel networks are each of them incapable of hindering the market. However, the 
aggregate effect of all such networks might foreclose other competitors causing a 
restriction to the competition
106
. The application of the but-for test to each network, 
would inevitably bring to the exclusion of any liability, since the single network 
behaviour is not a sufficient cause of the event. Differently, the causal proportional 
liability test takes for granted that the damage has necessarily a cause and proceeds 
directly with the analysis of the causal contribution of each participant.  
It is worth to notice that the Directive makes possible the recourse claim only 
against co-infringers. By consequence, the infringer who pays more than his own share 
of the harm, would not be able to obtain a contribution from subjects that did not 
partake to the infringement but were enriched by it. For instance, in case of umbrella 
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pricing, the infringer is not allowed to obtain a contribution from the direct purchaser 
who followed the umbrella prices but was not part of the cartel. If the domestic tort law 
provides the suitable means, the cartelist might be able to ask the restitution of that 
amount to the umbrella buyer.  
Finally, causal proportional liability might be an efficient instrument also in 
some instances where there is only one undertaking who acted through different legal 
persons forming a group, also called single economic entity.    
 
4.7. The single economic entity and the causal contribution to the harm 
It is treat law that a wholly owned subsidiary is presumed to be under decisive 
control of its parent company with regard to the application of competition law rules
107
. 
By consequence, the judge may ascribe the infringements committed by the subsidiary 
to the parent company, as under a direct causal relationship. This presumption is a 
corollary of the single economic unit theory developed by British courts,
108
 and then 
adopted by the CJEU to competition law
109
. The aim is to bypass the separate legal 
personality in groups of companies, in order to pursue the parent company hiding 
behind a ‘sham’ subsidiary.  
Competition law rules (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU) refer, as the subject of their 
provisions, to ‘undertakings’. This term encompasses not only companies, but also 
associations, cooperatives, professional regulatory bodies and any other business 
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activity, having or not a legal personality or a corporate form
110
. However, neither the 
term ‘undertaking’ nor the concept of single economic unit are defined by European 
law, not even in ‘soft law’ provisions. The single economic entity, indeed, is 
semantically and practically a creation of doctrine and case law. The first definition of 
undertaking in the European case law hails from the Shell case which describes 
undertakings as “economic units which consist of a unitary organisation of personal, 
tangible and intangible elements which pursues a specific economic aim on a long-term 
basis and can contribute to the commission of an infringement of the kind referred to in 
that provision [art. 101 TFEU]”111. The term undertaking, therefore, refers to the 
economic activity carried out more than to the subject conducting it. If so, there is a 
plethora of definitions of ‘economic activity’ that could be borrowed from the academia 
and the jurisprudence
112
, each of them convincing from an economic point of view. As 
for the application of competition law, the definition given in Shell has being recalled 
by all the following decisions and is now an established principle. However, when the 
discourse shifts to the assessment of causation and liability, the mere economic 
definition of undertaking is not enough.  In particular, when the undertaking addressed 
by the claim is a compound of different legal entities, which is a conglomerate of 
companies
113
, it might be objected a lack of causal contribution to the infringement of 
one of the companies forming it.  
The principle of corporate legal personality introduced the limited liability, as it 
was created to admit the separation of a legal entity from the individuals who concurred 
to create it. With the act of incorporation the law sanctions indeed the creation of a legal 
person. The corporate personality compels, on one side, the capacity to amend rights 
and obligations and, on the other side, the liability for the infringement of those 
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obligations
114
. Juridical or legal personality is a ‘fictio juris’ introduced by law to 
restrict the liability of firms to their assets. However, the principle of corporate separate 
legal personality is not as straightforward as it appears in its application, especially 
when the legal entity is used as a shield or a mere façade. The history of the piercing the 
corporate veil theory perfectly expounds this difficulty
115
. In some cases, subsidiaries of 
larger group of companies might be used to shield parent companies and prevent them 
from liability. In such cases, parent companies use their subsidiaries as instruments to 
pursue specific illicit aims
116
. The single economic unit principle has been then 
reinterpreted by European courts in order to fit it with the normative and jurisprudential 
background of European competition law. Therefore, tracing down its inception from 
the ‘piercing the corporate veil’ theory117, the single economic entity principle has being 
developed and adapted to the needs of competition law by European courts and 
Institutions, in particular equating it to the concept of undertaking. The notion of 
undertaking
118
 has being introduced by the European legislator in order to address the 
economic activities infringing competition law rather than the legal entities.
119
  
However, it is through the courts interpretation that the definition has being adapted to 
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match the single economic entity theory. While at the beginning the term undertaking 
was meant to draw attention to the different activities operated by the same legal 
entity,
120
 rather than on a compound of different entities, it became lately an instrument 
for joining several companies as if they deliver a single economic activity. This 
approach is summarised by the Court of Justice which states that  “the definition of an 
‘undertaking’ covers any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal 
status and the way in which it is financed”121. The interpretation of undertaking shifted 
therefore from a more restrictive view, in its inception, to a much broader definition 
which is comprehensive of corporate conglomerates. In Akzo, the CJEU pointed out 
that when a parent company owns, directly or indirectly, all the shares of the subsidiary 
there is a rebuttable presumption of liability of the parent company for the 
anticompetitive behaviours of the subsidiary
122
. The CJEU formed, in other words, a 
form of vicarious liability for competition law infringements. By consequence, the 
assessment of causation has to be likewise adapted
123
.   
The consequence of the application of such rule is that when one of the legal 
entities forming the group causes a damage for infringement of competition law, the 
responsibility spreads all over the group, with no need to substantiate a causal 
contribution. A company part might indeed give evidence of the absence of any control 
and, therefore, that it is not part of a single economic entity, but it cannot find 
exemption from liability substantiating lack of causation. 
In these cases the causal proportional liability might help to restore a balance, 
dividing the liability among the different legal entities on the basis of their causal 
contribution to the harm.
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V. Proof of causation and standards of proof in competition damages 
actions 
Causation, as any other element of the claim, has to be proven in the proceeding. 
The standard of persuasion adopted by the court is the level of proof demanded in a 
certain type of cases and it varies across European countries. In this chapter I will firstly 
analyse comparatively the different approaches adopted by the four countries under 
scrutiny and, secondly, I will deep into the rules developed by European courts. 
Issues of evidence are generally regarded as rules of procedure that benefit of 
the principle of procedural autonomy of Member States.  Therefore, in competition law 
cases, national courts are left free to apply the standards of proof provided by their 
domestic laws of procedure. 
The Treaty contains no rules on standards or evidences and Regulation 1/2003 
clearly states, at the Recital (5), that “This Regulation affects neither national rules on 
the standard of proof nor obligations of competition authorities and courts of the 
Member States to ascertain the relevant facts of a case, provided that such rules and 
obligations are compatible with general principles of Community law”1. 
The Directive n. 2014/104 considers that the effectiveness and consistency of 
the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU requires a convergence of the approaches 
across the Union on the disclosure of evidences in order to ease homogeneously the 
burden of proof across the EU. Moreover, the Directive notes that “Actions for damages 
for infringements of Union or national competition law typically require a complex 
factual and economic analysis” and, since “The evidence necessary to prove a claim for 
damages is often held exclusively by the opposing party or by third parties (..) strict 
legal requirements for claimants to assert in detail all the facts of their case at the 
beginning of an action and to proffer precisely specified items of supporting evidence 
can unduly impede the effective exercise of the right to compensation guaranteed by the 
TFEU”2. 
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In the pursuit of this aim the Directive states that “Member States shall ensure 
that national courts are able, upon request of the defendant, to order the claimant or a 
third party to disclose relevant evidence”3. Although the definition of the term ‘standard 
of proof’ remains rather vague and non-defined by EU law, it appeared in many of the 
Court’s competition law judgements4. 
In competition law, the European Courts do not provide any detailed 
specification of the degree required for the standard of proof
5
, limiting often the 
requirement to the “requisite legal standard” (“à suffisance de droit”)6. In some cases, 
the Courts additionally defined the standard of proof as “sufficiently proved in law”7, 
“sufficiently precise and coherent proof”8 and finally applied the method of “a firm, 
precise and consistent body of evidence” where there is no documentary evidence of 
concertation between producers
9
.  
With regard to the distinction to be maintained between burden of proof and 
standard of proof, Advocate General Kokott, in her Opinion to Case C‑97/08 P Akzo 
Nobel and Others v Commission, pointed out that “The standard of proof determines the 
requirements which must be satisfied for facts to be regarded as proven. It must be 
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distinguished from the burden of proof. The burden of proof determines, first, which 
party must put forward the facts and, where necessary, adduce the related evidence 
(subjektive or formelle Beweislast, also known as the evidential burden); second, the 
allocation of that burden determines which party bears the risk of facts remaining 
unresolved or allegations unproven (objektive or materielle Beweislast)”10. 
In the same vein, Advocate General Jääskinen, considered, in the case French 
Republic v Commission that “in the case of an implied guarantee inferred from a body 
of evidence, the standard of proof must be based on serious probability and sufficiency 
of evidence. The requisite standard is thus more than mere probability, whilst falling 
short of a requirement of being beyond all reasonable doubt.”11.  
However, this case law regards the burden of proof required for demonstrating 
the antitrust infringement in administrative proceedings. Differently, proof of causation 
in a competition law damages action mixes the requirements of national tort law with 
the limits established by EU rules and the typical causal uncertainty surrounding 
antitrust damages. Moreover, it has to be noted that competition law remedies have a 
mixed public and private nature
12
 that has the effect of heightening the standard of proof 
required. 
  
5.1. Proving causation in national courts 
The analysis of the law of evidences and their assessment by the judge is, from a 
scholarly point of view, a subject that received more attention in common law 
jurisdictions rather than in civil law countries. 
Judges exercise a certain degree of discretion in ‘weighting’ and evaluating the 
proof. This is true in both civil law and common law jurisdictions, although with some 
differences. The standards of persuasion of the judge can be lax or more constrained by 
formal limits but they are generally funded on the principle of ‘free evaluation’ of the 
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proof in order to reach conviction. In a paper published in 2002 Clermont and Sherwin 
maintained that the common-law preponderance standard is able to produce more 
accurate results than what they defined an “obscure” civil law standard13. Although 
harshly criticised by the following literature
14
, that paper had the merit to cast a light on 
a rather obfuscated part of the comparative research. 
In civil litigation, European national courts apply standards that are diversely 
formulated but that generally converge toward the intime conviction of the judge in civil 
law countries and to the balance of probabilities in common law countries. In 
competition law cases the free appreciation of the proof by the judge is even more 
poignant if we think that rarely national courts possess documentary evidence of both 
damage and  infringement
15
.  It is therefore a useful exercise - but not a resolving one - 
to observe the different standards adopted in civil and common law countries, to 
understand how the degree of the proof of causation in competition law varies 
depending on the court where the case is heard. 
 
a. Civil law jurisdictions 
In civil law countries, the degree of proof varies but it is generally 
acknowledged that the proof submitted has to be at least ‘sufficient’ in order to convince 
the judge about the claim or defence.  The diffuse standard in civil law countries, is the 
‘intime conviction’ of the judge16. This definition clearly differs from the standard 
                                                          
13
 Kevin M. Clermont and Emily Sherwin, “A Comparative View of Standards of Proof,” The American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 2002, 243–75. 
14
 See, among the others, Michele Taruffo, “Rethinking the Standards of Proof,” The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 2003, 659–77; Christoph Engel, “Preponderance of the Evidence versus Intime 
Conviction: A Behavior Perspective on a Conflict between American and Continental European Law,” Vt. 
L. Rev. 33 (2008): 435; Richard W. Wright, “Proving Causation: Probability versus Belief,” in 
Perspectives on Causation, ed. Richard Goldberg (Hart Publishing, 2011), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1918474. In particular Taruffo asserted that Clermont and Sherwin have fallen 
prey to a “reductivist fallacy”, due to a shallow comparative overview (at 659). 
15
 Lianos, Ioannis, “‘Judging’ Economists: Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation - A 
European View,” in The Reform of EC Competition Law: New Challenges, ed. Ioannis, Lianos and 
Ioannis Kokkoris (Kluwer, 2009), Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1468502 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1468502, 90-91. 
16
 See French Code de Procédure Pénale, Art. 3531; German Zivilprozessordnung, § 286 I 1; German 
Strafprozessordnung, § 261, Art. 116 Italian Codice di procedura civile. 
 95 
 
‘beyond reasonable doubts’ that should characterise the criminal procedure, although in 
some civil law systems such requirements are not differentiated by law
17
.   
In France, for instance, the law does not require the trier of facts to adopt any 
different standard of proof between criminal and civil law procedure
18
. The Article 353 
of the French Code de Procédure Pénale, talks indeed of ‘intime conviction’ of the 
judge. This means that the judge need to reach a personal, subjective, belief in the truth 
of the facts of the proceeding
19
. However, this should not bring to the conclusion that 
judges adopt the same standard in criminal and civil procedures
20
.  
On the other hand, while Continental civil law traditions similarly apply a 
standard recalling the subjective conviction of the judge on the specific case at hand, 
some of them have also sided this analysis with the probabilistic approach.  
For instance, in Germany, Section 261 of the German Code of Criminal 
Procedure states: “The court shall decide on the result of the evidence taken according 
to its free conviction gained from the hearing as a whole”. Thus, in Germany again it is 
required a minimum standard of persuasion of the judge based on her free conviction
21
, 
but courts, in the evaluation of the proof, generally apply the ‘preponderance of the 
evidence’ rule22. However, the leading German Courts decisions on the interpretation of 
the standard of proof has clarified that even a very high probability would not suffice a 
judge who did not reach a personal conviction about the case at hand
23
. More than a 
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discretionary decision, some authors explain, the judge is asked to adopt an empirical 
standard
24
 resting on “ethos, experience and intuition”25. 
In Italy, the Court of Cassation expressly stated that it pursues the application of 
the standard of ‘more probable than not’ in civil cases and ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ in 
criminal proceeding: “As this Court has previously stated, the main difference [between 
the penal and civil processes] is in the standards of proof that each system requires 
(Cass. Pen., S.U., 11.09.2002, n. 30328). The Penal Code requires proof ‘beyond a 
reasonable doubt’ while the Civil Code merely requires ‘more probable than not.’ The 
different standards correspond to the different values at stake in each system (Cass. 
16.10.2007, n. 21619; Cass. 18.04.2007, n. 9238; Cass. 05.09.2006, n. 19047; Cass. 
04.03.2004, n. 4400; Cass. 21.01.2000, n. 632)”26. 
However, the civil standard of proof has always to be completed by the judge’s 
conviction that the general statistical probability finds application in the case at hand
27
. 
This approach is indicated by the law; while Article 116 of the Italian Code of Civil 
Procedure predicates the principle of “cautious evaluation” of the proof, an attenuated 
version of the standard of intime conviction, Article 115, states that the judge has to 
base her decision on the evidences submitted by the parties. Hence, the decision, that is 
always motivated, hinges on the proof lodged by the parties during the proceeding, but 
the evaluation of this proof remains discretionary to a large extent, as the judge can 
decide the standard to adopt. 
For instance, the Italian Court of Cassation in the case Fondiaria SAI
28
 stated 
that in competition damages action the judge can proceed to the assessment of causation 
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using probability, but also logic, presumptions and the yardstick of ‘more probable than 
not’. This last method, is quite diffuse in antitrust, above all when the claim is based on 
lost chances and passing-on of overcharges. 
 
b. Common law jurisdictions 
Common law jurisdictions distinguish notably the criminal standard of ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ to the civil procedural standards of preponderance of the evidence 
(chiefly American definition) and balance of probabilities (generally preferred in 
English evidence law)
29
. These two definitions traditionally attest that the subject 
burdened has to prove that the event was ‘more probable than not’, that is to say that the 
event had more than the 50% chances to happen
30
.  
In the case of Miller v Minister of Pensions, Lord Denning pointed out in this 
regard that “The…[standard of proof]…is well settled. It must carry a reasonable 
degree of probability...if the evidence is such that the tribunal can say: ‘We think it 
more probable than not’ the burden is discharged, but, if the probabilities are equal, it 
is not” 31. 
The objectivistic approach that characterise the preponderance of the evidence 
standard is therefore based on the use of probability which should suffice for the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
antitrust, nesso causale e danni «lungolatenti», in Danno e resp., 2007, p. 764. In this decision the Court 
of Cassation deployed a flexible approach to causation in antitrust. However, in the final decision the 
Court rejected the approach of the appellate judge for which the assessment of causation was ‘in re ipsa’ 
and demonstrated by the verification of the antitrust infringement already purported by the National 
Authority. 
29
 Rarely, it is required in civil law cases the standard of a “clear and convincing evidence”, see Engel, 
“Preponderance of the Evidence versus Intime Conviction,” 3. 
30
 Richard Glover, Murphy on Evidence (Oxford University Press, 2013)., p. 104.Clermont and Sherwin, 
“A Comparative View of Standards of Proof”; Dominique Demougin and Claude Fluet, “Preponderance 
of Evidence,” European Economic Review 50, no. 4 (2006): 963–76; Juliane Kokott, The Burden of Proof 
in Comparative and International Human Rights Law: Civil and Common Law Approaches With Special 
Reference to the American and German Legal Systems (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998). 
31
 Miller v. Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 ALL ER, 372. See also Mallett v. McMonagle, AC 166 (1970), 
where the English court notoriously stated that “Anything that is more probable than not is treated as 
certainty”. 
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decision of the judge
32
. However, some other authors believe that also in the US, judges 
do not solely rely on class-based statistical probability of an event to happen to deliver 
the judgment, but rather they require “the formation of a minimal belief regarding the 
truth of the fact(s) at issue”33.  
 
5.2. Proving causation in the antitrust case law 
Class-based statistical probability form full proof of causation in common law 
countries
34
  and an evidence in civil law jurisdictions
35
. Competition law damages 
actions have followed generally in the wake of these domestic traditions. 
The European Court of Justice seems to have espoused a civil law standard for 
proving causation when stated that there is an infringement of competition law if “it is 
possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability” the damage to competition36. 
Similarly, the CJEU noted, in the case Tetra Laval, that it is “necessary to envisage 
various chains of cause and effect with a view to ascertaining which of them are the 
most likely”37. This approach which leaves ample room to the discretionary power of the 
judge, is indeed more similar to the civil law standard of intime conviction and, at the 
same time, enable the full application of national legal standards. 
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 Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA [2006] 
ECR I-06619. 
37
 Case C-12/03 P Commission of the European Communities v Tetra Laval BV ECR [2005] ECR I-
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In the United Kingdom, the antitrust courts have clarified that also in 
competition law litigation parties have to substantiate their claim under the standard of 
the balance of probabilities (ie, more likely than not)
38
.  
In this vein, the CAT observes that regarding the standard of evidence in 
competition law proceedings “There is no requirement, under the ECHR, of proof 
beyond reasonable doubt”39 and that “The balance of probabilities is a sufficiently 
flexible standard to require that the Tribunal (or Director) should be more sure before 
finding serious allegations proved than when deciding less serious matters”: per Lord 
Nicholls in In re H [1996] AC 563 at 586-587. The criminal standard of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt would not be appropriate in relation to the kind and range of issues 
this Tribunal has to determine under the Act.”40. 
The British courts believe therefore that the standard of balance of probabilities 
perfectly suits the type of proceeding involved in competition law damages actions and 
that, moreover, it is in line with the European courts’ jurisprudence41. As an exceptional 
measure, the seriousness of an infringement of the competition rules justifies, in the 
opinion of the High Court in Attheraces v British Horseracing Board
42
,  the adoption of 
a standard where the proof has to be ‘commensurately cogent and convincing’43. This is 
usually addressed as a ‘heightened civil standard’44. 
German antitrust courts have to abide to the same standards of proof designed 
for tort cases. Therefore the judge has to reach a personal conviction that has to reach a 
‘high level of plausibility’45. Similar standards are adopted by other Continental 
jurisdictions, with scant further specifications by courts. For instance, the Italian Court 
of Cassation conceded that, while applying the usual standard of intime conviction, the 
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 CAT JJB Sports Plc v Office of Fair Trading [2004]  17, [2005] Comp. A.R. 29 at [195] (2005), p. 195; 
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 Ibid., p. 112. 
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 [2005] EWHC 3015. 
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 Ibid., para 126. 
44
 See Glover, Murphy on Evidence, 114. 
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 Barry E. Hawk, International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law 2005 (Juris Publishing, 
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judge can infer the existence of a causal link between the agreement and the alleged 
damage also "through criteria of high logic probability or through presumptions"
46
. In 
other words, the standard of "probabilistic certainty" in civil law jurisdictions should not 
be exclusively based on the quantitative determination of statistical frequency of classes 
of events, which could also be missing or ineffective, but should be verified by the 
judge who has to determine whether the elements of the case at hand confirm the 
assumption based general probabilities and - at the same time – has to exclude other 
possible alternative causes
47
.  
 
5.3. Standards of proof, judges persuasion and causal uncertainty in 
competition law 
Civil law countries showed to be more prone to accept false acquittals rather 
than false condemnations adopting a higher standard of proof. On the other side, 
common law jurisdictions profess a cost-based approach for which the claimant should 
not be overtly burdened with a proof that goes beyond the mere ‘preponderance’48, 
otherwise any claim would be too difficult and expensive to prove
49
. 
These different approaches can explain, for a certain extent, also the hard time 
for competition law litigation in Europe, where indeed the main hurdle is detected in the 
difficult burden of proof for the claimant. On the other hand, the European legislator 
and national courts are trying to ease this burden building ‘bespoke presumptions’ that 
reverse the burden of proof on to the subject that has, assumingly, more information to 
provide the counter-proof.    
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The proof of causal connection, even if facilitated, is highly influenced by the 
standard adopted. The higher the standard the less will be the room for managing causal 
uncertainty, even in systems where the judge has wide discretionary powers. 
Knowledge of causal laws is limited, hence nothing is certain. For this reason, 
proponents of probability approach maintain that the only way to objectivise and render 
a predictable judgment is to rely on laws of probability rather than on obscure 
subjective conviction
50
. Differently some other authors object that mere class-based 
aggregate probability, cannot say what happened in the specific case
51
. 
However, in this dispute, two remarks are central in the analysis of the standard 
of proof in competition law damages actions. As already pointed out, the majority of the 
European legal traditions are not accustomed to delve into the ‘meanderings’ of the 
different standards of persuasions
52
. But the private enforcement of European 
competition law before national courts is posing the problem, calling for a major 
confrontation. 
Secondly, all these differences between civil law and common law traditions 
tend to fade away when factual issues become particularly complicated. As an example, 
after a thorough probabilistic-based approach, the English judge in Arkin v Borchard 
Lines Limited considered  that the assessment of causation between damages and the 
antitrust infringement was a matter of ‘common sense’53, that is a way to solve with the 
use of a ‘broad axe’54 and ample discretionary power a complex situation that class-
based probabilities and economic reasoning have brought to a dead end. 
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Williamson (1914) 31 RPC 104 at 117-118: "[t]he restoration by way of compensation is therefore 
accomplished to a large extent by the exercise of a sound imagination and the practice of the broad axe". 
 102 
 
The analysis of case law shoes indeed an aspect of the assessment of the 
standard of persuasion of the judge with relation to causation partly different from the 
theoretical background of the different systems. Judges, of both civil law and common 
law jurisdictions, tend to assess the causal link relying on the persuasiveness of the 
evidence rather than on the general probability of the outcome. In other words, the 
claims quashed for lack of proof of causation, such as in the English Enron and Italian 
Brennercom, demonstrate that the attention of the judge is focussed on the value of the 
proof submitted as able, in the specific case, to yield the supposed effect. This 
evaluation is certainly influenced by the judge’s perception of ‘normality’55 and by her 
intuition of standard patterns drawn by experience and common sense. In this context, 
causal generalisation, such as that in the x% of cases a cartel causes a damage via price 
effect to customers, certainly play a fundamental role in the judge’s persuasion56.  
For this reason, using class-based probabilities in order to build presumptions 
that revert the burden of proof can be a useful solution to offset a possible imbalance in 
the competition between the opposite explanations of the facts and issues at stake. 
Differently, intending class-based probabilities as proof of a causal link would be not 
only a logic mistake but also an empirical one. 
Finally, the analysis of case law shows that in all jurisdictions the judges’ 
persuasion is shaped by two competing narratives, the ones brought by the parties into 
the proceeding, more than by any other concurring factor. Claimant, defendant and 
eventually other intervening subjects, such as expert witnesses, present a narrative 
construction of reality on which the decision of the judge is based
57
. The level of 
persuasion of the judge is indeed determined by the evidences submitted and by the 
interpretation of their value. That applies in particular to the proof of causation which, 
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as already noted, is not a fact and therefore cannot be simply submitted as, for instance, 
a documentary evidence, but needs to be ‘explained’. This approach to the evaluation of 
the proof recalls the application of those theories
58
 that oppose to the probability 
theories an approach based on the “comparative plausibility of the parties’ explanations 
offered at trial”59. Allen and Leiter believe that the fact finder, in civil cases, identifies 
the most plausible of the competing explanations rather than merely applying pre-
confectioned probabilities
60
. The relative plausibility theory was firstly formulated by 
Allen and then refined through a number of contributions of Allen and Leiter, where the 
authors firmly opposed mathematical probability theories of the burden of proof
61
.  
In the end, what indeed is asked to the decision maker is not to sentence the 
truth, but rather the ‘truth of the decision’. 
 
5.4. Proving the uncertain causation 
As pointed out, the causal link is not a fact, it is indeed a connections between 
two known facts
62, also defined as “an empirical relation between concrete 
conditions”63. It follows that it is not subject to the same burden of proof as any other 
evidence of events submitted to the court. The causal link needs a demonstration 
through logic, statistic and common sense, that is supported by general scientific 
theories and, simultaneously, by specific justification of the singular causation. Proof of 
singular causation needs therefore, 1. scientific validity of causal generalisations that 
control the condition; 2. complete instantiation of the empirical relation. 
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Often, proof of causation hinges upon inferences and legal presumptions. These 
logic tools are used, in competition law, to draw conclusions about statistical and 
econometric evidences, which have an important role in the array of means of proofs 
available, and other means of proof. Generally, the plaintiff can prove its claim 
submitting documentary evidences, or gathering them through inspections, through 
proof by witnesses or by interrogations and, finally, thanks to expert reports that form 
evidences of the existence of a causal link between the event and the damage. When an 
expert evidence hinging on a well acclaimed theory (such as passing-on or umbrella 
effect) is laid out, this evidence constitutes a presumption of damages, whose rebuttable 
proof can often become particularly difficult task. 
In some cases, therefore, causal generalisations can form presumptions that 
revert the burden of proof on to the claimant
64
. 
 
5.5. Inferences and legal presumptions 
Legal scholars generally acknowledge the existence of two main types of 
presumptions, rebuttable and conclusive
65
. Some studies, also regarding competition 
law enforcement, classified presumptions in a more detailed manner, focusing on effects 
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of the use of the same on evidential burdens
66
. Hence, they have been divided into 
provisional presumptions, evidential presumptions, persuasive presumptions and 
conclusive presumptions
67
.  
The provisional presumptions, also called praesumptiones hominis, does simply 
state a matter of fact but does not need to be rebutted, since they are left to the free 
evaluation of the judge. Differently, rebuttable presumptions (also known as 
praesumptiones iuris tantum) are divided in common law countries into evidential 
presumptions and persuasive presumptions
68
 while generally left as a unitary class in .  
A conclusive presumption (presumptio iuris et de jure), instead, is a 
presumption of law that cannot be rebutted by evidence and must be taken to be the case 
whatever the evidence to the contrary
69
. In competition law, neither national domestic 
legislation nor European law have placed any such presumption with regard to the 
causation of damages to private subjects. 
In competition law damages actions we often have also substantive 
presumptions which “are invariably an expression of mainstream economic theory”70. 
For instance the “per se” rule applied in the Unites States, is a substantive non-
rebuttable presumption.  In competition law litigation, one can also find several 
procedural presumptions that can be divided in rebuttable and conclusive as well
71
. 
EU Courts tend to discern the probative value of a proof judging on the body of 
evidence gathered for the case
72
. The logical inferences used by the decision maker in 
competition law are used in order to reconstitute the relevant circumstances
73
 from the 
scratches of evidences gleaned.  
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In the T-Mobile case the CJEU responded to the question regarding the 
application of presumption in order to determine the causal link between the concerted 
practice and the market conduct of the operators. The question regarded in particular the 
relevance of the presumption established in the case Commission v Anic 
Partecipazioni
74
 and the case Hüls v Commission
75, “according to which, subject to 
proof to the contrary, which it is for the economic operators concerned to produce, 
undertakings participating in concerting arrangements and remaining active on the 
market are presumed to take account of the information exchanged with their 
competitors when determining their conduct on that market, particularly when they 
concert together on a regular basis over a long period.”76. The CJEU observed that the 
presumptions instituted by the Court in the mentioned decisions stem from the 
interpretation of article 101 and therefore form integral part of community law
77
. 
Consequently, the presumption has to be applied as it is and there is no room for the 
national procedural laws to overcome its application. The principle of procedural 
autonomy of national judges has therefore been cracked also in the realm of competition 
law.  
While the Courts have dealt, even if for a limited extent, with the use logical 
inferences in order to form an evidence out of a set of “coincidences” and “indicia” for 
finding an infringement of competition law
78
, no such guidance is provided in order to 
infer damages to private subjects. For a larger extent the legislator is making important 
use of them in order to remedy to the informational asymmetry of parties
79
. 
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Lianos observes that while permitting the Commission to operate inferences the 
Courts eased the burden on the Commission, on the other hand, legal presumptions limit 
that discretion within the boundaries of a “ready-made causal inference”80 .  
 
5.6.  Econometrics and the ‘calculation’ of causation in EU competition law 
The two stage process for assessing causation advanced in this thesis serves as a 
guidance also in this chapter. The economic theories and econometric techniques have a 
central role in the assessment of both material and legal causal links in competition 
damages actions. The advancement of science and the tangling nature of business 
activities made for the judge particularly cumbersome the application of deterministic 
approaches in causation
81
 also recurring to discretionary powers in the assessment of the 
proof. In some cases it becomes even impossible to determine the causal link, given the 
nature of the infringement. Judges firstly started to depart from a deterministic approach 
when endorsed in the area of medical responsibility
82
 and asbestos related illnesses
83
 the 
theory of stochastic causality
84
. The same probabilistic approach found fortune also for 
the assessment of the loss of chance in tort liability
85
. Similarly, competition law shows 
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frequent cases where it is impossible to state with certainty that the direct cause of the 
damage lies in a specific infringement
86
. In these cases courts are able to depart from the 
analysis of the single transaction to take into account statistical data from which they 
can obtain average patterns to establish a stochastic causation
87
.   
Scholars refer that the wide use of counterfactuals in competition law 
proceedings witnesses the importance of the economic “effect based” approach and, by 
consequence, the fact that legal causation borrows widely from (or even coincides with) 
causality
88
. Lianos divides the relevant factors for determining if and how legal 
causation borrows from causality dividing the causative links into two main categories. 
In the first box are falling all the causation links that work by mere reference to the 
general concept of causality
89
. In this case, causation is assessed embedding the result of 
the verification of causality outside law
90
 (as in the case of economic counterfactual 
explanation of the causes of damages). A second option regards instead the relevant 
legal category examined. The judge can analyse the causal link relying on the special 
conditions that characterise it by law (necessary or sufficient condition) or to focus on a 
specific future of the link itself. In the latter case the examination can hinge on the 
“cause in fact”, using a ‘but-for’, NESS, INUS test or on the evaluation of legal policies 
of risk distribution
91
, as economic analysis of law puts forward
92
. 
                                                          
86
 Abele, Kodek, and Schaefer, “Proving Causation in Private Antitrust Cases” 468. 
87
 Ibid., 470. 
88
 Lianos and Genakos, “Econometric Evidence in EU Competition Law” 85; Cento Veljanovski, 
“Counterfactual Tests in Competition Law” Competition Law Journal, no. 4 (2010); Damien Geradin and 
Ianis Girgenson, “The Counterfactual Method in EU Competition Law: The Cornerstone of the Effects-
Based Approach” (December 11, 2011) available at SSRN: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1970917. 
89
 Lianos and Genakos, “Econometric Evidence in EU Competition Law”, 85. 
90
 As argued by H. L. A. Hart and Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law (Oxford University Press, 1985). 
91
 Lianos and Genakos, “Econometric Evidence in EU Competition Law”, 87. 
92
 Richard A. Posner, “The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness,” The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 1999, 91–99; Landes and Posner, “Causation in Tort Law”; Calabresi, 
“Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts”; Steven Shavell, “An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of 
Liability in the Law of Torts” The Journal of Legal Studies, 1980, 463–516; Steven Shavell, “Uncertainty 
over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability” Journal of Law and Economics 28, no. 3, 1985, 
587–609; Richard W. Wright, “Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Economic 
Analysis,” The Journal of Legal Studies, 1985, 435–56. 
 109 
 
The objective of this reconstruction is to understand if the different concepts of 
causation in law might correspond to the one of causality in econometrics.  
Econometrics is defined as “statistics that is centrally conditioned by economic 
theory”93. In economic terms, the objective of econometrics is "the quantitative analysis 
of actual economic phenomena based on the concurrent development of theory and 
observation, related by appropriate methods of inference"
94
. Hence, this method 
consists in the interpretation of data through economic theories, in order to infer effects 
from selected causes. Econometrics, indeed, contrary to law, is mainly forward looking, 
since it aims at foreseeing future events
95
. In order to do this, econometrics uses 
economics, mathematics and statistics. The result is a probability addressing average 
quantitative data gathered in order to confirm or disprove the underlying economic 
theory. 
A first philosophical approach to the interrelation drawn in this ‘triangle’ 
(formed by statistics, economics and mathematics) wants economics to provide the 
blueprint to the underling theory that makes statistics economically interpretable
96
. This 
view is openly criticised by Hoover who remarks that “if the inferential direction runs 
only from theory to data, how could we ever use empirical evidence to determine which 
theory is right?”97. 
A second and contrasting position explains that econometrics differs from 
statistics because while the former seeks causality, the latter simply finds correlations
98
. 
As clarified by Stigum, indeed, the aim of econometrics nothing but “to obtain 
knowledge concerning relations that exist in the social reality” through a theory-data 
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confrontation
99
. In law, however, any assumption that is not imposed by law itself is 
part of a procedural debate that can disprove the truthfulness of its underlying theory. 
Therefore, both the theoretical basis for material and legal causation are questioned 
before the judge by parties, to the extent that their reliability lies mostly on the method 
of assessment rather than the ‘direction’ of it, marking a first difference with causality. 
Econometrics has been approached by economist in three different ways. The 
first (also chronologically) is a structural approach
100
 deployed by Haavelmo
101
 and the 
Cowles Commission
102
 in the 1940s’, where the effects are inferred by theories that are 
stated as underlying assumptions. Here the aim of Haavelmo was to bridge theory and 
empirical research in a logically rigorous manner
103
. This type of a priori approach has 
been opposed in the following years by different types of inferential approaches
104
 such 
as the VAR method
105
 and the LSE approach
106
. 
Finally, a third model of econometric evaluation of causal inference found place 
with the name of ‘counterfactual (test)’107. Only this last approach found application in 
competition law enforcement, hence we will focus exclusively on that. 
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Moreover, it is worth to hasten that a second and major difference between the 
causality and causation in law consists in the fact that econometric does not select 
causes on their legal significance. Indeed the aim of economic theories is not to spot 
responsibility of agents in the market but rather to establish connections between causes 
and effects. 
 
5.6.1. When ‘but-for’ becomes ‘if then’: the counterfactuals 
Courts are therefore trying to drag from the general principles of causality the 
tools for determining the causal link in antitrust damages actions. Competition law 
phenomena exists indeed firstly in a world of economic theories. The causation-in-fact 
is generally proven through the use of logic inferences or, in most cases, through 
counterfactuals. In other words, the but-for scenario is reconstructed thanks to economic 
models capable of designing a hypothetical situation with which the real world can be 
compared. But, as already explained, in econometrics we are in the realm of 
probabilities spawning from theories and generating other probabilities. It comes as a 
consequence that this process is error-prone, although this is not always acknowledged. 
In this vein the European Commission in its Guidance Paper to Quantification of Harm 
specifies that “(t)he quantification of such harm requires comparing the actual position 
of the injured party with the position this party would have been in without the 
infringement” but that “(t)his is something that cannot be observed in reality; it is 
impossible to know with certainty how market conditions and the interactions between 
market participants would have evolved in the absence of the infringement. All that is 
possible is an estimate of the scenario likely to have existed without the 
infringement”108. 
The last decades have seen arising academic and judicial interest around the 
problem of the assessment of counterfactuals
109
. Counterfactuals scenarios are generally 
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used to prove causation when is not possible to infer a sufficient (or necessary) 
connection between agency and effects, based on the mere reasonableness of the 
assumptions
110
. In this vein, for counterfactuals here we refer to a but-for test applied in 
antitrust through economic theories. Therefore these counterfactuals aim at describing 
an hypothetical situation through econometric explanations. In other words the decision 
maker compares the actual situation with a counterfactual (or theoretical) one created 
through economic theories and aggregate data. 
In public competition law enforcement the causal link between the infringement 
and the damage to the market is often presumed or even embedded in the same 
behaviour. For this reason, the research of a causal connection generally shifts to the 
link between the behaviour and the infringement
111
. The Court of Justice opened at the 
use of counterfactuals with the Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH 
decision
112
 where analysed a case of infringement by effect. In the recent cases Visa and 
MasterCard the European courts have adopted a counterfactual approach rather broad 
stating that “irrespective of the context or aim in relation to which a counterfactual 
hypothesis is used, it is important that that hypothesis is appropriate to the issue it is 
supposed to clarify and that the assumption on which it is based is not unrealistic”113. 
Public enforcement of competition law generally applies a wide number of different 
counterfactuals, based on the antitrust rule infringed or on their being purported ex ante 
(for the assessment of future conditions) or ex post (to find out a breach of competition 
law)
114
. Based on this division of the different alternatives it is possible to make 
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reference to the sole legal category and quality of the causal link is possible only when 
the infringement is “by object” and the damage can be inferred relying on the “id quod 
plerumque accidit” and therefore skipping the assessment of the effects of the 
infringement
115
. In restrictions by object the Commission favours the sole legal 
interpretation of the agreement to evaluate its lawfulness
116
. The use of restrictions by 
object has being far extended by the Commission that is aiming at dramatically reduce 
the use of counterfactual methodology
117
. Differently, when causation cannot be so 
inferred, it is necessary to rely on the use of counterfactuals in order to confront the 
present scenario with an hypothetical one where no antitrust infringement is committed. 
In the words of the CJEU, this approach consists in “taking into account of the 
competition situation that would exist in the absence of the agreement”118.  
In competition law damages actions, the assessment is done ex post and the 
counterfactual scenario aims at presenting an alternative situation where there are no 
market distortions due to the antitrust infringement. This method mainly consists in the 
assessment of stochastic causation that implies the analysis of the probability of effects 
across a set of data corresponding to a group of transactions. In other terms the method 
generate a probability that the damage would not have occurred in absence of the 
infringement. In this case the probability is used as a tool to substantiate an event. 
Differently, in the case of loss of chance the probability is the object of compensation 
(and injury), making therefore the claim utterly different. The but-for (or in 
counterfactual terms, the if then) test for causation is particularly cumbersome to prove 
on a case-by-case basis
119
. 
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The use of probability is creating classes of infringement based on the fact that 
the scant chances that a negligible risk would take place becomes element of proof, in 
substitution of the ‘objective substantiation’120. For instance, the recent Kone121 case 
introduced a new class of causative events where the damage is inferred from the main 
stochastic evaluation that markets are generally behaving in a way that prices tend to 
follow the ‘umbrella-price’. Here the peril consists in the fact that a blind equalisation 
of probabilities in similar categories of events might displace the objective or even 
stochastic analysis of the specific causative event.  
The detection of a causal connection implies a qualification and not a mere 
description of the event
122
. Causation in law does not totally depend indeed on factual 
determinants. Legal causation is indeed product of a judgment over the type of 
consequences that are connected by law to the unlawful behaviour. In this legal 
reasoning also scientific and economic concepts have to be turned in juridical truth
123
. 
 
5.6.2. The two different uses of economic tools for causation 
As seen there are cases in antitrust where it is not possible to determine with 
certainty which transactions were affected by the antitrust violation. For this reason, 
Courts and Authorities endorsed quantitative approaches that provide only an estimation 
of the probable damages over a set of transactions. This application of stochastic 
causality certainly echoes the risk-liability theory developed in tort law.  Here indeed is 
the fact of ex ante analysis of a risk to happen, that legitimize a Court to award damages 
for antitrust infringement. In the Microsoft case, the CJEU stated that in order to give 
application to art. 102 TFEU it suffices for the decision maker to assess that the agency 
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has a “high probability of eliminating effective competition”124. This approach, if 
reproduced in private enforcement, tends to reverse the risk of substantiating the tort on 
the defendant that is assumed as the party that can, in a most efficient cost-effect way, 
bear this burden, in order to reduce negative externalities due to informational 
asymmetries
125
.  However, when an ex post examination of the activity is required, 
judges normally resort to two different techniques for reconstructing an hypothetical 
situation as if the infringement was not committed. 
On the one hand, it is possible to use a comparator-based model
126
 where the 
anticompetitive prices are compared with a non-infringement scenario. This empirical 
study can be operated on the same market before or after the infringement, on a similar 
geographic market or on similar product markets
127
. 
On the other hand, when such comparator model is impossible to display for 
evident differences between geographical or product markets, it is possible to recur to a 
simulation model. This second technique consists in the simulation of market outcomes 
on the basis of economic models
128
. Here econometrics finds wide application since the 
proof of causation consists in finding average patterns through the analysis of set of data 
interpreted on the basis of the economic theories.  
Other approaches can also be distinguished on the basis of the benchmark of 
evaluation adopted. It is possible to analyse the differences in prices on a case by case 
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basis or through average patterns gained from statistical data
129
.  The case-by-case 
analysis is often made non feasible by the vast number of transactions comprised in a 
claim for antitrust damages. Therefore, often a statistical study is needed in order to 
infer effects from the market dynamics
130
. Through these techniques, substantiating 
causation implies to prove that, for instance, the price overcharge was due to the 
antitrust infringement and not to other price determinants. 
As maintained before, the use of case-by-case method (that is to analyse each 
transaction comparing all the price determinants with and without the antitrust 
violation) is often made impossible by the condition of the market and by the number of 
transactions operated on it. Claimants and judges therefore delve into the ‘universe of 
data’ in order to create a ‘world of theory’ that can explain a social reality where a 
damage has been caused. This demonstration implies a confrontation between different 
versions of reality in order to ascertain which of them is the most likely
131
.  While the 
assessment of causation is generally left to the free evaluation of the judge in civil law 
countries, the witness of economic experts has naturally gained a fundamental 
importance in gauging economic data submitted to the court
132
. Through econometrics 
economists infer causal links between causes and effects, using average quantitative 
data. However, these results should not be confused with causation in law which stands 
outside the realm of economic theory
133
. In competition law is very easy to mix these 
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two notions reducing causation to a quantitative substantiation of causality. The point of 
separation between causality and causation lies firstly in the nature of the causation in 
the law, practically expounded by the function of the violated norm.  
 
5.6.3. The use of counterfactuals and the presumption of damage in the case 
law 
The presumption of damage enshrined in the damages Directive does not change 
the use of counterfactuals in a dramatic way. Indeed it is in any case fundamental to 
substantiate firstly the existence of an infringement that, in case of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU, consists indeed in the causation of a damage to competition. Hence, the claimant 
need to prove through counterfactuals or logical inferences, that the behaviour caused a 
damage to the market
134
. In case of cartels, this proof allows the plaintiff to presume the 
damage to single market actors. However, before national courts while the claimant can 
presume the damage in some specific circumstances, she still has to substantiate the 
causal link between the type of damage that is not immediate in its connection to the 
anticompetitive behaviour and the infringement (legal causation). Moreover, the 
defendant will most probably recur massively to the use of counterfactuals in order to 
disprove the claim and will additionally have to counter-argue upon the reasons 
deducted for the legal causation. The Commission enjoys a broad discretion in the 
assessment of “complex economic and technical assessment” which can be overturned 
only on the base of a manifest error
135
. 
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Finally, the use of counterfactuals also shifts to the phase of quantification of 
damages
136
. However, while proving causation is a fundamental step for the recognition 
of damages, the quantification of the same damages can be avoided by the judge who 
can estimate uncertain damages. 
In Healthcare at Home, the CAT adopted a counterfactual test in order to assess 
causation in a margin squeeze case
137
. Genzyme Limited is a drug producer that 
manufactures and sells Cerezyme, used in the treatment of Gaucher disease. Between 
1999 and 2001, Healthcare at Home Limited provided the drug to patients thanks to an 
exclusive contract with Genzyme. At termination of the contract, Genzyme started an 
independent home care service in order to administer autonomously the drug to patients. 
From this moment on, other companies, such as Healthcare, had to purchase the 
Cerezyme at the ‘NHS list price’ which included also the home service costs. In 2003 
the OFT noted that Genzyme had abused its dominant position, imposing a margin 
squeeze on the upstream market for home care delivery. 
In the follow-on action initiated by Healthcare, the CAT  awarded damages, 
with an interim decision, based on the percentage discount that should have been 
applied in order to avoid margin squeeze
138. In other words, the CAT’s experts reckoned 
the pricing that would have ensured a reasonable profit margin to the defendant and, 
from that amount, obtained the percentage discount. The damages therefore were 
awarded to the claimant in form of loss of revenues
139
. 
The use of counterfactuals in order to prove lost profits is also well described by 
the recent case 2 Travel Group PLC v Cardiff City Transport
140
 where the Tribunal 
adopted a “but-for” approach in order to establish the cause in fact connecting the loss 
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to the infringement
141
. Here the CAT compared the market condition with the situation 
of an hypothetical  market in absence of the infringement. Through this  counterfactual 
the CAT observed that without the infringement the claimant would have made further 
profits.  
Similarly, the Commercial Court of Milan in the case Brennercom
142
 assessed 
the legal causation relying on the economic experts’ report which construed the 
counterfactual world. The counterfactual reasoning proceeded through a three steps 
assessment. Firstly the experts studied the difference between the prices charge by the 
antitrust infringer, Telecom Italia (TI) to its internal divisions and the ones fixed for the 
same services (LLs) to competitors. Hence, secondly, they assessed the raise in price of 
TI’s services. Finally, determined the price effect on Brennercom. 
The experts deployed different theories and standard economic models for the 
creation of different counterfactual scenarios. There were indeed no evidences of LLs 
prices and, therefore, of real differences of LLs prices over time and between the 
competitors. However, the experts, relying on the gathered data, created different 
counterfactual worlds to calculate the market price in situation of oligopoly
143
.  From 
the experts counterfactual report, the judge gained the information for assessing the 
margin squeeze and reckoning the amount of damages. The judge observed indeed that 
in absence of TI’s infringement, B would have been to get more clients (calculated in 
percentage)
144
.
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[2009] CAT 36 (at paragraph 85(a)) and the assessment reported by Colman J in Arkin v Borchard Lines 
Ltd [2003] EWHC 687 (Comm), [2004] 2 CLC 242. 
142
 Court of Milan, Brennercom Spa v. Telecom Italia Spa decision n. 14802/2011 (2014). 
143
 Based on the two theories of Martin Shubik and Richard Levitan, Market Structure and Behavior 
(Harvard University Press, 1980) and Nirvikar Singh and Xavier Vives, “Price and Quantity Competition 
in a Differentiated Duopoly” The RAND Journal of Economics, 1984, 546–54. 
144
  Tribunale di Milano, Brennercom Spa v. Telecom Italia Spa, no. 14802/2011, 3 March 2014. 
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VI. Indirect claimants and causal uncertainty in damages actions for 
competition law infringements 
A competition law infringement is capable of damaging different subjects at the 
same time, virtually all the market players that are directly or even indirectly connected 
to the business of the competition law infringer
1
. Exclusionary conducts, exploitative 
abuses and cartels bring about different types of damages to a potentially vast array of 
subjects. In particular, exploitative abuses and cartels can cause damages to: i) direct 
purchasers of the goods or services; ii) indirect purchasers to whom the overcharge was 
passed on; iii) costumers of goods affected by umbrella prices; iv) potential customers 
who renounced to the purchase due to the rise in prices (counterfactual customers); v) 
producers of complementary goods.  
On the other hand, exclusionary abuses tend to damage: i) undertaking excluded 
from the relevant market; ii) suppliers of undertaking excluded from the market; iii) 
future customers of excluded undertakings; iv) employees dismissed because of market 
foreclosure. One can formulate additional hypothesis with regard to subjects that might 
be damaged by a breach of competition law, since, as already noted, it potentially 
reaches all market players. Moreover, all these subjects are able to claim damages as the 
CJEU
2
 and the Directive 104/2014
3
 have granted the right to stand to any person 
damaged by an anticompetitive behaviour. But the empirical analysis of competition 
law litigation says
4
 that indirect purchasers, counterfactual buyers and other classes of 
non-direct purchasers are discouraged from bringing an action for damages.  In the four 
                                                          
1
 Green Paper - Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules SEC (2005) 1732 COM/2005, 
672, 678; Castelli, “La causalità giuridica nel campo degli illeciti anticoncorrenziali,” 1050. 
2
 Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA ECR 
[2006] I-06619, para 60 (2006), para 60; Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard 
Crehan v Courage Ltd and Others ECR I-06297, para 26 (2001), para 26; Case C-199/11 Otis and Others 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:684, para 41 (2012), para 41; Case C-536/11, Donau Chemie and Others (not yet 
published) ECLI:EU:C:2013:366, para 21 (2013), para 21. 
3
 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on Certain 
Rules Governing Actions for Damages under National Law for Infringements of the Competition Law 
Provisions of the Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA Relevance Article 1 and 
Recital (13). 
4
 I have developed this analysis starting from other researches covering the period 1999-2013. I added the 
most recent developments and delved into aspects that were not taken into consideration by such studies 
as, for instance, the number of actions brought by indirect purchasers.  
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jurisdictions selected for the comparative analysis in this thesis, which are also the most 
important in terms of size of the economy in Europe, I could not find any claim from 
counterfactual customers, neither from other classes of indirect purchasers or suppliers, 
if we except passing on claimants
5
. 
Competition law litigation is mainly centred  on claims brought by direct 
purchasers of goods or services
6
. These cases are characterised by a marked causal 
uncertainty due to the nature of the harm
7
. This causal uncertainty is generated by an 
additional action that adds up in the causal line. For instance, in the case of umbrella 
pricing, this action consists in the adaption of prices by the umbrella customer, while for 
counterfactual buyers it consists in the renounce to the purchase by the potential buyer. 
Establishing a causal link in all these situations can be a particularly difficult task as the 
claimant needs to fulfil the requirements of causation in national tort laws and 
substantiate a loss protected by the EU competition law.  
In this chapter I delve into the two main cases of causal uncertainty created by 
indirect customer. I firstly analyse the damages to indirect purchasers and the passing-
on defence (7.1) which moved into focus of courts and European legislator, especially 
in the last decade. The second part (7.2) of this chapter regards instead the umbrella 
customers, recently subject of an important decision of the CJEU. Finally (7.3) I 
conclude with considerations about non-direct claimants. 
 
6.1.  Indirect purchasers and the passing-on of an overcharge    
                                                          
5
 Only in Germany and United Kingdom I was able to find a few actions for damages brought by indirect 
purchasers. Paradoxically, English courts have been the most sceptical, among the four jurisdictions 
selected, with regard to pass on claims, mainly for reasons related to remoteness of the damage claimed.  
6
 See the results of the empirical research conducted by Rodger, Competition Law, Comparative Private 
Enforcement and Collective Redress Across the EU. 
7
 Some authors even excluded that the overcharge passed on can give rise to compensation, since this 
damage would be indirect; Mario Barcellona, Trattato della responsabilità civile (UTET Giuridica 2011); 
M. Barcellona, Funzione compensativa della responsabilità, 2009, p. 62.  
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An antitrust infringement very often results in harm via price effect
8
. This means 
that the cartel or the dominant undertaking fixes a supra-competitive price that charges 
to its customers. However, these buyers might not be  the end consumers of those goods 
or services but only a first juncture of a supply chain that can be more or less complex
9
. 
The direct purchaser has therefore a threefold choice. Firstly, she can internalise the 
overcharge and impose to her clients the same prices as before the infringement. 
Alternatively, she might pass-on the whole overcharge, raising at her turn the prices to 
the same amount as the overcharge, and burden the indirect purchaser with the 
correspondent cost. Finally, the direct purchaser can pass on a part of this overcharge, 
internalising the rest of it. The passing-on is due to trade relations that bind the 
production to the distribution process, so that what happens in a certain level of the 
supply chain tends to be passed on to the next level
10
.  
To put it with an example, take a vitamin producer ‘β’ which cartelises with 
other competitors in order to fix higher prices for bulk vitamins. β sells the vitamins at a 
supra-competitive price to the cosmetic producer ‘Ω’. This latter firm has a distributor, 
‘α’, to whom sells the cosmetic products. Although the price of vitamins increased, due 
to the cartel, Ω might decide, for instance because worried about losing an important 
client, to sell the cosmetics at the same price as before. 
                                                          
8
 Einer Elhauge, Research Handbook on the Economics of Antitrust Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2012). 
9
 Hence, for price overcharge we mean the difference between the supra-competitive price fixed by the 
antitrust infringer and the market price of the same goods or services. 
10
 For an introduction to the problem of passing-on of price overcharges in competition law see, Damien 
Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, and Nicolas Petit, EU Competition Law and Economics (Oxford University 
Press, 2012); Ashton and Henry, Competition Damages Actions in the EU; Ivo Van Bael, Due Process in 
EU Competition Proceedings (Kluwer Law International, 2011); Richard Craswell, “Passing on the Costs 
of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships,” Stanford Law Review, 1991, 
361–98; Frank Verboven and Theon Van Dijk, “Cartel Damages Claims and the Passing-on Defense*,” 
The Journal of Industrial Economics 57, no. 3 (September 1, 2009): 457–91; Robert G. Harris and 
Lawrence A. Sullivan, “Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis,” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1979, 269–360; Earl E. Pollock, “Standing to Sue, Remoteness 
of Injury, and the Passing-On Doctrine,” Antitrust Law Journal, 1966, 5–40. 
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Differently, and as it is more likely to be for the economic scholars
11, Ω might 
decide to pass-on the whole or part of the price increase it had to pay on vitamins to the 
next level of the supply chain, that is the cosmetics’ distributor α. The question posed in 
this regard in both EU and US systems is, therefore, if α is entitled to claim damages 
against the cartelist β and if the latter can oppose the passing-on defence to a claim 
raised by the direct purchaser Ω. It is questioned, indeed, whether the overcharge paid 
by the indirect purchaser is the result of a free choice of the direct purchaser to raise the 
prices that, for some critics, would alone suffice the lack of causation, or a natural and 
foreseeable dynamic. 
The scenario is even more complicated if we think that in the downstream 
market, after the distributor, there might be a long list of subjects buying, implementing 
or re-selling the vitamins under cartel and the other derived products. The longer and 
more complex the supply chain, the more the final purchaser will be ‘far’ from the 
initial infringement. This distance raises questions of proximity of the causal connection 
between the damage and the infringement, not exactly for matters of geographical 
distances but rather because at each step of the supply chain a new action will be 
implemented, resulting in an additional possibility to introduce an independent and 
sufficient cause of the damage (‘break the causal chain’). In other words, it is not 
always clear when the overcharge passing through the supply chain dissipates and stops 
being a cause of damages and when instead remains an adequate causal link of the 
damage. 
In this chapter, I analyse the passing-on in the light of causation laws. Once 
described the general problem around the proof of causation in passing-on actions, I 
present the choices made by national judges in the four countries selected for the 
comparative study. Therefore, the third part describes the approach adopted by the 
                                                          
11
 Assimakis P. Komninos and Oxera, “Quantifying Antitrust Damages: Towards Non-Binding Guidance 
for Courts,” Oxera, X, accessed March 20, 2014, http://www.oxera.com/Latest-
Thinking/Publications/Reports/2010/Quantifying-antitrust-damages-Towards-non-binding.aspx; Directive 
2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on Certain Rules 
Governing Actions for Damages under National Law for Infringements of the Competition Law 
Provisions of the Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA Relevance Recital (41). For a 
different view, see Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, “Toward a European Directive on Damages Actions,” Journal 
of Competition Law and Economics 10, no. 2 (January 23, 2014): 346. 
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recently released Directive on competition law damages actions
12
. With regard to the 
Directive, this chapter argues that the legislator has been sufficiently precise in 
identifying the problems and fixing the aims, but has not been as efficient in proposing 
solutions. Part IV analyses the solutions laid down by the Directive in the light of the 
aims posed by the same European legislator. Finally I suggest interpretative solutions in 
order to bring consistency both into the interpretation of the causation link in passing-on 
cases and the policy issues that the same arises. 
 
6.1.2 Passing- on as a matter of causation 
The private enforcement of European competition law is centred on the aim of 
compensating the victim of the antitrust infringement
13
. This is one of the main 
differences with the US system relying on the deterrence effect of private antitrust 
provisions
14
. The compensatory principle dispenses a general rule for which the 
damaged party should be able to recover damages in order to restore the same situation 
she was, at least from an economic point of view, before the breach occurred
15
. For 
obtaining compensation of the damage, the claimant has to substantiate the 
infringement, the prejudice suffered and the causal connection between the two. 
Antitrust infringements usually affect several subjects at the same time, because they 
impact horizontally on the direct buyers of those goods and vertically on the 
                                                          
12
 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on 
Certain Rules Governing Actions for Damages under National Law for Infringements of the Competition 
Law Provisions of the Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA Relevance. 
13
 The principle was stated in Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico 
Assicurazioni SpA ECR [2006] I-06619 (2006); Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and 
Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and Others ECR I-06297 (2001)., and subsequently adopted by the 
Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on Certain 
Rules Governing Actions for Damages under National Law for Infringements of the Competition Law 
Provisions of the Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA Relevance. For an historical 
reconstruction of the right to damages in competition law see Veljko Milutinović, The “Right to 
Damages” Under EU Competition Law: From Courage V. Crehan to the White Paper and Beyond 
(Kluwer Law International, 2010). 
14
 Wouter P. J. Wils, The Optimal Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law: Essays in Law & Economics 
(Kluwer Law International, 2002). 
15
 Deakin, Johnston, and Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law; Prosser, Prosser and Keeton on 
the Law of Torts. 
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downstream markets connected to them. These commercial chains of distributions can 
be simple or complex and are composed by different links which correspond to an equal 
number of steps before the final consumer. The complexity of these chains depends, 
therefore, also on how many levels the product undergoes before reaching the final 
consumer. 
A supply chain is defined as “a network of autonomous or semi-autonomous 
business entities collectively responsible for procurement, manufacturing, and 
distribution activities associated with one or more families of related products”16. 
Market chains (sometimes alternatively called value chains) comprise a broader 
spectrum of subjects than supply chains, that is all the economic actors who produce 
and transact a particular product as it moves from primary producer to final consumer. 
In simple chains there is an immediate connection between undertaking and 
distributor and between undertaking and consumer, through one or more exchange of 
goods, services, money and information. Differently, complex chains include all firms 
spanning from the first supplier to the last customer involved in the exchange of goods, 
services, money and information.  
An antitrust infringement is normally capable of affecting multiple subjects, 
since its impact on the market is not limited to the direct purchaser of the good or 
service directly interested by the infringement
17
.  Economists explain that one of the 
main reasons for the propagation of the damage along the market chain, rests on the 
passing-on phenomenon since market players react to cost changes contributing to the 
distribution of the damage passing it through the chain
18
. For instance, when a 
                                                          
16
 Jayashankar M. Swaminathan, Stephen F. Smith, and Norman M. Sadeh, “Modeling Supply Chain 
Dynamics: A Multiagent Approach*,” Decision Sciences 29, no. 3 (1998): 607–32. 
17
 William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, “Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under 
the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick,” The University of Chicago Law 
Review, 1979, 602–35; Firat Cengiz, “Passing-On Defense and Indirect Purchaser Standing in Actions for 
Damages against the Violations of Competition Law: What Can the EC Learn from the US?,” University 
of East Anglia Centre for Competition Policy, Working Paper, 2007, 39; Ashton and Henry, Competition 
Damages Actions in the EU, 42. 
18
 The Oxera and a multi-jurisdictional team of lawyers led by Dr Assimakis Komninos have developed a 
study for the European Commission where they cautiously state that “Economic theory has identified 
certain relationships between cost changes (such as changes in input prices) and price changes. In 
essence, these relationships follow from the standard models of competition, oligopoly and monopoly in 
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downstream cartel sets higher prices for the goods sold, it is thought by economic 
literature that it is often the case that the direct purchaser of those goods passes at least 
part of the overcharge on to the following link of the chain
19
. This passage might repeat 
till the final purchaser who is not able to unload the overcharge. While these passages 
are seen by economists as almost unavoidable in some cases because of cost-price 
embedded in the pricing dynamics (to a higher input cost corresponds a higher output 
price), it is also true that the damage propagates at each step thanks to the actions of 
market actors which are damaged parties and not the antitrust infringers. 
 
a. Cause-in-fact and the passing-on 
It is intuitive to understand that the causation link between the breach of law and 
the damage of an indirect purchaser along such complex chains might be not as 
immediate as in direct purchases. However, this convincing evidence has to be 
converted into a more dogmatic truth and correspondent solutions has to be drawn. The 
position of the indirect purchaser in passing-on actions is generally analysed as a matter 
of standing rather than of causation
20
. As related to pass on damages in EU competition 
damages actions, however, the CJEU and the directive 104/2014 clearly stated that any 
natural or legal person who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of competition 
                                                                                                                                                                          
which there is a certain relationship between price and (marginal) cost. On this basis, the report 
describes several insights from economic theory regarding the likely pass-on rate in various market 
situations. A distinction must be made between firm-specific and industry-wide cost increases”   
Komninos and Oxera, “Quantifying Antitrust Damages,” X. 
19
 Maier-Rigaud labels this view as simplistic, as he argues that “By changing relative prices, competition 
law infringements trigger responses throughout the economy and neither all competition law 
infringements nor all repercussions of competition law infringements occur within a vertical chain” and 
that the overcharge should not be classified as damage; Maier-Rigaud, “Toward a European Directive on 
Damages Actions,” 346. 
20
 Süleyman Parlak, “Passing-on Defence and Indirect Purchaser Standing: Should the Passing-on 
Defence Be Rejected Now the Indirect Purchaser Has Standing after Manfredi and the White Paper of the 
European Commission?,” World Competition 33, no. 1 (2010): 31–53; Ashton and Henry, Competition 
Damages Actions in the EU, 36; Cengiz, “Passing-On Defense and Indirect Purchaser Standing in Actions 
for Damages against the Violations of Competition Law”; Assimakis P. Komninos, Ec Private Antitrust 
Enforcement: Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by National Courts (Hart Publishing 
Limited, 2008). 
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law is able to claim full compensation for that harm
21
 irrespective of whether they are 
direct or indirect purchasers
22
. Therefore, no room remained on speculations about the 
possibility for these subjects to claim for damages as a matter of standing
23
. 
The general question for causation, instead, is whether steps after the first 
purchase reduced the damage to the purchaser, or caused other types of damages such as 
lost profits. However, the specific questions related to causation are different and 
specifically related to the factual situation
24
.  The causal link is indeed a structural 
element of the infringement, which generally responds to an objective reconstruction of 
a syllogistic type, between an action (author of the act) abstractly considered (not yet 
classified as damnum injuria datum) and the harmful event. In order to identify the 
primary relationship between conduct and event, the judge in the first instance excludes 
any assessment of foreseeability, both subjective as an objective, that is an analytic 
element placed at a later stage of the reconstruction of the causal nexus. Here again, 
therefore, the double-test on causation applies. The problem is to understand and 
substantiate, firstly that the overcharge inflicted a damage to the claimant and not to 
another subject along the supply chain, who internalised the negative externality 
(compensatory principle). Secondly, it is fundamental to assess the proximity, or 
however the legal causation, of the specific type of damage claimed to the antitrust 
infringement. 
On this basis, a general subdivision of causal questions can be framed as 
follows. The material causation demands the claimant (indirect purchaser) to give 
sufficient proof that the cartel overcharge has passed on to her. So the question would 
be whether the damage would have happened but-for the antitrust infringement
25
. On 
                                                          
21
 Article 2 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 
on Certain Rules Governing Actions for Damages under National Law for Infringements of the 
Competition Law Provisions of the Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA Relevance. 
22
 Article 12, ibid. 
23
 It remains certainly still vivid the policy-based discussion about the opposite choice made by the US 
Supreme Court and the most efficient system as confronted to the aim it pursues. 
24
 Although causation is a matter of fact that, therefore, regards the specific characteristics of the singular 
situation, it is important to make clear the general structure of the rules on causation in order to avoid 
inconsistencies or (as demonstrated) failures in its substantiation. 
25
 Differently and, in a more sophisticated way, the judge can ask whether the overcharge passed-on was a 
necessary element of a set of conditions jointly sufficient for causing the damage claimed. For an analysis 
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the other hand, the defendant (the antitrust infringer) has to prove that the steps taken 
after the first purchase reduced or eliminated the damage.  
When instead is the direct purchaser to claim for damages, the evidential burden 
related to causation varies according to the specific characteristics of the domestic 
system. Generally, it is required to the claimant to substantiate the damage, the 
negligent violation of law and the causal link connecting them. However, in case of 
passing-on some courts have also required the claimant to provide sufficient proof that 
the overcharge was not passed on to the next buyer. The motivation of this approach  is 
mainly about proximity to the relevant information for proving passing-on. However, 
this requirement reverts the burden of proof onto the claimant. This presumption does 
not technically affect causation since the claimant has in any case to prove that the 
overcharge is directly connected to the damage claimed. However, the presumption 
revert the burden of proving a further element, the passing-on, which is strictly related 
to causation. Therefore, as for the factual causation, it is crucial to assess if the damage 
to the indirect purchaser would have occurred but-for the antitrust infringement via 
price effect. The claimant has to prove that the antitrust infringement, and not the 
following actions enacted by direct and indirect buyers, has caused a damage.  
When the overcharge is the result of an antitrust infringement that inflates prices 
of goods or services, the legislator has to decide whether to allow indirect purchasers to 
claim compensation for the relative damages or not. At this point, the material causal 
link between the conduct and the event finds correspondents in each antecedent (near, 
intermediate and remote) that has generated, or even contributed to this objective 
relation to the fact, and therefore should be considered a cause of the event. The second 
stage requires instead the analysis of legal causation in order to ascertain that the 
damage claimed falls foul of competition regulation and within is attributable to the 
antitrust infringer. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
of the NESS theory and its application in tort law see supra, para 2.6; Wright, “Causation, Responsibility, 
Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof”; Hart and Honoré, Causation in the Law; Richard W. 
Wright, “Causation in Tort Law,” California Law Review, 1985, 1735–1828; Wright, “The NESS 
Account of Natural Causation.” 
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b. Legal causation in passing-on damages actions 
The illegal overcharge passed through the market chain may cause different 
types of damages to both direct and indirect purchasers. Firstly, there is the actual loss 
of the consumer (or anyway of the purchaser who did not pass on the overcharge) that 
amounts to the level of the overcharge multiplied the number of items purchased
26
. As 
for intermediate buyers of the good or services under infringement, when they succeed 
to pass on the overcharge paid, they can claim for lost profits caused by the decline in 
demand due to higher prices
27
. 
The evaluation of legal causation - both in terms of the dependence of the event 
from its factual antecedents and belonging to the scope of the rule infringed - is done 
according to criteria of scientific probability or relying on logic inferences
28
. Legal 
causation delimits the compensation, identifying which damages are ruled out from the 
compensation to the indirect purchaser materially injured by the infringement. 
Hence, through the tests of remoteness, directness, scope of the rule, ‘causal 
regularity’, probability29, or any other, the claimant has to substantiate that the supra-
competitive price of her purchase, albeit indirectly charged, caused damages that are 
causally linked to the antitrust infringement. 
Hence, on the basis of these theories, are damages caused by pass-on such as 
umbrella effects, renounce to the purchase,  decrease in demand, lucrum cessans, and 
the like, recoverable? 
The time is not ripe enough to base a response on national case law that –so far- 
has mainly dealt with claims that are more straightforward
30
, however, some responses 
(and some new doubts) can be gleaned from the Directive and from the CJEU case law. 
The following paragraph displays indeed an analysis of the case law of the European 
                                                          
26
 This actually happens only in perfectly competitive markets where the pass-on rate is 100%, see 
Commission Staff Working Document – Practical Guide on Quantifying Harm in Actions for Damages 
Based on Breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union  
SWD(2013) 205, 2013 para 170. 
27
 Ibid. para 175 ff. 
28
 Hart and Honoré, Causation in the Law, 85 ff. 
29
 For an analysis of some national European approaches to the legal causation, see here chapter III. 
30
 See here para 2.1. 
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Courts about passing-on which focused on different areas of law but holds applicable, to 
some extent, to competition law. 
 
6.1.3. Passing-on in non-competition law cases and the CJEU 
a. Passing-on on tax levies 
A consistent CJEU case law admits the passing-on defence in claims for 
restitution of taxes and burdens illicitly charged in conflict with EU regulation
31
. The 
national tax Authority can oppose the passing-on to the claimant which is asking for the 
restitution of the burden paid. However, this case law burdens the defendant (the tax 
Authority) to give evidence that the tax was passed on
32
. In the San Giorgio case the 
Court points out that “in a market economy based on freedom of competition, the 
question whether, and if so to what extent, a fiscal charge imposed on an importer has 
factually been passed on in subsequent transactions involves a degree of uncertainty for 
which the person obliged to pay a charge contrary to Community law cannot be 
systematically held responsible”33. In other words burdening the possible injured 
subject to substantiate that the overcharge was not passed on the downstream market, 
would make the exercise of its right to compensation almost impossible. 
Moreover, the CJEU has more recently required the national tax Authority to 
prove also the unjust enrichment of the claimant in case of compensation
34
. The CJEU 
deems it necessary because, even in case of passing-on of the charge levied, the 
claimant might suffer a reduction in its sales due to the price increase, resulting in a loss 
of profits
35
 
                                                          
31
 See, among the many others, Case C-398/09 Lady & Kid A/S and Others v Skatteministeriet ECR I-
07375 (2011); Case C-94/10 Danfoss A/S and Sauer-Danfoss ApS v Skatteministeriet ECR I-09963 
(2011); Case C-440/12 Metropol Spielstätten Unternehmergesellschaft (haftungsbeschränkt) v Finanzamt 
Hamburg-Bergedorf not yet published (2013). 
32
 Case 199/82 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v SpA San Giorgio ECR 1983 03595 (1983). 
33
 Ibid. para 15. 
34
 C-192/95 - Comateb and Others v Directeur général des douanes and droits indirects ECR I-00165 
(1997) para 27. 
35
 Ibid. para 29. 
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b. Passing on in non-contractual liability 
In Ireks-Arkady
36
 a quellmehl producer claimed for compensation of the 
damages caused by the European Community that rejected his application to receive the 
subsidies. The quellmehl is used in bread production and is derived from maize or 
wheat. The point made by the claimant was that the quellmehl is used in alternative to 
starch, therefore the European institutions were supposed to recognise the subsidy under 
the parity of treatment clause. At the moment of the claim the European Commission 
already stated that quellmehl producers had to be levelled with the starch producers. 
Ireks decided to claim for the prior damages felt. The Commission opposed that the 
claimant had passed the damage through the supply chain. In response, the claimant 
objected that he could not raise prices, given the competition of starch producers who 
were benefitting of subsidies in the same relevant period. 
The CJEU admitted in general terms the possibility to invoke the passing-on 
defence. However, in the specific case, rejected the objection of the defendant because 
there was no sufficient proof of the passing-on. 
In the following Wührer case
37
, the Court faces a double defence by the 
Commission and the Council based on passing-on exceptions. This case regards the 
same line of refunds to maze producers as in the Ireks-Arkady. Differently from Ireks, 
the Italian brewery Wührer was not a maze producer. However, it purchased the maze 
directly from the producers and used it for the production of beer. The same producers 
assigned to Wührer their right to the production refund. On this point, the Commission 
and the Council raised two objections. With the first objection, they maintained that 
Wührer had passed on the damage through price overcharges on the final products sold. 
Here the Court rejected the objection, because the defendants failed to substantiate their 
counter-claim, which was mainly speculative
38
. 
                                                          
36
 C-238/78 - Ireks-Arkady v Council and Commission ECR 01719 (1981). 
37
 C-256/80 - Birra Wührer v Council and Commission ECR 00789 (1987). 
38
 Ibid. paragraph 85. 
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Secondly, the Commission and the Council objected that Wührer was an 
‘indirect assignee’ of the right to production refund. Hence, the claimant had to 
substantiate the consideration paid for having that right. On this ground, the Court stated 
that the Commission erred to qualify the relationship between Wührer and the right to 
compensation. The claimant was indeed assignee of those rights, which were legally 
transferred to him by the owner. By consequence, Wührer was not claiming for a refund 
passed on by the producers. The claimant was, indeed, the direct owner of the right to 
refund
39
. 
 
6.1.4. Passing-on in national courts: a comparative overview 
National courts have since long been dealing with passing-on of price 
overcharges in competition damages actions, preceding in time the choices made with 
the Directive. Generally, national courts have accepted the passing-on, granting indirect 
purchasers the right to claim damages and ensuring, at the same time, the right to 
exercise the passing-on defence. However, the degree and extent of these rights are 
slightly different in modulation. 
 
A. Germany 
The German Act against Restrictions of Competition (ARC) provides at Section 
33, subsection 3, that “whoever intentionally or negligently commits an infringement of 
competition law shall be liable for the damages arising therefrom”. According to the 
wording of this paragraph, the antitrust infringer is liable indifferently for damages to 
direct purchasers and to indirect purchasers. However, it is not clear if the passing-on 
defence is admitted. In 2005 the German legislator amended the law and specified that 
“if a product or a service has been purchased at an excessive price, the damage is not 
excluded because the good or service has been resold”40. The fact that the direct 
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purchaser passed on the price overcharge does not exclude his right to claim 
compensation of damages.  But the provision fail to indicate what these damages are. 
Some authors observed that the provision had to be referred to the direct cartel damages 
caused by the price overcharge, and that by consequence it prevented the antitrust 
infringer to raise the passing-on defence. However, the German Supreme Court 
interpreted this sentence differently.  
The ORWI case
41
 solved indeed a longstanding issue in German case law about 
the admissibility of passing-on actions and defences. Before this decision, the Court of 
Appeals of Berlin opened a fracture in the judicial approach to passing-on. In an early 
case, the Court of Dortmund held that the defendant could not raise the passing-on 
defence
42
. In the following Readymix case the Higher Regional Court of Berlin
43
 
disallowed the cartelist to object the passing-on of the overcharge. The Court observed 
that the payment, either to direct or indirect purchaser, relieves the infringer from any 
other action pertaining to the same cartel damage
44
. The Appellate judge of Berlin, by 
contrary, held that both the direct and indirect purchasers could claim the entire amount 
of damages. 
In a later case, related to the carbonless paper cartel, the Federal Court of Justice 
finally granted right to stand to the indirect purchaser and allowed the passing-on 
defence
45
. The proceeding involved three parties, a savings Bank (claimant), a printing 
firm (injured party) and the cartelist (defendant), a carbonless paper producer. 
The damaged party, an insolvent printing firm, transferred its own right to 
compensation to the savings bank through an assignment of claims. The defendant, on 
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the other side, was part of a cartel fined by the European Commission
46
.  The claimant 
purchased carbonless paper from a wholesaler of the defendant at inflated prices. By 
consequence, when it learned about the existence of the cartel claimed for compensation 
of the damages due to the price overcharge. 
The Court of first instance (District Court of Mannheim) dismissed the claim, 
stating that only direct purchasers of cartel members had the right to claim 
compensation
47
. Moreover, the judge of the merit clung to the motivation observing that 
the claimant, by its turn, might have passed on the overcharge on to its clients. The 
claimant appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeal of Karlsrusche, which, however, 
endorsed the position of the first grade judge with regard to the passing-on issue
48
. The 
Appellate Court, however, found out that in the specific case the claimant was entitled 
to claim for damages. The claimant purchased the paper from a wholesaler which was 
fully owned by the cartelist. On this basis the judge reasoned that, since the direct 
purchaser, being it a subsidiary, would have never recovered the damage against the 
parent company, the judge had to grant the indirect purchaser with the right to claim 
compensation, in order to avoid unjust enrichment of the cartelist. The reasoning appear 
to be lagging, since it recognise the right to compensation only as a counterbalance to 
avoid unjust enrichment of the cartelist. 
On the other hand, both courts agreed that the passing on defence should not be 
likewise allowed. For, in that case, the cartel member would be exempted by any sort of 
compensatory liability. By consequence, the Appellate Court granted the defendant with 
the damages, calculating only the sales from the wholly owned subsidiary of the cartel 
member and excluded the passing-on exception, by denying any possible reduction of 
damages based on eventual pass-on of the overcharge. 
By contrast, and finally, the Supreme Court held that also indirect purchasers 
should be able to bring damages claims against the members of a cartel
49
. In addition, 
the Court sided for the admissibility of the passing-on defence, so dismissing the 
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argument of the Court of Appeal
50
. As a result, the Supreme Court stated that every 
damaged party is entitled to claim compensatory damages from any of the antitrust 
infringers
51
. By consequence, each cartelist is jointly and severally liable for the whole 
damage caused to a purchaser, being it direct or indirect. On the other hand, the 
defendant has the right to object the fact that the direct purchaser had passed the damage 
through the market chain. The Court moreover reasserts the power of the trial judge to 
estimate damages caused by a cartel
52
. The Court bases its interpretation also on Section 
33(3), sentence 2 ARC (even though was not applicable in the case at hand) making 
more difficult the possibility to object the passing-on defence. The defendant can invoke 
the passing-on defence pleading an adjustment of profits. For doing this the defendant 
has to substantiate the simultaneous fulfilment of three conditions. Firstly the defendant 
has to support with plausible proof or evidence that the passing on was economically 
possible. Secondly, he has to show that there was a causal link between the 
infringement and the damage passed on. Finally, the defendant’s burden of proof 
compels also that he has to give evidence of the fact that no other economic 
disadvantages injured the direct purchaser. In particular, the Court refers to the loss of 
profit descending from the decrease in demand, that is a normal market response to the 
increase in prices.  
The BGH made clear that the burden of proof of the passing-on of the 
overcharge lies on the defendant. Therefore, when the direct purchaser claims 
compensation from the antitrust infringer, it is up to the cartelist to show evidence of the 
passing-on. On this point, commentators already noticed that the proof can in many 
cases become a ‘probatio diabolica’ given that it can be particularly thorny the access to 
information needed to substantiate the passing-on
53
. Some pointed out that the obstacle 
could be overcome by courts giving acceptance to the so called ‘secondary burden of 
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allegation’54.  This is a special procedural instrument used in some jurisdictions to 
oblige claimants to disclose the relevant. 
However, in fact it will prove to be rather difficult for an indirect purchaser to 
claim damages successfully due to the evidential burden, e.g., having to prove that the 
intermediary has passed on the excessive prices. The damage suffered by an indirect 
purchaser is relatively minor compared to the cost risk and, by consequence, the 
practical relevance of such cases is reduced. In this respect, it is also important to note 
that the possibility of class actions does not exist in Germany
55
. German civil procedure 
law is based on the individual filing of an action. Thus, apart from the contractual 
possibility of agreeing on a model suit clause, German procedural law does not provide 
for a representative action by one member of a group of potential claimants with a 
binding effect of res judicata towards and against all the other members of the group.  
The claimant then has to demonstrate and to prove that his damage is based on 
the prohibited cartel. If the victim did not purchase directly from the cartel members, he 
must also prove that the overcharge was passed on to him as indirect purchaser. Given 
the complexity of pricing, the BGH held that there is no presumption that an increase in 
prices during the period of cartelization results from such cartel. In contrast to the EU 
Commission, the BGH demands evidence in every individual case. 
 
B. France 
There is no specific statutory basis for actions proposed by indirect purchasers. 
Hence, all claims are based on art. 1382 FCC. Given the broadness of the rule, French 
judges facing for the first time indirect purchasers actions had enough room to interpret 
the law as they deemed more reasonable. This discretion created conflicting judgments 
that ended in the Court of Cassation decision of 2010
56
. 
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This notable case takes place as a follow on action of the lysine cartel decision 
of the European Commission of 2004
57
. The claimant, Doux aliments Bretagne (Doux), 
a poultry farmer group, purchased lysine from Ceva santé animale (Ceva) which did not 
take part to the cartel. However, Ceva purchased lysine from cartel members, in 
particular Ajinomoto Eurolyne (Ajinomoto), at inflated price and supplied Doux. Doux 
decided to bring an action for damages directly against Ajinomoto before the French 
courts, arguing that the overcharge of the cartel had been passed on to it.  
The Court of first instance, the Commercial Court of Paris
58
, rejected the claim 
of Doux because the claimant failed to prove that it was unable to pass the overcharge 
through the market chain. In other words, Doux failed to prove the causal link between 
the cartel and the damage claimed. Moreover, the judge observed that the claimant 
failed to calculate the amount of damages. But Doux did not lose heart and appealed the 
decision before the Court of Appeals of Paris that reversed the judgement on both 
points
59
. The appellate judge commented that Doux was entitled to damages since it 
suffered a loss of profits due to a diminution of competitiveness of its products for 
which it should be compensated up to 30 per cent of its claims and, by consequence, 
awarded damages amounting to € 380,00060.  
Finally, the Court of Cassation defined the dispute and stated that the Court of 
Appeal failed to motivate the underlying reasons for accepting Doux’s claim. The judge, 
indeed, erred when considered the passing-on as non-influent in order to assess the 
damage and its quantification
61
. Although the Cassation concluded that indirect 
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purchasers are allowed to bring claims directly against cartelists, the decision has being 
criticised for taking a rather defensive approach with regard to pass on
62
.  
In a following case
63
 the French Supreme Court also specified that, as a matter 
of usual market dynamics, there is a presumption that purchasers tend to pass on the 
price overcharge paid for the good or service. Hence, the claimant has the burden to 
prove that she internalized the damage and avoided to pass the overcharge on the next 
level of the market chain.  
In both cases, the Court ruled that the claimant has the burden to substantiate the 
claim and also to prove that she internalised the overcharge avoiding to pass it on. 
The Commercial Court of Nanterre, in 2006, adopted a similar approach
64
 that, 
however, has brought the judge to draw different conclusions. In this case, the judge 
burdened the plaintiff to prove why he could not have passed on the price increase onto 
consumers. The court based its decision on the Commission’s decision on the vitamins’ 
cartel, presuming that price increases were likely to be passed on to consumers
65
. 
Ultimately, the court held that the cartel was implemented worldwide and, 
consequently, every competitor of the plaintiff was subject to the same conditions. 
Therefore, the plaintiff had the possibility of passing on the increase and the choice not 
to do so was part of the plaintiff’s pricing policy. In view of this, the court concluded 
that the plaintiff had not established the causal link between the fault and the damage.  
However, by recognising the standing to indirect purchasers, the Court of 
Cassation’s decision should bring a new wave of antitrust damages actions and could 
have a deterrent effect on potential infringers. It must be however underlined that, under 
French tort law, only damages amounting to the actual loss are awarded to claimant, 
since no punitive damages are admitted. Therefore, given the costs of proceedings, only 
indirect purchasers left with a significant damage should, in practice, seek compensation 
before courts. 
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C. Italy 
Some of the earliest cases regarding the passing-on in antitrust damages actions 
have taken place in Italy with the proceedings Indaba v. Juventus
66
 and  Unimare v. 
Geasar
67
. 
In the former case, Indaba, a travel agency, agreed with Juventus Football Club 
to sell tickets for the 1997 Champions League final match in Munich, offering them 
along with extra services such as transportation, excursions and the like. The ‘travel 
package’ had no success among supporters and Indaba sued Juventus claiming that the 
football club abused its dominant position infringing Article 102 TFEU and imposing 
an unreasonable surcharge on the ticket prices. The Court of Appeal noted that, indeed, 
the parties entered an agreement that restricted competition and that Juventus imposed 
excessive prices. Moreover, the practice of tying the sales of the tickets to the sale of 
travel packages amounted to a second infringement of competition law as it illegally 
restricted the relevant market, ultimately damaging consumers.  
However, the Court observed that Indaba entered into the agreement with the 
intention to pass on the overcharge to its customers. The Turin Court reasoned about the 
effects of the passing-on in the specific case applying the Article 1227 of the Italian 
Civil Code, for which the causal contribution of the damaged party to the event reduces 
or even exclude the compensation. For this reason the Court awarded no damages, 
noting that Indaba passed on the full amount of the costs with which was illegally 
burdened. In this vein, the Court stated that only the indirect customers “would be the 
ones entitled to claim damages for the overcharges they did not want”68. 
 
D. England 
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English courts have for long being reluctant to deal with the problem of passing-
on in competition damages actions. The admissibility of passing-on has been accepted 
with a few obiter dicta
69
 but never became object of judicial interpretation. In Devenish 
Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis SA, for instance, Tuckey LJ considered that “…Devenish 
is claiming the overcharge as if it were the defendants' net profit so as to avoid having 
to take into account the fact (if true) that it passed on the whole of the overcharge to its 
customers. I can see no way in which it could avoid taking this "pass on" into account 
in any compensatory claim for damages”70.  
Moreover, in Emerald Supplies v British Airways Mummery LJ stated at this 
regard that “The potential conflicts arising from the defences that could be raised by 
[British Airways] to different claimants, such as direct purchasers who have "passed 
on" the inflated price and would not want BA to run that passing on defence to their 
claims and those indirect purchasers to whom the inflated price has been passed on and 
who would want BA to raise the pass on defence to claims by direct purchasers, 
reinforce the fact that they do not have the same interest and that the proceedings are 
not equally beneficial to all those to be represented”71. 
Following, in Cooper Tire, the parties settled the case and agreed that the 
availability of the passing-on defence should depend on normal English principles of 
causation and mitigation
72
. 
The ostensible reluctance to treat the problem of passing-on in-depth might be 
explained by the factual approach that English judges have with regard to the pass-on 
issue. As explained by Mr Justice Popplewell in Fulton Shipping Inc v Globalia 
Business Travel SAU: “In order for a benefit to be taken into account in reducing the 
loss recoverable by the innocent party for a breach of contract, it is generally speaking 
a necessary condition that the benefit is caused by the breach […] The test is whether 
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the breach has caused the benefit; it is not sufficient if the breach has merely provided 
the occasion or context for the innocent party to obtain the benefit, or merely triggered 
his doing so […] Nor is it sufficient merely that the benefit would not have been 
obtained but for the breach.”73. Hence, the court should adopt a case-by-case approach, 
verifying whether the cartel “has caused the benefit” or “provided the occasion or 
context for the innocent party to obtain the benefit”, and it is be part of the claimant’s 
burden of proof to demonstrate how the cartel influenced prices. 
However, as a matter of principle, the English system is in line with the other 
European jurisdiction that accept both claims from indirect purchasers and the defence 
of passing-on.  
Meanwhile in the United States the Supreme Court, with the Hanover Shoe
74
 
and Illinois Brick
75
 cases, rejected the defence of passing on and barred indirect 
purchaser claims under federal antitrust law
76
. Defendants are not allowed to invoke the 
defence of passing on against the claims of direct purchasers, and indirect purchasers 
cannot claim damages on the basis that an overcharge has been passed on to them
77
. 
These two opposite views show dogmatic, legal and economical differences that 
it is worth to analyse but their enforcement is mostly leaded by considerations 
connected to the specific legal, economic and geographical drawbacks. The US 
approach is however deeply complicated by the fact that State courts have generally 
disregarded this case law. In many states it is indeed recognised to the indirect 
purchaser the right to claim for antitrust damages and the antitrust infringer can use the 
passing-on argument as a defence. It is reported indeed  that “thirty-six states and the 
District of Columbia, representing over 70 percent of the nation’s population, now 
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provide for some sort of right of action on behalf of some or all indirect purchasers”78. 
This situation has generated paradoxical litigation where indirect purchasers are 
claiming for damages before state courts and direct purchasers sue the infringers before 
the federal courts. 
 
6.1.5. The regulatory framework for passing-on in Europe 
The choice of the EU Commission, expounded in the White Paper 2008 and 
clinched with the Directive 104/2014, has been to grant indirect purchasers with the 
right to claim for damages due to the passing-on of the overcharge and, simultaneously, 
to allow cartelists to oppose the passing-on defence. This choice is justified by the aim 
of ensuring the effective exercise of the victims’ right to full compensation. However, 
the actual formulation of the Directive is the result of a process that counts at least ten 
years of different drafts. During the same period of time, the priorities of the European 
legislator changed and with them also the formulation of the relative rules on the 
passing-on, some of whose were hardly uncomplicated by a cryptic formulation
79
. In the 
following two paragraphs a critical description of such evolution is laid down. 
 
a. The Green Paper and the White Paper 
In the Green Paper
80
, the Commission left open the question whether or not a 
defendant should be able to invoke the passing-on defence. The Green Paper proposed 
four different alternatives to the passing-on of to the passing-on defence issue and 
indirect purchaser standing
81
. The Ashurst study laid down, instead, a highly sceptic 
position in this regard, noting that “The existence of the passing on defence itself is an 
obstacle to the extent it complicates claims. Moreover, to the extent it reduces the 
money paid to the plaintiff it clearly also reduces the latter’s incentive to bring a claim. 
                                                          
78
 Kevin J. O’Connor, “Is the Illinois Brick Wall Crumbling,” Antitrust 15 (2000): 34. See alsoAntitrust 
Modernization Commission Report and Recommendations VI, 2007, available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/toc.htm. 
79
 See, for instance, art. 12.3 of the Directive Proposal. 
80
 Green Paper - Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules SEC (2005) 1732 COM/2005, 
672 at 2.4. 
81
 Ibid. para 2.4. 
 144 
 
Lack of clarity as concerns the possibility for the indirect purchaser to claim and the 
difficulties of proof (in particular as regards causation and damages) both constitute 
obstacles to the indirect purchaser’s claim. The combination of the passing on defence 
(in particular where this is readily accepted) and the difficulties faced by indirect 
purchasers will seriously restrict private claims”82. 
This advice remained however largely unheard
83
. Basing their assumption on the 
evolution of the CJEU case law, the Commission argued in the White Paper
84
 that it was 
time to introduce a common European rule about passing-on in private antitrust 
enforcement. With the Courage and Manfredi cases, the CJEU stated that anyone 
should be able to claim for damages caused by an illegal conduct, agreement or practice, 
where there is a causal link between the infringement and the harm, and that the 
compensation is limited to the damnum emergens and lucrum cessans, plus interests. 
The aim of the White Paper was to ensure a consistent application of this 
principle, through a twofold action. Firstly it intended to deny that the application of the 
right to compensation could lead to multiple compensation and artificial multiplication 
of lawsuits
85
. Secondly, the White Paper sought to avoid unjust enrichment of the 
claimant who actually passed-on the overcharge
86
. 
Therefore, the Commission proposed to make available both a passing–on 
defence for the defendant and the right for the indirect purchaser to claim for damages 
connected to the cartel. Regarding the standard of proof, the White Paper also pointed 
out that for the defendant it should not be lower than the burden imposed on the 
claimant to prove the damage. For indirect purchasers, instead, the Commission 
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suggested the integration of the normative text with a rebuttable presumption that the 
illegal overcharge was passed on to them
87
. 
  
b. The Directive Proposal and its amendments 
In the wake of the mentioned CJEU case law and the White Paper, the Draft 
Directive
88
 stated that injured parties are entitled to compensation for actual loss 
(overcharge harm) and loss of profit. The direct purchaser who passes the overcharge 
on, is entitled – therefore – to claim for the loss of profit due to the reduction of the 
volume sold consequent to the increase of price. 
The Commission then pointed out the situation - before neglected - that the pass-
on can take place also in upwards direction on the supply chain (for instance in cases of 
buying cartels)
89
. 
With Article 12 the Commission has then introduced the main innovation to the 
previous formulations. In particular art. 12.2 states that “Insofar as the overcharge has 
been passed on to persons at the next level of the supply chain for whom it is legally 
impossible to claim compensation for their harm, the defendant shall not be able to 
invoke the defence referred to in the preceding paragraph”. 
This article has been totally changed by the General Approach that stated more 
simply that the defendant in an action for damages can invoke as a defence against a 
claim for damages the fact that the claimant passed on the whole or part of the 
overcharge resulting from the infringement. Moreover, it provided that the burden of 
proving that the overcharge was passed on rest with the defendant.  
The following Article 13 determined that the passing-on of the overcharge is 
presumed unless the infringement is proven. The defendant is entitled to give proof that 
the overcharge has not been passed on or has been only partially passed on to the 
indirect purchaser. 
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6.1.6. Passing-on of the overcharge in the ‘Damages Directive’ 
Finally, on 26 November 2014, the Directive 104/2014
90
 on antitrust damages 
action was signed down and, with it, the load of amendments it brought.  
With this Directive, the EU legislator intended to ensure effective application of 
the compensatory principle enshrined in the Manfredi
91
 and Courage
92
 landmark cases. 
In order to do this the Commission proposes, firstly, to deny that the application of the 
right to compensation could lead to multiple compensation and artificial multiplication 
of lawsuits. Secondly, to avoid unjust enrichment of the claimant who actually passed-
on the overcharge. The solution to this problem is, for the legislator, to introduce the 
passing-on both as a ‘sword’ and as a ‘shield’ in the EU legislation, in order to make it 
applicable in the whole EU area. 
In this vein, the Directive proposes, in first instance, to ensure effective 
application of TFEU’s rules; in particular granting the right to full compensation93. 
Secondly, the Directive aims at the creation of a level playing field for undertakings and 
ensure equivalent protection to all the market players over the European economic 
area
94
. 
The Article 2 sets out the general rule of the right to full compensation based on 
which “any natural or legal person who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of 
competition law is able to claim and to obtain full compensation for that harm”. The 
damage is composed by (and limited to) the actual loss and the lost profits, plus 
interests (Article 2.2.). In this way, the European legislator intended to oppose any form 
of overcompensation, “whether by means of punitive, multiple or other types of 
damages” (Article 2.3.).  
                                                          
90
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With regard to passing-on, this compensatory principle has to be linked to 
Artilce 12.2  for which “compensation for actual loss at any level of the supply chain 
does not exceed the overcharge harm suffered at that level”. Article 12 lays down the 
general principle supporting both the indirect purchaser claims and the passing-on 
defence. It firstly makes application of the judgements Manfredi and Courage to state 
that compensation of harm can be claimed by anyone who suffered a damage, included 
indirect purchasers
95
. Moreover, it clarifies that, as for all the other claims based on 
infringement of competition law, the compensation consists of actual loss and loss of 
profits. If the passing-on defence is successfully  
The indirect purchaser has therefore the right to claim for damages directly from 
the antitrust infringer. As a general rule, the claimant bears the burden of proving the 
passing-on
96
. This burden of proof for the claimant is, however, simplified (at least at 
first glance) by a sum of presumptions. Firstly, the Directive instructs the national judge 
that the passing-on has to be assessed “taking into account the commercial practice that 
price increases are passed on down the supply chain”97. This statement is partly 
disproved by the Commission’s Practical Guide on Quantifying Harm which states that 
“Where the direct customer of the infringing undertakings uses the cartelised goods to 
compete in a downstream market, it is likely that the direct customer will normally not 
be able to pass on this increase in cost (or only to a very limited degree) if his own 
competitors in that downstream market are not subject to the same or a similar 
overcharge (for example, where they receive their input from a market that is not 
subject to the cartel)”98. 
Despite this apparent inconsistency, that might be justified by the objective of 
relieving the burden of proof to indirect purchasers, the Directive creates a further 
incongruence, this time right inside the legislative text. The Article 14.2 lays down 
indeed a presumption of damage dependent on the realisation of three conditions: 
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“The indirect purchaser shall be deemed to have proven that a passing-on to 
him occurred where he has shown that: 
 (a) the defendant has committed an infringement of competition law; 
 (b) the infringement of competition law resulted in an overcharge for 
the direct purchaser of the defendant; and 
 (c) he purchased the goods or services that were the subject of the 
infringement of competition law , or purchased goods or services derived from or 
containing the goods or services that were the subject of the infringement.”. 
In follow-on actions the first condition is automatically fulfilled thanks to the 
disposal of Article 9 regarding the validity of the national competition authorities’ 
decisions
99
. Moreover, the second requisite is also satisfied in case of cartels. Art. 17.2 
states indeed that it shall be presumed that cartel infringements cause harm, in particular 
via price effect
100
, and the infringer shall have the right to rebut that presumption. 
Finally, the injured party needs to substantiate the purchase of a good or service 
that was subject to the infringement, or that derived from it or, finally, that contains the 
good or services subject to the infringement. The broad formulation of the third 
condition placed by Article 14.2 simplifies as well the burden of proof of the claimant 
but creates deep interpretative issues. What the norm means for “goods or services 
derived from or containing the goods or services that were the subject of the 
infringement”? It is open to question. 
Let us make an example. The international law firm ‘X’ purchases a number of 
printers from the undertaking ‘Y’. After few years it comes out that the seller took part 
to a printers’ cartel. In the meanwhile, the law firm decides to raise its fees. Are the 
clients of the law firm entitled to claim compensation as indirect purchasers?  
Can we say that the service offered by the law firm is derived by the use of the 
printers and therefore its cost reflects also the cartel overcharge? 
                                                          
99
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In favour of a positive response stands the consideration that the operating costs 
of the law firm increased in the relevant period. In this case, relying on the actual 
formulation of the Directive, the clients of the advising company should be able to 
claim damages against the cartelist, since they purchased a service from a direct 
purchaser and they also paid an overcharge due to the price increase. Their advisor, 
indeed, included - allegedly and presumably – an overcharge caused by the price 
increase, in which the cartel overcharge is embedded. However, this simple assertion is 
too feeble to prove causation. Indeed, the legal service is not directly derived from the 
printing devices. And also from a cost analysis, the price overcharge of the printers 
weights on the cost of the service for a very limited extent. Therefore, it cannot be 
assumed that the cost is contained in one of the services
101
. 
This reasoning can be extended to all cases where the good or service passed 
through the supply chain is somehow related but not yet part of the good or service 
subject to the infringement. Otherwise, we should admit damages actions from any 
indirect purchaser related to any of the good or services of subjects that purchased cartel 
products. The link of causation would be definitely lost as well as the function of the 
antitrust compensation would be distorted.  
The right to compensation of the indirect purchasers finds a counterbalance in 
Article 13 which allows the passing-on defence. Thanks to this clause, the defendant 
can oppose to the claimant that he passed on the whole or part of the overcharge 
resulting from the infringement of competition law. The burden of proof of passing-on 
remains on the defendant, who may reasonably require disclosure from the claimant or 
from third parties. 
The direct purchaser who passed on the whole or part of the overcharge 
maintains, in any case, the possibility to obtain compensation for lost profits
102
. 
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6.1.7. How the passing-on works in the Directive: a game of opposing 
presumptions 
Article 14 (1) firstly restates the (by now blurry) principle that the burden to 
substantiate the claim rests on the claimant. A special clause completes Article 14(1) 
where it is suggested that the judge should take into account the commercial practice of 
passing on the price increases. This statement, is further explained in Recital (41) which 
specifies that since i) it may be commercial practice to pass on price increases and ii) 
that it may be particularly difficult for indirect purchasers to prove the harm as 
connected to the infringement,  the claimant has to be regarded “as having proven that 
an overcharge paid by that direct purchaser has been passed on to its level where it is 
able to show prima facie that such passing-on has occurred”. The same Recital (41) 
adds that “This rebuttable presumption applies unless the infringer can credibly 
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that the actual loss has not or not entirely 
been passed on to the indirect purchaser”. This clause has been introduced only with 
the very last Parliamentary amendments
103
. Since it is embedded as acting commercial 
pattern, the pass on is more likely to happen than not, at least for the law. Hence, the 
Directive prefers to presume the pass on to be happened with the indirect purchaser 
being able to show a prima facie clue.  
While this clause forms therefore a proper presumption, the second paragraph of 
the same article 14 arranges another rebuttable presumption that heads in the same 
direction and works subordinately to three conditions. The first condition requires the 
proof that the defendant has committed an infringement of competition law. Secondly, 
the infringement has to result in an overcharge on goods or services. Finally, the 
indirect purchaser obtained goods or services subject of the infringement or derived or 
containing them. If all these three conditions are fulfilled, the judge can presume that 
the overcharge was passed-on to indirect purchaser, reverting the burden of proof on the 
defendant.  
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The reason for this rules mainly resides in motivations of substantial justice. The 
legislator indeed followed a long-standing CJEU case law that considered that it would 
be better to burden the tortfeasor with the risk of having to substantiate the causal link, 
rather than the (possible) injured party, being it direct or indirect
104
. Moreover, the 
defendant is also in this occasion closer to the information decisive for proffering the 
proof. However, the wording of the article raises a number of interpretative problems 
that national courts will have to deal with relying again on the evaluations of facts and 
on domestic principle of causation. The case will have to overcome another hurdle as 
well. This is created by a presumption which goes in the opposite direction. 
Art. 17 (2) states that “Member States shall ensure that it shall be presumed that 
cartel infringements cause harm. The infringer shall have the right to rebut this 
presumption”. The claimant therefore does not need to demonstrate the existence of a 
damage originated by the cartel, for the burden of proof is rebutted on the infringer. 
Also in this case, the reason for such presumption reflects the intention of the Directive 
to remedy the information asymmetry and other hurdles that the claimant has to face in 
antitrust litigation
105
. This should work has an incentive to litigation through alleviating 
the role of the claimant and as a tool to harmonise the different approaches to antitrust 
liability
106
. However, the presumption is limited to violation of Article 101 TFUE. 
In other words, the most common application of such rebuttable presumption is, 
in the head of the legislator, for cases where claimant purchase a good or service subject 
to cartel overcharge. The pricing of a good or service depends on a vast number of 
variables, each capable of influencing the price
107
. The subject who is closer to the 
information regarding pricing strategies is, beyond doubt, the same cartelist who fixed 
the price. In this fashion, the EU legislator has operated a redistribution of information 
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costs burdening the defendant to disclose the information regarding the influence of the 
cartel on the price it charged to the claimant. However, the claimant still needs to 
substantiate that he suffered the damages consequence of the unlawful behaviour
108
.  
This presumption clearly conflicts with the Article 17 (2) which presumes that 
cartels cause harm via price effect
109
. A first conflict would be therefore created 
between the presumption of damage to the direct purchaser of the cartel and the indirect 
buyers. 
Moreover, it is hard to imagine how can the judge deny the application of the 
same presumption of passing on embedded in Article 14(1) when it is submitted by the 
defendant who is using the passing-on defence. Take the case of a direct purchaser who, 
relying on the general presumption set forth in Article 17(2), claims for the damages 
incurred as a consequence of the cartel overcharge. If the action is a follow-on type, the 
infringement and the overcharge are already proven. As a consequence, if the defendant 
gives evidence that the claimant sold, at her turn, the good or services subject to cartel 
overcharge, the same presumption of pass-on should apply. The Directive does not give 
any clear explanation on this point. 
On the other side, if the aim of the Directive is to give exclusive prerogative to 
the two opposite presumptions, this might have deeply inconsistent effects on the 
market. If direct and indirect purchasers from the same supply chain claim for damages, 
they will all benefit of presumptions that burden the defendant to substantiate whether 
the overcharge was passed through or not. On the other hand, a game of contrasting 
presumptions takes the stage also when the defendant resorts to the argument of the 
‘commercial practice’ in order to object the claim.  
The Directive partly solves this problems warding off the danger of multiple 
liability through overcompensation. The total amount of the actual loss that the infringer 
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might be called to compensate equate indeed, and its limited to, the overcharge harm
110
. 
Moreover, the court seized for each case is supposed to decide the case taking “due 
account of” related actions for damages111.  
However, unless the claimant is not the final consumer of the good or service, 
the presumption of passing-on should prevail. By consequence, the damage, which is 
identified in the overcharge, would be always presumed to be found at the bottom of the 
supply chain. 
In this perspective, it is reasonable to observe that the Directive falls short of the 
aims that poses as its basis. The first aim of the Directive is indeed to ensure full 
compensation to anyone who is damaged by a competition law infringement. Secondly, 
the Directive intends to improve the conditions for consumers to exercise the rights
112
 
and, thirdly, to create a ‘level playing field’ for all undertakings operating in the internal 
market
113
. The rules contained in the Directive tend to push the overcharge to the 
bottom of the supply chain where consumers are not helped anyhow to bring a claim 
more easily. The ‘big absent’ of the Directive on damages actions is indeed a rule on the 
collective redress system, topic that has been relegated to a Commission 
recommendation
114
.  
The further aim of the Directive is the convergence of the different approaches 
adopted by the Member States’ jurisdictions, in order to create a ‘level playing field’. 
On this point, the Directive harmonises the rules on passing-on but fails to do the same 
with its consequences. Questions such as what damages are recoverable, how the 
different presumptions work and to what extent the causation test is proven, it remain 
wrapped in uncertainty. Moreover, the Directive says nothing about the possibility of 
resorting to actions for restitutions and unjust enrichment instead of claims for 
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compensation of damages, although they have already being excluded in different 
European jurisdictions were the conflict could arise
115
. 
In conclusion, the solutions proposed by the Directive are insufficient to cover 
the present needs of the private antitrust enforcement. The Directive registers - with a 
lag of almost a decade – what some doctrine suggested after the publication of the 
Ashurst Report
116
. In the meanwhile, though, many other issues gained importance in 
antitrust litigation and some other have been naturally digested and harmonised by the 
member states’ systems, through case law and legislative adaptations. 
 
6.1.8. Heads of damages and computation of cartel damages in passing-on 
The main practical concern rightly addressed by the Commission relates the 
position of the indirect purchasers. They are distant from the infringement and have 
scarce economic power, which makes for them very hard if not impossible to prove the 
damage. For this reason the Commission introduced a rebuttable presumption of 
passing-on of the overcharge, reversing the burden of proof in favour of the indirect 
purchasers. However, the consumer has still to cope with the problem of the 
computation of cartel damages and of the demonstration of the types of damages he or 
she is entitled to claim. The commonly accepted basis for calculating cartel damages is 
the price overcharge
117
. This corresponds to the price actually charged during the 
infringement minus the price that would be charged in normal market conditions. 
Therefore the end-consumers’ damages are equal to the pass-on of the 
overcharge. On the other side, the direct purchaser might not have passed on the whole 
overcharge, in which case he or she would be entitled to claim for the difference. In 
addition, the cartel-inflated prices cause a loss of profit to the direct purchaser who will 
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typically sell less, because of the decrease in the consumer demand
118
. The full 
compensation principle compels the award of both the actual loss suffered (damnum 
emergens) and also for the loss of profit (lucrum cessans) plus interest. The total harm 
suffered by the direct purchaser will amount therefore to the price of the overcharge 
minus the passing-on of the overcharge plus the damage from the lost sales that results 
from the pass-on. 
The computation of lost sales factor is instead particularly thorny. Economist 
typically apply to the price of the overcharge an adjustment factor which is a number 
comprised between 0 and 1
119
. In a perfectly competitive downstream market the lost 
sales adjustment factor is 0. In this case the profit margin of the direct purchasers’ lost 
would be 0. Conversely, in a monopolist or oligopolist industry the adjustment factor 
equal to 1. In this case, instead, the lost sales from passing-on exactly offset the gains 
from the pass-on. 
In a nutshell, the computing of pass-on damages poses several problems. Firstly 
it is particularly difficult to determine how much of the cartel price over-charge direct 
purchasers actually passed on to the next level. Secondly, the calculation of the lost-
sales effect, that occurs when direct purchasers are passing on higher input prices, is 
made difficult by the different clashing approaches of economic theories on the topic 
and by their practical application. 
Some scholars argued that we do not need passing-on because that is not a real 
“defence” but is merely a way to calculate damages120. Domestic private laws already 
provide all the tools for overcoming any problem of unjust enrichment or lack of 
compensation of the damaged party. When the volume of sales decreases, generally 
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companies respond by increasing prices. Therefore, if a company internalise the 
overcharge but, given for instance to a (cartel) margin squeeze, it is forced aside of the 
market losing clients and sales, it cannot neither invoke the actual loss. Since it 
increased prices in the relevant period, it is presumed that the cartel overcharge is 
comprised in that amount. It should rest therefore with the direct purchaser to 
demonstrate that, instead, the price increase depends on the loss of sales and that the 
cartel overcharge was internalised. 
 
 
6.2. Indirect purchasers aggrieved by ‘umbrella effects’ 
After about two years of gestation, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
has established in the Kone case that antitrust damages caused by umbrella effects are 
indemnifiable under art. 101 TFEU
121
. 
The case originates from an action for compensation purported by 
ÖBB‑Infrastruktur AG (ÖBB), a subsidiary of the Österreichische Bundesbahnen 
(Austrian national railway company) against the members of the lifts and escalators 
cartel which operated in Austria since the ‘80s. 
The operation of a collusive agreement among the major undertakings of the 
sector
122
 was identified and fined by the European Commission
123
 for activities in 
Belgium, Germany, the Netherland and Luxemburg. Following this decision, the 
Austrian antitrust authority also fined the cartel for its operations within the domestic 
borders. The decision was ratified by the Austrian Cartel Court
124
 and subsequently by 
the Appellate Court
125
. 
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The ÖBB purchased and installed a considerable amount of supplies of 
escalators and lifts hailing partly from members of the cartel and partly from other 
distributors which passed-on to ÖBB the cartel overcharge. Finally, a third part of the 
supplies was purchased by sellers that were not connected at any title to the antitrust 
infringement. ÖBB claimed reparation of damages felt as a consequence of price 
overcharges caused by the cartel, for a total amount of  8.134.344,54 Euros. Only a third 
of it (precisely 1.839.239,74 Euros) has become subject of the plea that induced the 
Austrian Supreme Court to submit a request for preliminary ruling to the CJEU. The 
matter of law was posed indeed only on the portion of damage relating to the purchases 
done by ÖBB from non-cartelists. 
ÖBB maintained that those sellers external to the collusion raised their prices as 
a consequence of the price umbrella created by the cartel. Without that collusion and, 
hence, in a normal market setting, the distributors not partaking to the cartel would have 
had no chances to impose such high prices. 
The Austrian court of first instance rejected this part of the claim because 
unfounded as a matter of law. The decision was reversed by the Appellate Court where 
the claim was wholly accepted. Joined before the Cassation Court, the claim was once 
more rejected in the part concerned by the umbrella pricing. The preliminary ruling 
regards exclusively this point. 
 
6.2.1. What is an umbrella price 
In the Kone case, the overcharge causing the damage has been imposed by an 
undertaking  that did not take part to the cartel. We might consequently wonder how is 
possible to ascribe also this damage to the cartelists. Here, particular economic 
dynamics play a substantial role. 
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A cartel exerts, by definition, a monopolist-like power on the market
126
, even 
when it does not control the whole relevant market. This situation makes possible for 
the cartel to impose prices higher than the market value of the goods or services
127
. 
However, some competitors might remain in the market or the market itself might 
maintain a certain degree of elasticity as to redirect buyers on substitute goods
128
. 
In order to determine the price of the good or service, the seller does not 
consider solely elements internal to the undertaking such as turnover, production costs 
and the units sold but also examines the price choices of competitors. For doing so, the 
firm adopts as a benchmark for setting its own prices the market price of the same 
goods. Hence, if due to an illicit collusion this market price is artificially inflated, the 
non-cartelist will in any case be bound to follow the market-price and raise at its turn 
the selling prices. 
The Kone case takes into consideration exclusively this possibility. However, 
also a second scenario can be advanced. The non-cartelist might indeed decide to raise 
prices consequently to the increase in demand of its substitute goods
129
. Those who can 
no longer purchase the goods subject to cartel will turn, in fact, to the producers of 
alternative goods with a consequent increase in demand for them. This second 
possibility seems more likely, moreover, in markets where information about the prices 
charged by competitors are difficult to access. From the point of view of the causal 
relationship it does not matter, though, if the issue at hand falls in one case or the other. 
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Both dynamics are anti-competitive effects of the offense that has distorted the market, 
resulting in fixing supra-competitive prices. The problem is to determine whether there 
is adequate causal link between the first and the second. 
 
6.2.2. The reference for a preliminary ruling of the Austrian Court 
 According to the Austrian Supreme court the causal link between the anti-
competitive conduct and the harm suffered by the plaintiff does not exist. The link was, 
in fact, interrupted by the act of the seller, who has freely established the selling price of 
the goods. The Austrian Court applied, in accordance with the Manfredi and Courage 
judgments
130
, its domestic statutory principles to decide above the existence of the 
causal link in the case at hand. The Supreme Court held that the continuity of the causal 
chain was interrupted by the sale made by a person operating outside the cartel 
agreement. In addition, for the Court the collusion would not be illegal with reference to 
the damage claimed. What is the standard of protection violated by the companies 
participating in the cartel, the Austrian Court questions? The referring court therefore 
asked to the Court of Justice whether Article 101 TFEU postulates an autonomous 
concept of adequate causation and wrongfulness that can overcome the domestic law, in 
order to recognize the right of the injured party to seek compensation for damages. 
 
6.2.3. Causation and umbrella effects  
The existence of a notion of causation of European law and its own legal 
definition independent of national legal traditions has long been questioned. The Court 
of Justice does not advance an idea so daring and indeed abstains from formulating a 
general principle of causation
131
. For the purpose of solving the case, it considers that, 
in spite of the doubts harboured by the national court, the assessment of causation 
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according to the national substantive law should be barred by the principle of 
effectiveness of European law
132
. If the national judge denies the right to compensation 
for lack of adequate legal causation under domestic law, the effectiveness of the 
prohibition of anticompetitive agreements would inevitably be compromised. A victim 
of anticompetitive behaviour (in the specific case Article 101 TFEU) would in fact be 
deprived of its right to claim damages. The Court observes in that regard that art.101 
TFEU gives the right to 'anyone' is aggrieved by an illegal agreement to ask for 
compensation of damages suffered. The wrongfulness of the conduct occurs, therefore, 
not only, as claimed by the Oberster Gerichtshof, with respect to damages caused to the 
direct buyers of the cartel, but also to other subjects, provided that the damage is 
causally linked to the behaviour and is foreseeable
133
. The Court also stated that the 
increase in the prices of alternative goods is a phenomenon that must certainly be 
foresaw by the cartelists
134
.  
Similarly, the causal chain is not interrupted by a decision taken ‘ad nutum’ by 
the non-cartelist, for the direct purchaser has determined the selling price based on the 
market price altered by the cartel
135
. It follows that the buyer of the distributor unrelated 
to the illegal agreement has the right to seek compensation for the damage caused by the 
overcharge just as the direct or indirect purchasers of the cartelists. 
 
6.2.4. On the application of national law  
The Austrian court had pointed out that the Manfredi judgment has been clear in 
stating that, in the absence of Community rules governing the matter, it is for the 
domestic legal system of each Member State to prescribe the detailed rules governing 
the exercise of the right to compensation. This includes also those rules governing the 
application of the concept of ‘causal relationship’, provided that the principles of 
                                                          
132
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equivalence and effectiveness are observed
136
. With its only (and laconic) response, the 
Court of Justice asserts the existence of a causal link, in the case of price umbrella, 
which can be defined independently of the domestic law of obligation, in accordance 
with the principle of effectiveness. The CJEU does not explain, however, this 
independent concept. In general, it can be drawn from the judgment the principle that, 
all the times the analysis of the causal link within the internal ordering principles 
induces the rejection of the claim for compensation for damage caused by an antitrust 
offense, the court must ask if the principle of effectiveness of European law has been 
infringed. From here the need to obtain a notion of causality independent from that 
deduced by interpretation of the national court, which excludes the application of 
Article 101 TFEU in case. 
6.2.5. Legal causation, consequential damages and the burden of proof  
The Court of Justice also requires the application of a principle of direct 
causality that, in spite of what is said, was never detailed by the Court’s case law137.  
The European legislator admits, in the recent Directive on damages claim, the 
lack of a common concept of legal causation and refers to the judgment Manfredi for a 
provisional solution
138
. This decision, being it equally vague, delegates to the national 
law of the Member States the definition of causation, with the sole limitations of the 
respect of the principles of equivalence
139
 and effectiveness
140
 of EU law
141
.  
The Court of Justice in its judgment considers necessary for the award of 
damages a prior verification that, given the peculiarities of the specific market, the 
agreement is likely to create a price umbrella in the market. Additionally, the CJEU 
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argues that this effect shall be expected by all cartelists. The Court avoids, however, to 
detail the burden to prove such circumstances in future similar cases.  
The attempt to harmonize the various positions adopted by domestic laws with 
respect to damages resulting from the umbrella effects, was then arrested on the ground 
of the burden of proof. It will be, therefore, up to the national courts to identify the rules 
applicable to it. According to a generally accepted principle amongst European 
jurisdictions in the field of non-contractual liability, the claimant bears the burden of 
proving whether the injury has been caused by the defendant's behaviour.  
The victim must then prove the existence of a cartel (in the case of stand-alone 
actions), the suitability of this cartel to create an umbrella effect on the market and the 
presence of a causal link between the unlawful behaviour and the damage.  
It might be objected that it is necessary for the claimant also to substantiate the 
causative link between the fact of the cartel and the increase in prices by the non-
colluding seller. This must be ruled out, first of all, based on what the Court says, since 
the judgement limits the burden of proof only on the suitability of the collusion to create 
an umbrella price and not also to its inflating effect on seller’s prices. Moreover, a 
careful examination of the causal link within the principles of national law reveals that 
the damage (i.e. the overcharge paid by the buyer) must be a probable consequence of 
the wrongful act, which is the anticompetitive agreement and not the sale made by the 
independent undertaking. Therefore, the claimant should not be asked to prove the 
behaviour of the seller in relation to the cartel, or that he had increased prices as a result 
of the anticompetitive agreement. In this regard, the claimant shall only prove the 
presence of a (potential) "price umbrella" created by the cartel, together with the 
circumstance that the prices imposed by the non-colluding seller are higher than the 
market standard price. However, this might form the basis of a further interpretative 
conundrum, prioritise again the use of econometric analysis before national courts.  The 
decision requires that the umbrella purchaser, in order to claim for damages, has to 
establish that “the cartel at issue was, in the circumstances of the case and, in 
particular, the specific aspects of the relevant market, liable to have the effect of 
umbrella pricing being applied by third parties acting independently, and that those 
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circumstances and specific aspects could not be ignored by the members of that 
cartel”142.  
In this perspective, it is also useful to refer to the presumption of cartel damage 
laid down in the Directive
143
. The rule does not define, however, or otherwise delimits 
such damages. With this presumption, therefore, the buyer of goods or services of 
colluding undertakings will have to prove only the extent of the injury and not the 
damage itself. It will be up to the defendants to substantiate the lack of direct causation 
between the agreement and the injury. In the case of umbrella pricing, however, the 
damage is induced and not caused directly by the cartel overcharge. Indeed, even the 
Court of Justice provides that it must first be established that the characteristics of the 
market concerned has made possible the application of a price umbrella. It must 
therefore be the claimant to demonstrate these market conditions. He will benefit from 
the presumption established in his favour when it is given sufficient justification of the 
adequacy of the cartel to influence market prices. At this point, based on an 
interpretation of the directive in conformity with the law in question, the presumption 
will play its role.  
A further aspect of the test, not clarified by the Court, is the quantification of the 
damage caused by umbrella pricing. The independent undertaking, in fact, does not 
necessarily apply an overcharge equal to the one imposed by the cartel. The proof of the 
quantum of damages appears therefore entrusted, in such cases, to complex economic 
arguments which will have to determine to what extent the non-colluding firm increased 
prices with reference to the market price. 
 
6.2.6. Umbrella actions following the Kone case  
The echo of the decision in Kone will certainly be heard in the years to come. 
The most important interpretative problems, however, have to be expected from 
possible attempts to apply by analogy a judgment that is written to be confined to the 
specific nature of the issue submitted to the Court.  
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The decision also brings to light a particularly thorny aspect of the application of 
national rights in private antitrust litigation. The European legal traditions provide 
statutory definitions of the different legal principles and institutions that are often very 
different from each other
144
. The approach followed so far, in order to pursue the 
convergence of these different standards, has been to deal with specific aspects of civil 
law separately. So did this time the Court in addressing the issue of causation in 
umbrella claims. The lack of an overall design, however, raises doubts about the 
effectiveness of an harmonization which bundles rules and decisions changing the 
systematic order of domestic civil laws, rather than promoting their comprehensive 
development.
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Conclusion 
Causation in competition law damages actions shows peculiarities that 
distinguish it from any other tort in civil law and common law countries. Antitrust 
damages claims are based on pure economic losses made compensable by the violation 
of statutorily protected interests (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU). The claims are therefore 
based on losses caused by distorted market dynamics which negatively affect the assets 
of undertakings or consumers operating in the same market. The wide range of subjects 
and heads of damages involved in this process makes the identification of the causal 
link a particularly difficult task for parties and judges. In confirmation of this, the 
empirical analysis of national case law suggests that claimants are often discouraged 
from bringing damages claims characterised by high causal uncertainty. 
The European Union courts have dealt with the issue of the causal link in 
numerous cases. Notwithstanding this, it is not possible to find in this case law the 
formulation of an independent principle of causation. By consequence, it is necessary to 
resort to the domestic antitrust laws and laws of obligations. At a theoretical level, the 
solutions laid down by national courts differ in many aspects. From a practical 
viewpoint, these differences are more important for parties that need to know how to 
substantiate and pose a question of fact or a question of law, rather than for the results 
they bring with the judicial decisions. In all countries analysed, the econometric 
analysis has abruptly ‘stolen the spotlight’ in the assessment of the causal nexus. 
However, while parties often erroneously confuse the proof of economic causality with 
the one of legal causation, judges rarely have fallen into the same mistake. The analysis 
of national case law shows that final judgements, albeit often heavily relying on the 
expert witnesses, generally establish the causative link between the infringement of 
competition law and the harm through logic inferences and functional interpretation of 
the rule infringed.  
In this regard, it is suggested that the counterfactual test, especially in its NESS 
formulation, shows optimal outcomes when the statement over the general causation 
does not automatically become an assumption and is always followed by the 
substantiation of the singular causal claim. Generalisations through probabilities may, in 
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some circumstances, justify the creation of ‘bespoke presumptions’, as in the case of the 
passing-on of price overcharges
1
. However, the adoption of an all-or-nothing approach 
shows its limits when the likeliness of a damage is close to a ‘turning point’. In other 
words, when the probability of a damage is close to 50% the judge has to decide 
whether to award damages or leave the possible harm without compensation. In these 
cases, the application of a causal proportional liability approach may be introduced, 
although none of the analysed jurisdictions adopts a similar approach for the time being. 
Similarly, the causal proportional approach may find application for the apportionment 
of liability among multiple tortfeasors and in conglomerates of companies deemed 
responsible altogether as a single economic entity, when the circumstances would bring 
to a rejection of the claim. 
The case law on the passing-on of the overcharge has shown that the diversity of 
approaches to the causal link does not impede to reach common aims established by EU 
law and the uniform interpretation of the function of competition law damages actions. 
The CJEU appear to be still reluctant to deep into such aspects of the private antitrust 
enforcement and the recent legislative interventions have put forward the same cautious 
approach. On the other hand, the European Commission seems more distracted by the 
ambitious objective of suggesting the convergence of domestic laws of obligations, at 
least to the extent it serves for the creation of a harmonised discipline for competition 
law damages actions. The actual situation, by contrast, creates incentives to regulatory 
competition among domestic laws of obligation and procedure that not necessarily 
deserves to be combated. The assessment of the causal nexus depends, especially in its 
second stage, on the clarification of the function and aims of the right to compensation 
for infringement of competition law rules. This theoretical underpinning, if duly 
elaborated, would benefit any regime. 
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